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Abstract 
 
Vicarious perception describes our ability to co-represent the experiences of others, by 
matching observed states onto representations of our own experience. For instance, 
seeing another person feel touch or pain elicits activity in regions associated with first-
hand touch and pain sensation, including somatosensory cortices. Vicarious touch and 
pain perception is thought to facilitate complex social processes such as empathy, and 
also shows substantial inter-individual variability. For a minority of people, a physical 
sensation of touch (mirror-touch synaesthesia) or pain (conscious vicarious pain) is felt 
on their own body when observing someone experience the same sensation. Current 
theory suggests increased excitability in somatosensory cortices may underlie conscious 
vicarious experience. Recently, broader impairments in self-other distinction have also 
been implicated. This thesis first attempted to modulate vicarious tactile perception with 
transcranial current stimulation targeted at somatosensory cortices or the right temporo-
parietal junction (linked to self-other control). A lack of modulation provided minimal 
support for either somatosensory excitability or self-other distinction accounts. 
Behaviourally, conscious vicarious pain responders and control participants did not 
significantly differ in self-other control abilities. Additional self-other distinction 
processes (beyond self-other control) were next considered. This revealed atypical 
bodily self-awareness in conscious vicarious pain responders. Lastly, perception of 
animacy was modulated by stimulus and perceiver variability, but did not significantly 
differ between mirror-touch synaesthetes and controls, providing implications for 
vicarious perception from inanimate stimuli. Collectively, this thesis highlights broader 
impairments involved in conscious vicarious perception, and the importance of the 
sense of bodily self-awareness for social perception and interaction in typical adults. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a review of existing literature on two crucial processes for social 
interaction: vicarious perception and self-other distinction. Firstly, research is 
discussed regarding vicarious perception of touch and pain. Secondly, several 
processes involved in self-other distinction are discussed, with a specific consideration 
of how these processes may contribute to vicarious perception. A summary of current 
research on conscious vicarious perception, including mirror-touch synaesthesia and 
conscious vicarious pain, is also provided, with an emphasis on the possibility of 
atypical self-other distinction mechanisms in these extreme cases. The primary aims of 
this thesis will be to further examine self-other distinction processes and their potential 
contribution to vicarious experiences of touch and pain.  
 
1.1 Vicarious perception of touch and pain in neurotypical adults 
 
Vicarious perception refers to the ability to co-represent the experiences of other 
people by matching the observed state onto representations of our own first-hand 
experience. While vicarious perception has been extensively studied in the action 
domain, vicarious touch and pain has only gained attention in recent years (Gillmeister, 
Bowling, Rigato & Banissy, 2017; Lamm & Majdandžić, 2015). Vicarious tactile 
perception and nociception forms a particularly important field of study, since 
representing others’ sensory experience is crucial to facilitate complex social processes 
such as affective understanding and empathy, and as such allows individuals to form 
social bonds (Bird & Viding, 2014). Accurately perceiving and representing others’ 
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sensory experiences is also thought to be important for developing and maintaining a 
stable sense of our own bodily self (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Adler, Schabinger, 
Michal, Beutel & Gillmeister, 2016). 
Functional neuroimaging studies over the past decade have repeatedly shown 
that brain regions associated with experiencing touch on one’s own body are also 
activated by passively observing touch to another person, indicating a process of 
somatosensory mirroring. Overlapping regions of activity have been reported in both 
primary (SI) and secondary (SII) somatosensory cortex in several functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies (e.g., Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith & Ward, 2005; 
Ebisch et al., 2008; Holle, Banissy, & Ward, 2013; Keysers et al., 2004; Kuehn, 
Mueller, Turner & Schütz-Bosbach, 2014; Schaefer, Heinz & Rotte, 2012). 
Electroencephalography (EEG) studies also show modulation of somatosensory-evoked 
potential (SEP) components in response to a tactile stimulus, when concurrently 
observing touch to another person (e.g., Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo & Aglioti, 
2007; Deschrijver, Wiersema & Brass, 2016; Martínez-Jauand et al., 2012). Studies 
using methods of non-invasive brain stimulation provide further support for 
somatosensory representations of observed touch. Repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS) targeted at SI specifically impairs visual detection of touch to 
another person’s hand, compared with touch to an object (e.g., Bolognini, Rossetti, 
Maravita and Miniussi, 2011; Rossetti, Miniussi, Maravita & Bolognini, 2012). Further 
studies by Bologini and colleagues (Bolognini, Miniussi, Gallo & Vallar, 2013; 
Bolognini, Rossetti, Fusaro, Vallar & Miniussi, 2014) have also indicated that this 
region may be involved in the conscious vicarious perception of touch (i.e., mirror-
touch synaesthesia, but see section 1.3 and Bowling & Banissy, In Press). 
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In the case of painful touch, it is important to consider the negative affective 
consequences of the sensation. The neural network involved in the first-hand processing 
of pain, known as the pain matrix, comprises regions associated with both the sensory 
(including SI, SII) and affective (including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior 
insula (AI)) components of pain (Ingvar, 1999). Vicarious activity in areas representing 
the affective experience of pain, including the AI and ACC, has been found fairly 
consistently, across different experimental paradigms. For instance, vicarious affective 
response has been recorded from a cue that another person is receiving pain (e.g., Bird 
et al, 2010), and others’ facial expressions of pain (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2005; Budell, 
Jackson & Rainville, 2010), as well as directly viewing the painful event (e.g., Lamm, 
Meltzoff & Decety, 2010). Rütgen, Seidel, Riečanský and Lamm (2015) suggest that 
this vicarious affective pain response involves neural mechanisms that are at least 
partially functionally equivalent to first-hand experience of pain. In this study placebo 
analgesia reduced amplitudes of P2 ERP components related not only to self-pain, but 
also to others’ pain. This effect was supported by decreased self-reported empathy in the 
analgesia condition. 
Studies using EEG and magnetoencephalography (MEG) provide some evidence 
for the involvement of somatosensory regions in vicarious pain representations. Similar 
to effects of observed touch, these studies have demonstrated increased amplitude of 
SEP components (Bufalari et al., 2007; Martínez-Jauand et al., 2012) when observing 
pain. In addition, increased somatosensory resonance, indexed by mu rhythm 
suppression (Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee & Decety, 2008; Yang, Decety, Lee, Chen & 
Cheng, 2009), and synchronisation between sensory and motor cortices (Betti, 
Zappasodi, Rossini, Aglioti & Tecchio, 2009) has been found for observing other-pain 
compared with no pain. Viewing a painful stimulus to another person’s body is also 
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associated with corticospinal inhibition (examined using motor-evoked potentials 
(MEPs) induced by TMS) specific to the same muscle as the location of the observed 
painful stimulus (e.g., Avenanti, Bueti, Galati & Aglioti, 2005). While fMRI studies 
also provide some evidence for activation of somatosensory cortex when observing 
others in pain (e.g., Lamm et al., 2010; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff & Decety, 2007) a 
recent meta-analysis of fMRI data from 32 studies comparing activation for self- and 
other-pain found that this effect is not consistent (Lamm, Decety & Singer, 2011). In 
this analysis, common activation in regions associated with sensory processing of pain 
was found, but was limited to studies which had used visual images of painful events, 
rather than cues that another person was experiencing pain. With these studies in mind, 
there appears to be some evidence that regions associated with sensory processing do 
have a role to play in vicarious perception of pain. 
Neuroanatomical evidence provides potential pathways by which visual input 
may be integrated with somatosensory information, and subsequently modulate activity 
in somatosensory cortex. In monkeys, Brodmann area 2 (a subdivision of SI) contains 
afferent and efferent connections with regions of the intraparietal sulcus, (particularly 
the ventral intraparietal area, VIP; Lewis & Van Essen, 2000) and with the inferior 
parietal lobule (specifically areas PF/PFG; Pandya & Seltzer, 1982). Both regions also 
receive input from visual cortex (Anderson, Asanuma, Essick & Siegel, 1990; Maunsell 
& Van Essen, 1983), providing candidate regions for where visual and somatosensory 
information are integrated in humans (Banati, Goerres, Tjoa, Aggleton & Grasby, 
1999). Notably, single neurons in VIP have been shown to be activated by visual 
observation as well as the direct experience of touch (Ishida, Nakajima, Inase & Murata, 
2010). Moreover, SII also contains indirect pathways with visual cortex, via reciprocal 
connections with VIP (Lewis & Van Essen, 2000) and IPL (Rozzi et al., 2006). As such, 
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the cortical connections described above provide a pathway by which somatosensory 
cortices may be vicariously activated by the mere observation of touch or pain. 
 One region implicated in mediating somatosensory responses to observed 
stimuli is the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The TPJ refers to the area of the cortex 
covering the point at which the posterior temporal gyrus meets the parietal lobes. 
Within the literature there has not been complete consensus regarding the anatomical 
boundaries of the TPJ, since it does not map on to specific anatomical landmarks 
(Schurz, Tholen, Perner, Mars & Sallet, 2017), or indeed whether it should be 
considered as one unified region. Typically, the TPJ is considered to include regions of 
the angular gyrus (AG) and supramarginal gyrus (SMG), which correspond to areas 
PF/PFG of the IPL (Carter & Huettel, 2013). As discussed above, these neighbouring 
regions are thought to be involved in integrating multimodal (including visual and 
tactile) stimuli. Mars and colleagues (2012) propose a three-cluster structure to the TPJ, 
reporting that direct structural connections with somatosensory-related areas are found 
mostly in anterior regions of the TPJ. Connections were found with the postcentral 
gyrus (SI) as well as anterior insula (AI), which contains tactile receptive fields 
(Olausson et al., 2002) and further direct connections with primary and secondary 
somatosensory cortex (Mufson & Mesulam, 1982). Afferent connections with SI/SII 
provide a pathway by which mechanisms involved at the TPJ (discussed further in 
section 1.2) may mediate subsequent somatosensory activity. Consistent with this, 
lesions to the TPJ result in marked reductions in somatosensory-evoked potentials over 
(Yamaguchi & Knight, 1991), supporting a role in tactile processing. 
Overlapping regions of activity in response to the experience or observation of 
touch and pain has given rise to speculation of somatosensory-related mirror-systems 
that respond to both own and others’ touch and pain sensations (Keysers, Kaas & 
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Gazzola, 2010), based on evidence of mirror neurons for action (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 1992) and touch (Ishida et al., 2010) in monkeys. While 
studies using fMRI methods can show overlapping activity in the same regions of the 
brain, they cannot provide evidence for specific mirror neurons, since each voxel can 
cover hundreds or thousands of neurons. At present only minimal direct evidence 
suggests that shared representations do reflect the activity of mirror neuron networks 
rather than separate networks within the same brain regions. Single cell recordings in 
awake participants have identified neurons that respond during the observation and 
execution of actions (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni & Fried, 2010) as well as 
neurons in the ACC that respond to both the observation and experience of pain 
(Hutchison, Davis, Lozano, Tasker & Dostrovsky, 1999). In addition, Coll, Bird, 
Catmur and Press (2015) provide EEG evidence for a tactile-specific mirror system. In 
this study mu rhythm attenuation was observed over sensorimotor cortex following the 
observation and experience of touch, indicating vicarious activity during observation. 
Crucially, this attenuation was reduced when an observed or felt stimulus was repeated, 
either in the same or the other modality. This suggests that the same neural networks 
were employed for both types of stimulus, therefore indicating the involvement of 
tactile mirror systems. However, contrasting results from multivariate pattern analysis 
of fMRI data suggest that there are distinct neural signatures involved in perceiving own 
and others’ pain (Krishnan et al., 2016). Further evidence is needed to provide 
convincing support for tactile mirror systems, and their potential involvement in 
vicarious perception.  
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1.1.1 Individual variability in vicarious perception of touch and pain 
Several individual difference factors have been associated with variability in 
vicarious perception of touch and pain. In the case of pain, trait differences related to 
the perception of threat may be of relevance. Evidence of localised motor inhibition in 
response to observed pain indicates that vicarious perception may be important for 
predicting and preparing for potential harm to the self (e.g., Avenanti et al., 2005; 
Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari & Aglioti, 2006; Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari 
& Aglioti, 2009). Moreover, when observed pain is perceived as intentionally caused by 
another agent rather than accidental, stronger connectivity is observed between the 
amygdala and medial orbitofrontal cortex (Akitsuki & Decety, 2009). Connectivity 
between these regions has previously been associated with perceiving social threat 
(Coccaro, McCloskey, Fitzgerald & Phan, 2007). Ochsner and colleagues (2008) report 
an association between high trait anxiety and increased activity in rostral lateral 
prefrontal cortex in response to observed other-pain. The authors interpret this 
association as increased vigilance to potential threat in highly anxious individuals. In 
line with this assertion, scores on the pain vigilance and awareness questionnaire, a self-
report measure of hypervigilance to pain (McCracken, 1997) have been found to 
modulate conscious vicarious pain perception (Vandenbroucke et al., 2013; 
Vandenbroucke, Bardi, Lamm & Goubert, 2016; see section 1.3). However, this 
association has not been consistently found in subsequent studies (Vandenbroucke, 
Crombez, Loeys & Goubert, 2014; Vandenbroucke, Crombez, Loeys & Goubert, 2015). 
Ward and Banissy (2017) also highlight that we cannot disentangle cause and effect 
regarding these factors, whether traits such as anxiety or hypervigilance to pain 
contribute to vicarious perception, or heightened vicarious perception leads to increased 
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anxiety or vigilance to pain. Further work is therefore needed to establish the role of 
these traits in vicarious pain perception. 
Alexithymia has also been associated with reduced vicarious response to seeing 
others in pain (Bird et al., 2010). Alexithymia refers to a difficulty identifying and 
describing emotions, as well as a tendency to reduce emotional experiences and focus 
attention externally (Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994). Bird and colleagues show a 
negative correlation between self-reported alexithymia and activity in the AI when a cue 
indicated that their partner would receive a painful electric shock, indicating a reduced 
vicarious affective response in alexithymics. Given that the AI has previously been 
linked with monitoring own internal bodily states (see section 1.2.2), this evidence has 
led to the suggestion that common neural networks underlie affective and bodily 
representations of the self and others. 
Regarding tactile perception, Schaefer, Rotte, Heinze and Denke (2013) find an 
association between vicarious touch response and conscientiousness. Conscientiousness 
is a ‘Big Five’ trait referring to a disciplined, organised and achievement-orientated 
personality (McCrae & Costa, 1987). In this study higher self-reported 
conscientiousness was associated with reduced insula activation when viewing touch to 
a hand. The authors speculate that the relation with conscientiousness in this case may 
reflect the ability to inhibit the observed tactile stimulation in order to maintain a sense 
of self (see section 1.2.3).  
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1.1.2 The role of vicarious representations in empathy 
The wealth of evidence regarding mechanisms of vicarious perception gained 
over the last decade has led to interest in the extent to which these contribute to the 
experience of empathy. To address this question it is important to define what we 
understand empathy to be. Most conceptions of empathy in recent research comprise an 
affective and a cognitive component. The affective component involves an emotional 
state which is isomorphic to and elicited by the emotional state of another person (de 
Vignemont and Singer, 2006). Importantly, this defines empathy as a process of feeling 
as the other, rather than feeling for the other, thus distinguishing the concept of empathy 
from related processes such as sympathy. The cognitive component pertains to the 
understanding of that other person’s mental state, commonly referred to as perspective-
taking, mentalizing, or theory of mind. This component separates empathy from 
emotion contagion, which usually refers to the pure affective mirroring of the other’s 
state, without the self-other distinction necessary to acknowledge the other person as the 
source of that affective state (Bird & Viding, 2014; Lockwood, 2016).  
Collected evidence indicating that passive observation of others’ sensory 
experience can elicit neural activity similar to that involved in representing first-hand 
experience, particularly in regions involved in affective representation such as the AI 
and ACC, provides support for a simulation theory of empathy (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Preston & de Waal, 2002). This line of argument follows the discovery of motor 
mirror neurons, which fire when either performing an action or viewing another 
individual perform the same action, and have been implicated in understanding others’ 
goal-directed actions (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 1992). 
Simulation accounts suggest that similar mirroring mechanisms underlie the 
understanding of others’ mental states, and elicit the isomorphic affective state defined 
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by de Vignemont and Singer (2006). However, at present there is little direct evidence 
either that shared representations actually reflect mirror neuron activity, or that these 
contribute to empathy (see Lamm & Majdandžić, 2015).  
Various studies into vicarious perception of touch and pain have identified links 
with self-reported empathy. Sensorimotor responses to observed pain (observable as 
attenuation of MEPs) are greater for individuals with higher trait cognitive empathy 
(Avenanti et al., 2009), as indicated on the perspective-taking and fantasy subscales of 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1980). Cheng and colleagues (2008) also 
demonstrate greater mu suppression (indicative of somatosensory resonance) in 
response to observed pain in individuals with higher perspective-taking scores. 
Extending this link the tactile domain, Martínez-Jauand and colleagues (2012) show 
that higher perspective-taking is also associated with greater amplification of SEPs 
when observing either touch or pain. Schaefer and colleagues (2012) also find a positive 
correlation between perspective-taking scores and vicarious activity in SI when viewing 
non-painful touch to another hand. In contrast with perspective-taking, the personal 
distress subscale of the IRI (reflecting the self-focused affective component of empathy) 
is associated with reduced vicarious sensorimotor response (Avenanti et al., 2009), but 
shows a positive correlation with activity at the right AI and the ACC (Vistoli, Achim, 
Lavoie & Jackson, 2016) when observing pain, providing further support for the 
involvement of these regions in affective representations of pain. 
Recent theories of empathy incorporate vicarious representations as one set of 
mechanisms contributing to a highly complex process. For instance, Bird and Viding 
(2014) suggest that automatic mirroring may contribute to emotion contagion aspects of 
empathy. The authors also highlight a key role for self-other control in this model, 
positing that a self-other switch allows attention to be biased towards the affective state 
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of the other individual, to inform understanding and empathic response. This may also 
be necessary to reduce excessive personal distress elicited by the situation in order to 
empathise effectively with another’s mental state. For instance, medical professionals 
appear to be able to down-regulate their vicarious response, as indicated by reduced 
vicarious activations in both sensory and affective regions of the pain matrix (Cheng et 
al., 2007), as well as reduced ERP responses to others’ pain (Decety, Yang & Cheng, 
2010). De Guzman and colleagues (2016) showed that training the ability to control 
representations of self and other improved the ability to inhibit automatic imitation of 
others’ actions when required, but also increased vicarious perception of others’ pain 
and self-reported empathy. An alternative account of the observed link between 
vicarious perception and empathy could be provided by this self-other control switch, 
where a bias towards the other over the self may enhance both vicarious perception and 
empathy; rather than vicarious perception contributing to empathy directly. The role of 
self-other distinction in vicarious perception is discussed further in section 1.2. 
 
1.2 Processes of self-other distinction 
 
1.2.1 Perception of animacy 
One vital perceptual process for social interaction is distinguishing between 
what is ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ (see Meltzoff, 2007). This involves the accurate 
distinction of animate (i.e., living beings capable of independent actions, thoughts, and 
emotions) human faces and bodies from inanimate objects in our environment. Looser 
and Wheatley (2010) propose a two-stage ‘fast and slow’ process to animacy perception 
from faces. This involves an initial, rapid categorisation to allow allocation of resources 
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to human face stimuli, observable as the N170 component. This initial stage is thought 
to be prone to errors, providing an account of the phenomenon of pareidolia, in which 
faces are perceived in face-like patterns or objects; such as plug sockets, cars or pieces 
of toast. The second stage, occurring at least 400ms from onset, involves a more 
conservative decision process (Wheatley, Weinberg, Looser, Moran & Hajcak, 2011). 
This highly accurate stage of processing may contribute to the “uncanny valley” theory 
(Mori, 1970), which describes the unpleasant, eerie feeling experienced with very 
lifelike inanimate faces, such as dolls or CGI animations. Looser, Guntupalli and 
Wheatley (2013) suggest that this process of animacy detection allows additional mental 
resources to be allocated to enhance the processing of animate agents. 
In order to study perception of animacy, previous research has used face stimuli 
that are morphed between humans and dolls. These studies have identified the point 
along the continuum from doll to human at which we first perceive animacy, which 
consistently falls around 56-68% animate (Balas, 2013; Balas & Horski, 2012; Hackel, 
Looser & Van Bavel, 2014; Looser & Wheatley, 2010). This judgement of animacy can 
be modulated by the social identity of the stimulus face (e.g., Hackel et al., 2014; 
Swiderska, Krumhuber and Kappas, 2012), with out-group faces less likely to be 
perceived as animate than in-group faces, which may reflect a bias towards greater 
motivation for social interaction with the in-group than the out-group (Hackel et al., 
2014). Stimulus gender (e.g., Balas, 2013) is another factor influencing perception of 
animacy, with female faces less likely to be perceived as animate than male. These 
findings have led to speculation that dehumanisation of women may influence animacy 
perception from faces (Balas, 2013), however, no there is currently no evidence to 
support this assertion over a purely perceptual account. Individual differences in the 
observer, as well as the stimulus, have been found to affect animacy detection, including 
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the desire for social connection. Powers, Worsham, Freeman, Wheatley and Heatherton 
(2014) report that scores on the Need to Belong scale (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell & 
Schreindorfer, 2013) correlate with animacy perception thresholds, where animacy is 
perceived more readily by individuals with a greater desire for social acceptance. 
Additionally, inducing feelings of social disconnection was found to lower the threshold 
for perceiving animacy, compared with a socially connected induction. These findings 
may reflect an adaptive strategy for individuals who feel socially isolated, where 
perceiving animacy more readily increases the likelihood of the desired social 
interaction. Collectively, the evidence regarding stimulus and perceiver variability in the 
perception of animacy provides further support for the importance of this categorisation 
process in enabling effective social interaction.  
The perception of animacy is thought to modulate vicarious perception of touch 
and pain. Previous research has demonstrated specificity of behavioural and neural 
responses for observed touch and pain to animate human bodies and to inanimate 
objects (Avenanti et al., 2005; Bolognini et al., 2013; Costantini, Galati, Romani & 
Aglioti, 2008), providing support for the notion that vicarious representations of other 
humans’ sensory experiences may act as a mechanism for social cognition and empathy 
(see section 1.1.2). However, since these studies have typically used inanimate stimuli 
which do not visually resemble human body parts; it is unclear whether the different 
response patterns are related to stimulus differences in animacy, or in visual form. 
Recent work has provided some contribution to this question in other domains. For 
instance, motor priming from observation of others’ actions is greater when that other is 
perceived as animate (Liepelt & Brass, 2010); and sensorimotor action observation 
networks show greater activity when observing an animate human form compared with 
inanimate (see Press, 2011 for a review). Animacy has also been found to modulate 
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person perception and activity in mentalizing networks (Cross, Ramsey, Liepelt, Prinz 
& Hamilton, 2016), indicating a role in social cognition more broadly. While less 
research in direct relation to vicarious tactile perception has been conducted, 
Deschrijver, Wiersema and Brass (2015) show modulation of both early and late SEP 
components in response to a tactile stimulus on the finger while viewing the tapping 
finger of a wooden hand compared with a real human hand, indicating that vicarious 
somatosensory representations are associated with a process of distinguishing other 
animate agents with the capacity for physical sensation from inanimate objects. 
However, further research and replication is needed to establish the importance of 
animacy perception in modulating vicarious touch and pain. 
 
1.2.2 Bodily self-awareness 
In order to correctly distinguish between the self and other, it is necessary to 
maintain a stable and coherent sense of self. Interoception refers to the awareness of our 
own internal bodily states (Brewer, Cook & Bird, 2016), and makes an important 
contribution to bodily self-awareness. Interoception has frequently been linked to 
insular cortex, so much so that this region is often referred to as the ‘interoceptive 
cortex’ (Craig, 2003, 2009, Critchley, 2005). Much of recent research has focused on 
interoceptive accuracy (sometimes referred to as interoceptive sensitivity), the ability to 
correctly monitor internal states such as heartbeats (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki and 
Critchley, 2015). Reduced interoceptive accuracy is associated with greater 
susceptibility to illusions of body ownership over external objects, including the rubber-
hand illusion (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez & Costantini, 2011) and enfacement illusion 
(Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014). An accurate awareness of internal bodily states 
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therefore appears to contribute to self-other distinction in body ownership, maintaining 
a strong sense of one’s own body. Interoceptive accuracy is also associated with the 
ability to control representations of self and other in the motor domain. Ainley, Brass 
and Tsakiris (2014) report that individuals with higher interoceptive accuracy show 
greater interference effects on an imitation-inhibition task, which requires participants 
to enhance self-relevant while inhibiting other-relevant representations. Similar 
difficulty on this task is found for individuals with conscious vicarious perception of 
touch (Santiesteban, Bird, Tew, Cioffi & Banissy, 2015; see section 1.3). Interoception 
therefore appears to be an important factor in self-other distinction processes, 
potentially impacting on vicarious perception. Continued research is required to clarify 
the mechanisms underlying this contribution in different domains. 
Depersonalisation occurs when there is a sense of detachment from the bodily 
self (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As shown for individuals with low 
interoceptive accuracy, higher levels of depersonalisation are also associated with 
greater susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion (Kanayama, Sato & Ohira, 2009). This 
indicates a potential impairment in self-other distinction in individuals with 
depersonalisation, and so further highlights the importance of bodily self-awareness for 
self-other distinction processes. Adler and colleagues (2016) provide evidence for the 
role of bodily self-awareness in vicarious perception. In this study early SEP 
components distinguished images of the participant’s own face being touched (P45) 
from another face (N80), and later components (P200) were attenuated in the own-face 
condition compared with the other-face. This self-other distinction in vicarious 
somatosensory response was not present for individuals with high levels of 
depersonalisation. The sense of bodily self-awareness may then be important for 
accurate self-other distinction in the vicarious perception of touch.  
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1.2.3 Self-other control 
A number of key social processes require the online control and manipulation of 
self-relevant and other-relevant representations. The temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) has 
been implicated in several such tasks, including, but not limited to, visual perspective 
taking (Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen & Ladurner, 2006), theory of mind, or 
mentalizing (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Völlm et al., 2006), control of imitation (Brass, 
Ruby & Spengler, 2009) and empathy (Völlm et al., 2006). Right hemisphere TPJ 
(rTPJ) specifically shows greater activation when focusing on representations of others 
than representations of the self (Ruby & Decety, 2004). Studies using transcranial 
direct-current stimulation (tDCS) provide evidence that increasing excitability of rTPJ 
enhances performance on tasks requiring self-other control (Santiesteban, Banissy, 
Catmur & Bird, 2012; Hogeveen et al., 2015). It therefore seems likely that rTPJ plays a 
role in directing attention to the self or the other where appropriate. 
In addition to regions of the pain matrix associated with affective and sensory 
components of pain processing, fMRI studies of vicarious pain perception have 
identified activity in regions associated with representing mental states of the self and 
others, including the TPJ (see Lamm et al., 2011 for a meta-analysis). The TPJ appears 
to be most strongly activated when others’ pain is represented by an abstract cue rather 
than an image of the painful event, indicating that this region may be involved with 
inferring the mental states of others. Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff and Decety (2006) 
provide some further evidence regarding the role of the TPJ in vicarious perception. In 
this study participants were shown images of hands and feet in painful situations, and 
increased activity was detected at the TPJ when participants imagined that the pain was 
occurring to another person, compared with imagining themselves. Vistoli and 
colleagues (2016) report similar effects, adding that this difference was found only 
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when stimuli were presented in a first-person rather than third-person perspective. 
Increased activity at TPJ may then reflect self-other control mechanisms required to 
enhance other-relevant representations, necessary to resolve the conflict between visual 
cues towards the self (i.e., first-person perspective) and the instruction cueing the 
participant to imagine another person. Most recently, Coll, Tremblay and Jackson 
(2017) report a reduction in the subjective perception of others’ pain, in addition to a 
reduction in amplitude of late ERP components related to perceiving facial expressions 
of pain, following cathodal (inhibitory) tDCS over rTPJ. The functional relevance of the 
TPJ in these studies indicates the involvement of self-other control mechanisms in 
vicarious perception. De Guzman and colleagues (2016) have directly explored the role 
of self-other control (i.e., the ability to enhance or suppress representations of the self or 
other according to task demands) in modulating vicarious perception. This study found 
that training the ability to control self–other representations can enhance vicarious pain 
perception, as shown by a greater decrease in MEPs when viewing others in pain, and 
improved ability to control imitation. Taken together, the evidence provides support for 
the self-other control processes and the recruitment of the TPJ in vicarious perception of 
touch and pain. 
However, recent models have suggested a more domain-general function of the 
TPJ. Cook (2014) proposes that previous findings indicating involvement of the TPJ in 
self-other control may in fact reflect control over task-relevant and irrelevant stimuli. In 
support of this, increased activity in the TPJ is also observed during non-social 
attentional reorienting tasks (Mitchell, 2008). Anatomical evidence is provided by 
Nicolle and colleagues (2012), who identify a ventral-dorsal organisation in temporo-
parietal cortex according to task relevance, where ventral regions were associated more 
with task-relevant, and dorsal regions with task-irrelevant representations, irrespective 
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of whether these corresponded to self- or other-focused decision making. The TPJ, 
which corresponds to the ventral portion of the TPC may therefore be involved in 
facilitating representations of task-relevant over irrelevant information, rather than 
representations of the self over others. Previous evidence regarding the involvement of 
the TPJ in self-other control can be reinterpreted in light of this model. For instance, 
Santiesteban and colleagues (2012) demonstrate enhancement of self-relevant 
representations on an imitation-inhibition task and other-relevant representations on a 
perspective-taking task following anodal stimulation of rTPJ with tDCS. While one 
interpretation could conclude an improvement in self-other control, it must be noted that 
in both cases the task-relevant representation was enhanced, and therefore increasing 
excitability of rTPJ may in fact lead to a domain-general facilitatory effect on task-
relevant representations.  
Carter and Huettel’s (2013) ‘nexus model’ provides some potential 
reconciliation of these two accounts, proposing that the convergence of multimodal 
representations (to include perception, memory, attention, and language as well as social 
processing) within spatially differentiable but overlapping regions of the TPJ establishes 
social context for behaviour. For instance, the TPJ has been identified as a core region 
within a ventral attention network, involved in stimulus-directed reorienting of attention 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Recent models suggest that the TPJ may also be involved 
in communicating between ventral and dorsal networks (engaged in goal-directed 
attention), allowing goal-directed attention to be interrupted to reorient towards a salient 
stimulus (Carter & Huettel, 2013; Corbetta, Patel and Shulman; 2008). This integration 
of modalities appears to be primarily relevant to social interactions. TPJ activity, for 
instance, has been shown to predict behaviour in an online poker game, when playing 
against opponents deemed to be competent (i.e. in situations which require complex 
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representations of others’ behaviour as well as one’s own; Carter, Bowling, Reeck and 
Huettel, 2008). Altogether, this evidence can account for the involvement of the TPJ in 
non-social activities (i.e. attentional reorienting), but supports the overarching function 
of establishing social context based on these multimodal inputs. Considering the 
functional role of the TPJ in self-other control, Carter and Huettel’s model therefore 
proposes that multiple inputs are integrated within the TPJ in order to enhance or 
suppress representations of the self or others according to task demands. 
 
1.2.4 Self-other similarity 
In further support of the importance of self-other distinction processes for 
vicarious perception, self-other similarity in the visual perspective of a stimulus has 
been found to modulate both vicarious touch and pain (Bach, Fenton-Adams & Tipper, 
2014; Vandenbroucke et al., 2015). In these studies touch or pain observed to hands 
from a first-person perspective facilitated tactile detection of a stimulus on the 
participant’s own hand, compared with the same stimulus viewed from a third-person 
perspective. Further, Canizales, Voisin, Michon, Roy and Jackson (2013) demonstrate 
greater modulation of somatosensory steady-state response when observing pain from a 
first-person compared with a third-person perspective. Mahayana and colleagues (2014) 
extend this evidence to show that vicarious perception of pain is modulated by whether 
the body part is seen close to the participant’s own body (i.e., in peripersonal space) or 
further away. In this study a greater reduction of MEPs was found when viewing others’ 
pain in near, peripersonal space than in far space. The behavioural and neural effects of 
visual perspective found across these studies suggests that vicarious perception can be 
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reduced by enhancing self-other distinction between the observer and the person 
experiencing touch or pain.  
Furthermore, manipulating contextual self-other similarity has been shown to 
influence vicarious perception of touch and pain. For instance, vicarious affective 
responses to pain, indicated in autonomic responses and subjective reports, are 
enhanced when the pain occurs to a hand which is imitating the participant’s own 
movements (De Coster, Verschuere, Goubert, Tsakiris & Brass, 2013). Self-other 
similarity manipulations relevant to social group membership also affect both vicarious 
affective and sensorimotor responses to pain. Viewing a painful stimulus delivered to 
another person is associated with greater reduction in amplitude of motor-evoked 
potentials as well as greater activation of AI (Azevedo et al., 2013) when the person 
receiving pain is of the same race as the perceiver. A similar increase in AI activity can 
be found for observed pain of individuals who support the same football team, 
compared with a rival team (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson & Singer, 2010). 
Regarding vicarious touch, Serino and colleagues have demonstrated that viewing 
synchronous touch while being touched on one’s own face improves tactile perception 
in the same location, compared with viewing asynchronous touch. This effect was 
strongest when participants viewed touch on their own face compared with another face 
(Serino, Pizzoferrato & Làdavas, 2008; Cardini, Tajadura-Jiménez, Serino & Tsakiris, 
2010) and for the face of another person of the same race or political affiliation as the 
participant, compared with other racial or political groups (Serino, Giovagnoli & 
Làdavas, 2009). It appears then, that similarity between self and other enhances both 
affective and sensory vicarious representations. 
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1.2.5 Summary of self-other distinction processes in vicarious perception  
Given the multiple sources of evidence discussed above suggesting that 
vicarious perception is enhanced when it is more difficult to distinguish between self 
and other, it has been suggested that previously reported vicarious somatosensory 
activity in response to touch and pain (see section 1.1) may reflect a misidentification 
with the viewed body that is not one’s own. This may occur because typically used 
body parts in these experiments (e.g., hands, arms) are not as distinctive as the face, and 
so may appear very similar to the participant’s own body. Body parts are also 
commonly presented in near-space, in a first-person position, while the participants’ 
own body parts are hidden, which may further promote the other body part to be 
attributed to the self. In many EEG studies, simultaneous tactile stimulation will also be 
delivered, creating additional self-other similarity which may elicit a sense of ownership 
over the viewed body part (Schaefer et al., 2006; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
Collectively, these factors may lead to identification with the body part at early stages 
of somatosensory processing (Gillmeister et al., 2017). 
 
1.3 Mirror-touch synaesthesia and conscious vicarious pain 
 
1.3.1 Prevalence and characteristics  
As discussed in section 1.1, while typical adults show vicarious somatosensory 
activation and physiological responses to others’ experiences of touch and pain, the 
majority do not experience a conscious sensation on their own body from pure 
observation. For those with mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS), an automatic and 
involuntary first-hand tactile sensation is experienced in response to observed touch 
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(Ward & Banissy, 2015). The prevalence of MTS is estimated at 1.6%; however, self-
reported prevalence is much higher, at around 10.8% (Banissy et al., 2009). The 
estimate of 1.6% refers to participants that objectively differ to control participants on a 
visuotactile interference test designed to verify the authenticity of MTS (Banissy & 
Ward, 2007). In this task participants are required to report the location of a tactile 
stimulus on their own body while observing another person being touched. The tactile 
stimulus can either be spatially congruent or incongruent with the location of 
synaesthetic induced touch (i.e., the location where the individual reporting MTS claims 
to experience a sensation when observing touch). Compared with controls, MTS 
participants typically make more errors and show a greater congruency effect in their 
responses. This indicates that the observed touch generates a tactile sensation on the 
synaesthetes body that feels similar to first-hand tactile experience, leading to greater 
interference. Congruency effects on the visuotactile interference task are consistent with 
inter-individual differences within the MTS group. For instance, Banissy and Ward 
(2007; see also White & Aimola Davies, 2012) identify two contrasting spatial 
reference frames in MTS: anatomical (e.g., the synaesthete reports a sensation of touch 
on their own left cheek when observing another person being touched on the left cheek) 
and mirrored (e.g., the synaesthete reports touch on the right cheek when observing 
another person being touched on the left cheek, mapping to the same side of the body as 
if looking in a mirror). Individuals with a mirrored MTS show congruency effects under 
a mirrored frame of reference on the visuotactile interference task, while individuals 
with an anatomical MTS show congruency effects under an anatomical frame of 
reference.  
In addition to vicarious touch, conscious vicarious perception of pain (also 
known as mirror-pain synaesthesia) has been reported from observing a painful stimulus 
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to another person. A prevalence rate of 33-34% is reported for conscious vicarious pain 
in healthy individuals, although this figure is based on fairly liberal cut-offs 
(Giummarra et al., 2015; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010). In a recent study, Grice-Jackson, 
Critchley, Banissy & Ward (2017) used a cluster analysis method to classify individuals 
conscious vicarious responders on the basis of self-reported responses to video stimuli. 
The study supports previous estimates, reporting a prevalence of around 31%. The 
authors also identify further sub-categories of conscious vicarious pain responders. 
These comprised a Sensory-Localised responder group who tended to use sensory 
descriptors to describe their experience, and report that it was localised to the same 
body part as the observed pain (estimated prevalence 19%) and an Affective-
Generalised group who used more affective descriptors and reported a more generalised 
bodily sensation (estimated prevalence 12%).  
Prevalence rates of MTS are based on individuals that show conscious vicarious 
tactile sensations in response to other human bodies being touched. Some synaesthetes 
also report conscious sensations in response to inanimate objects or dummy body parts 
(Banissy & Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009). However, these vicarious experiences are 
typically described as less intense than touch to an animate human (Holle, Banissy, 
Wright, Bowling and Ward, 2011; Holle et al., 2013). Despite reporting some 
synaesthetic experience in response to dummies being touched, individuals with MTS 
show significantly less activity in primary somatosensory cortex when viewing 
dummies compared with humans, indicating some specificity of vicarious 
representations for human bodies. Collectively, this behavioural and neural evidence 
indicates that conscious vicarious touch may be modulated by self-other similarity with 
the stimulus, where touch involving subjects more similar to the self elicit greater 
vicarious response (see section 1.3.3). However, further work is needed to establish the 
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sources of inter-individual variability in conscious vicarious responses to inanimate 
stimuli. If perceived dissimilarity between the self and the dummy does indeed underlie 
the reduced vicarious response found in prior work, then inter-individual differences in 
conscious vicarious experience may arise from variability in self-other distinction (see 
section 1.2), influencing the extent to which dummy bodies are perceived as similar to 
the self. 
Of relevance to the connection between vicarious perception and empathy, 
Banissy and Ward (2007) demonstrate that individuals with MTS obtain significantly 
higher scores on the emotional reactivity subscale (pertaining to the affective experience 
of empathising with others) of the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2004) 
than non-synaesthetes. This increase in emotional reactivity is also found for individuals 
with an acquired form of MTS, who experience vicarious touch in a phantom limb 
(Goller, Richards, Novak & Ward, 2013). While recent work has failed to replicate this 
finding in developmental MTS (Baron-Cohen, Robson, Lai & Allison, 2016), there 
were key methodological differences in this study, including a less stringent method of 
participant selection. Individuals with MTS were recruited solely from self-report rather 
than objective behavioural differences, as used by Banissy and Ward (on the 
visuotactile interference task described above). Banissy and Ward demonstrate that 
many individuals who report experiencing MTS do not differ from controls on this 
verification measure. A self-report selection process alone may therefore not have been 
sensitive enough to detect between-group differences, highlighting the need for standard 
methods of verification that can be administered across different labs. Qualitative 
evidence from participants with MTS also indicates experiences of excessive emotion 
contagion (Martin, Cleghorn & Ward, 2017). For individuals who report conscious 
vicarious pain, empathic concern (a subscale of the IRI referring to the other-oriented 
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affective component of empathy; Davis, 1980) is also increased (Vandenbroucke et al., 
2013, 2014). These findings provide support for theories of empathy which involve a 
process of simulating others’ experiences, (Bird & Viding, 2014; Gallese & Goldman, 
1998). As such, mirror-touch synaesthesia and conscious vicarious pain can provide 
insight into social cognition and interaction more in the wider population.  
 
1.3.2 Threshold Theory of Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia 
Functional MRI studies have shown that, compared with controls, individuals 
with MTS display greater activation of both primary (SI) and secondary (SII) 
somatosensory cortex during the observation of touch (Blakemore et al., 2005) and that 
this can match a pattern that would be expected given their self-reported frame of 
reference (Holle et al., 2013). Individuals with MTS therefore show greater activation in 
the same regions involved in vicarious tactile perception in typical adults (see section 
1.1). In addition, MTS participants show greater grey matter density in SII than controls 
(Holle et al., 2013). Threshold Theory arises from these observations, arguing that 
hyperactivity of tactile mirror systems underlies conscious vicarious experience in MTS 
(see Ward and Banissy, 2015), in which vicarious activity is raised above a threshold 
for conscious perception. In this respect, conscious vicarious perception is considered to 
be an extreme case of normal vicarious processing. In support of Threshold Theory, 
congruency effects on the visuotactile interference task described above (typically 
displayed by individuals with MTS) have been induced in controls by increasing 
excitability in somatosensory cortex using anodal tDCS (Bolognini et al., 2013). Similar 
evidence of increased activity in somatosensory cortices has been found for conscious 
vicarious pain responders when observing pain, reflected in both fMRI BOLD signal 
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(Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010) and in mu rhythm suppression (Grice-Jackson et al., 
2017). In addition, these individuals show increased activity in insular cortex, 
associated with affective responses to pain (Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010). Increased 
grey-matter density is also found in both insula and somatosensory cortex in conscious 
vicarious pain responders compared with controls (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). Due to 
these similarities in vicarious somatosensory activity, Threshold Theory has also been 
applied to account for conscious vicarious pain experiences. 
 
1.3.3 Self-Other Theory 
While previous evidence points to hyperactive tactile mirroring in MTS and 
conscious vicarious pain, the cause of this increased activity remains unclear. 
Furthermore, a somatosensory hyperactivity account cannot explain additional 
differences in brain structure and behaviour outside of the domains of touch and pain 
that have been associated with these conditions. For example, both MTS and conscious 
vicarious pain have been linked to reduced grey matter density in rTPJ (Grice-Jackson 
et al., 2017; Holle et al., 2013) as well as altered bodily awareness and ability to control 
representations of self and other even in the absence of inducing experiences (e.g., 
Cioffi, Banissy & Moore, 2016; Santiesteban et al. 2015b; Derbyshire, Osborn & 
Brown, 2013; Aimola Davies & White, 2013). The more recent Self–Other Theory 
(Banissy & Ward, 2013; Ward and Banissy, 2015) was originally proposed to account 
for some of these factors with regards to MTS, but can also be applied to conscious 
vicarious pain. Self–Other Theory suggests that conscious vicarious experiences are 
related to atypical abilities in distinguishing the self from others. This ability to 
distinguish self and other could act as a gating mechanism by which somatosensory 
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activity is moderated, explaining the hyperactivity associated with conscious vicarious 
touch and pain. As such, MTS and conscious vicarious pain may reflect more than just a 
heightened example of typical vicarious perception. 
One mechanism by which self-other distinction is thought to be impaired is 
through an extension of bodily self-awareness, with MTS being linked to a more 
expansive plasticity of the bodily self (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Banissy et al., 2009). 
Individuals with MTS as well as those with conscious vicarious pain experience the 
rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), and individuals with MTS the 
enfacement illusion (Tsakiris, 2008), without the synchronous tactile stimulation 
necessary to induce a sense of ownership over the other body for typical adults (Aimola 
Davies & White, 2013; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010; Maister et al., 2013). In addition to 
body-ownership, MTS is associated with a greater sense of vicarious agency. In a study 
by Cioffi et al., (2016), participants saw hand actions performed by an experimenter in a 
mirror placed in front of them while listening to action instructions that either matched 
or mismatched the actions performed. Although the actions in the mirror were 
performed by the experimenter, they appeared to the participant in a congruent location 
with where they would be if the participant performed the actions themselves. The 
procedure therefore induces blurred boundaries between the self and other. Compared 
with controls, participants with MTS reported a greater sense of agency over the 
experimenter’s actions in the match condition. Individuals with MTS also showed a 
stronger sense of ownership of the experimenter’s hand compared to controls, in both 
the match and mismatch conditions. This crucial finding suggests that merely seeing 
another body making an action in a congruent location with where one expects to see 
one’s own body was sufficient for the synaesthetes to represent the other body as their 
own. Collectively, the evidence regarding sense of ownership and agency over another 
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body indicates a greater susceptibility to self–other merging in MTS and conscious 
vicarious pain, which may contribute to the atypical vicarious experiences of this group. 
Another important aspect of self-other distinction for vicarious perception is the 
ability to control the degree to which we prioritise representations of the self or 
representations of other people. For instance, in order to experience appropriate levels 
of vicarious response it is necessary to enhance representations of others and inhibit 
representations of one’s own affective or sensory state. However, to prevent excessive 
personal distress from another’s negative state, it can be adaptive to inhibit 
representations of the other’s state and enhance representations of the self (Cheng et al., 
2007; Decety et al., 2010). Impairments in self-other control therefore provide another 
candidate mechanism which may contribute to atypical vicarious perception according 
to Self-Other Theory. In line with this suggestion, individuals with MTS show a 
difficulty with appropriate self–other control in situations that require inhibiting 
representations of others and enhancing representations of the self. In a study by 
Santiesteban and colleagues (2015b) individuals with MTS performed less accurately 
than controls on an imitation-inhibition task (see section 1.2) requiring the inhibition of 
other-relevant representations and enhancement of the self, while their performance on 
visual perspective-taking and theory of mind tasks which require enhancing 
representations of others while inhibiting the self were comparable with controls. 
Derbyshire and colleagues (2013) provide additional evidence regarding self-other 
control ability in conscious vicarious pain responders. On a dot-perspective task, 
participants with conscious vicarious pain showed greater difficulty than controls in 
enhancing representations of the self while inhibiting the other, similar to the pattern 
observed in MTS.  
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An alternative interpretation of these results is suggested by Heyes and Catmur 
(2015), who propose that vicarious touch and pain experiences may reflect domain-
general inhibitory control mechanisms rather than those specific to self and other 
representations (Task Control Theory). Indeed, the dot-perspective task used by 
Derbyshire and colleagues (2013) has been criticised for not being a pure measure of 
self-other processing. Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird and Heyes (2014) 
demonstrate that replacing the human avatar in this task with an arrow leads to similar 
interference effects. Further, it is possible that prior evidence of atypical self-awareness, 
such as increased susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion (Aimola Davies & White, 
2013; Derbyshire et al., 2013), could also be explained in terms of domain-general 
mechanisms of associative learning. Indeed, a lack of domain-general control conditions 
in previous research prevents interpretation in terms of domain-general or purely social 
mechanisms. However, the results presented by Santiesteban and colleagues (2015) 
somewhat conflict with Task-Control Theory, since individuals with MTS performed 
comparably with controls on a perspective-taking task requiring participants to enhance 
representations others and inhibit representations of the self. If MTS were associated 
with a domain-general impairment in task control, then we should predict that they 
would also perform more poorly than controls in this domain (see Ward & Banissy, 
2017 for a similar discussion). Further research is necessary to fully explore the 
mechanisms underlying group differences on tasks of self-other control. 
Collectively, evidence of atypical self-other distinction makes an important 
contribution to understanding vicarious perception, as it indicates that individuals who 
experience conscious vicarious touch and pain have a difficulty inhibiting 
representations of others even in the absence of the vicarious touch or pain stimulus. 
These broader differences in cognitive ability cannot be accounted for by Threshold 
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Theory in isolation. Considering current evidence, an interaction between mechanisms 
involved in somatosensory mirroring (proposed in Threshold Theory) and self–other 
distinction (proposed in Self–Other Theory) may provide the most comprehensive 
account of conscious vicarious perception. 
 
1.4 Aims of thesis 
 
The primary focus of this thesis was to examine self-other distinction processes 
and their contribution to vicarious perception of touch and pain. Primary aims were: 
1. To examine the extent to which vicarious tactile perception can be modulated 
by increasing excitability in primary somatosensory cortex or the right temporo-parietal 
junction with transcranial current stimulation (Chapter 3) 
2. To clarify the contribution of self-other control and domain-general inhibitory 
control mechanisms to vicarious perception by comparing the performance of conscious 
vicarious pain responders and controls on an imitation inhibition and a domain-general 
task (Chapter 4). 
3. To assess the involvement of self-other distinction processes with regard to 
bodily self-awareness in vicarious pain perception, comparing trait levels of 
depersonalisation and interoceptive sensibility in conscious vicarious pain responders 
and controls (Chapter 5). 
4. To identify individual and stimulus factors contributing to the distinction 
between animate and inanimate human faces, with a view to developing future studies 
to examine the role of animacy in modulating vicarious perception (Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 2 
Methodological Introduction to Transcranial Current Stimulation 
 
This chapter contains an overview of the methodological principles of different forms of 
transcranial current stimulation (tCS), including direct current (tDCS), alternating 
current (tACS) and random noise (tRNS). Each method is discussed in terms of its effect 
on neural activity and potential to modulate cognitive function. Practical issues such as 
spatial resolution and the effect of varying intensity and duration of stimulation are 
discussed, along with individual variability factors and ethical and safety issues. The 
following chapter (Chapter 3) will present two studies which attempted to modulate 
vicarious tactiIe perception using tDCS and tRNS, and so a particular emphasis is 
placed on these methods in the present chapter.  
 
2.1 Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)  
 
Among different methods of transcranial current stimulation, the most widely 
used is tDCS. This technique was first used over 200 years ago, but has gained 
significant attention in the last decade, with research moving from animal models to 
human participants (Nitsche et al., 2008). This particular method of stimulation passes a 
constant, low-level electrical current, usually between 1-2 milliamps (mA), through 
external saline-soaked sponge electrodes placed on the scalp (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). 
Using tDCS, electrical current flows from the anodal electrode to the cathodal electrode, 
and this is thought to increase cortical excitability at the region under the anode, and 
decrease excitability in the region under the cathode (Paulus, Nitsche & Antal, 2016). A 
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comparison of anodal and cathodal tDCS waveforms with other methods of tCS is 
shown in Figure 2.1. One electrode is typically placed over a region of interest, and the 
other (sometimes referred to as the ‘reference’ electrode) is placed either over the 
vertex, the contralateral hemisphere, or can be placed on the body, such as the 
contralateral shoulder (Moliadze, Antal & Paulus, 2010). TDCS therefore provides a 
versatile technique to modulate cortical function in the desired brain area, in a chosen 
direction.  
This method of stimulation appears to have potential to modulate a range of 
perceptual and cognitive functions, including language, working memory and vicarious 
perception (Bolognini et al., 2013; Coll, Tremblay & Jackson, 2017) to name a few (see 
Parkin, Ekhtiari & Walsh, 2015). For this reason, tDCS has become a method of great 
interest and attention in recent years. 
 
2.1.1 Mechanisms of action 
Rather than directly inducing an action potential, tDCS is thought to polarise the 
resting membrane potential of neurons in the cortical region of interest, affecting the 
spontaneous firing rate of the neuron. While anodal stimulation depolarises the 
membrane potential, increasing the spontaneous firing rate, cathodal stimulation 
hyperpolarises, decreasing the firing rate (Woods, Bryant, Sacchetti, Gervits and 
Hamilton, 2016). Neurotransmitter concentrations in regions under the electrode may 
also be affected by tDCS, with anodal stimulation thought to have an inhibitory effect 
on GABA concentration (e.g., Nitsche et al. 2004) while cathodal tDCS may inhibit 
glutamate levels (e.g., Stagg et al., 2009). However, while tDCS has become a popular 
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method of neuromodulation in the last decade, the mechanisms which underlie its action 
are still not thoroughly understood (Bestmann, de Berker & Bonaiuto, 2015). 
Recent research has indicated that tDCS may be effective for clinical application 
(Brunoni et al., 2012) or to enhance cognitive function in neurotypical adults (Paulus et 
al., 2016). In these cases, effects of stimulation must be long-lasting, beyond the 
termination of stimulation, for there to be a benefit to the individual. In addition to 
online effects during stimulation, sufficient periods of tDCS have been shown to have 
offline aftereffects. For instance, tDCS targeted at primary motor cortex is reported to 
increase excitability in this area for up to 90 minutes after stimulation (Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2001). Repeated sessions of tDCS may also have long-term cognitive effects 
which last up to several weeks when paired with behavioural training (Vestito, 
Rosellini, Mantero, and Bandini, 2014). These offline aftereffects are likely to reflect 
mechanisms of synaptic plasticity, such as long term potentiation and long term 
depression (Fritsch, et al. 2010).  
 
2.2 Transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS)  
 
An alternative method of transcranial current stimulation, tACS, delivers a 
sinusoidal electrical current of up to 2mA which alternates between two external 
electrodes placed over the region of interest (see Figure 2.1c). The aim when using 
tACS is to entrain neural oscillations within physiologically relevant frequency bands: 
delta (0–3Hz), theta (4–7 Hz), alpha (8–12 Hz), beta (13–30Hz), or gamma (30–200 Hz) 
(Antal and Paulus, 2013). This technique is therefore useful to study the role of 
particular oscillations in a given cognitive function.  
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Several sources have demonstrated the effectiveness of tACS in entraining 
particular frequencies of neural oscillations (Helfrich et al., 2014; Vosskuhl, Huster & 
Hermann, 2015; Zaehle, Rach & Herrmann, 2010). For instance, Zaehle and colleagues 
(2010) demonstrate that tACS delivered at each participant’s predetermined individual 
alpha frequency (recorded using EEG) is effective in increasing subsequent alpha 
power. Measurable cognitive and perceptual effects of tACS have also been 
demonstrated, including visual perception (Kanai, Chaieb, Antal, Walsh & Paulus, 
2008; Kanai, Paulus & Walsh, 2010), tactile perception (Feurra, Paulus, Walsh & 
Kanai, 2011) and memory (Polanía, Paulus & Nitsche, 2012). 
 
2.3 Transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS)  
 
A specific form of alternating current stimulation which has begun to be used 
more recently is tRNS. This technique passes a current between the two electrodes 
which varies randomly between 0.1-640Hz (see Figure 2.1d). High frequency tRNS 
restricts oscillations to higher frequencies in this range, between 100-640 Hz, and is 
more commonly used in neuroscientific research. High frequency tRNS has been found 
to enhance cortical excitability at both electrode sites (Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, 
and Paulus, 2008), in contrast with tDCS, which increases excitability under one 
electrode, and decreases at the other (Paulus et al., 2016). This method therefore has the 
advantage of targeting stimulation bilaterally.  
While fewer studies have been conducted into the potential to modulate 
cognitive function using high-frequency tRNS compared with tDCS, effects have been 
reported in several domains, include numerical cognition (Cappelletti et al., 2013), 
facial identity perception (Romanska, Rezlescu, Susilo, Duchaine, and Banissy, 2015) 
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and perceptual learning (Fertonani, Pirulli & Miniussi, 2011). In this case tRNS was 
found to be more effective than tDCS for modulating performance. 
 
2.3.1 Mechanisms of action  
Compared with tDCS, very few studies regarding the mechanism of action of 
tRNS have thus far been carried out. One account that has been proposed is that tRNS 
modulates cortical excitability through stochastic resonance (Miniussi, Harris & 
Ruzzoli, 2013). Stochastic resonance is the effect of boosting a weak signal above a 
threshold for detection by adding noise (McDonnell & Abbott, 2009). In this case, a 
sub-threshold neural signal may be amplified by adding random noise using tRNS. 
Continuous depolarization and repolarization of neuronal membrane potential may also 
contribute to an increase in cortical excitability (e.g., Chaieb, Antal, and Paulus, 2015; 
Chaieb et al., 2011). Like other methods of tCS, stimulation aftereffects have been 
found using high-frequency tRNS. Terney and colleagues (2008) report that 10 minutes 
of stimulation at 1mA over the motor cortex lead to increased excitability lasting up to 
1.5 hours. 
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Figure 2.1: Waveforms of different methods of transcranial current stimulation, 
including a) anodal tDCS, b) cathodal tDCS, c) tACS and d) tRNS. Adapted from 
Fertonani and Miniussi (2017). 
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2.4 Spatial resolution  
 
Importantly, effects of stimulation are not limited to the target site under the 
electrodes, but spread through surrounding tissue and regions between the two 
electrodes (Miranda, Mekonnen, Salvador & Ruffini, 2013; Opitz, Paulus, Will, 
Antunes, & Thielscher, 2015). Despite this spread of current flow, however, numerous 
studies have been able to demonstrate the efficacy of tCS in modulating excitability at 
specific target sites. For instance, increased excitability of primary motor cortex can be 
demonstrated in MEPs following both tDCS (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2001) and high-frequency tRNS (Terney et al., 2008) over this region. The 
spatial resolution of tDCS can also be improved with the use of different electrode 
montages. Using a smaller stimulation electrode and a larger reference electrode focuses 
the electrical current over a smaller area to direct the stimulation towards to target 
region (Nitsche et al., 2007). High definition tDCS uses multiple small electrodes in 
place of the large electrodes typically used, and is thought to improve the spatial 
resolution of the technique (Dmochowski, Datta, Bikson, Su & Parra, 2011; Minhas et 
al., 2010). Head models can also predict the direction of current flow, and enable the 
researcher to choose appropriate electrode montages (e.g., BONSAI and SPHERES; 
Rahman, Lafon & Bikson, 2015; Truong et al., 2014). Further research is required to 
improve the focal specificity of tDCS, as well as tRNS and tACS.  
In order to target a region of interest, it is vital to use a reliable method of 
localisation to place electrodes which can account for individual differences in the 
anatomy of the head. Woods et al., (2016) demonstrate that electrode movement of as 
little as 1cm can significantly alter tDCS current flow within the brain. The most 
common method of localisation is the International 10-20 system (Herwig et al., 2003). 
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Electrodes can also be placed using neuronavigation systems, which rely on structural 
brain scans; or with physiological methods, for example using TMS to generate MEPs 
(Woods et al., 2016). 
 
2.5 Stimulation protocol 
 
When deciding on a tCS protocol, both the intensity and duration of stimulation 
delivered are important considerations. In a previous study, increasing the intensity of 
tDCS from 1mA to 2mA reversed stimulation effects in the motor domain (Batsikadze, 
Moliadze, Paulus, Kuo & Nitsche, 2013). Increasing the duration of tDCS stimulation 
from 4 seconds to 3 minutes leads to aftereffects in motor cortex (Nitsche and Paulus, 
2000). However, increasing duration to 26 minutes may result in inhibition of 
aftereffects (Batsikadze et al., 2013). The influence of changing the duration and 
intensity of stimulation is also inconsistent across domains. Pirulli, Fertonani and 
Miniussi (2014) show that increasing the duration of tDCS over visual cortex from 9 to 
22 minutes did not significantly alter stimulation effects. Stimulating for longer periods 
or at higher intensity therefore does not necessarily increase desired effects, and 
protocols should be based closely on prior work in the relevant domain. 
Another factor to consider is whether stimulation should be delivered online 
(i.e., during the experimental testing session) or offline (i.e., prior to testing). TCS is 
associated with some mild tingling and itching sensations (e.g., Poreisz, Boros, Antal & 
Paulus, 2007; Paneri et al., 2016), and so it is important to consider the impact this 
distraction may have on behavioural performance during online stimulation. Despite 
this, it has been found that online tDCS can be more effective for enhancing cognitive 
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performance than offline stimulation (Martin, Liu, Alonzo, Green & Loo, 2014). 
However, the relative advantages of online and offline stimulation are likely to vary for 
different cognitive domains, and according to the method of tCS used. Further research 
is necessary to identify ideal stimulation parameters for different areas of research. 
A further consideration in tCS experimental design is the addition of appropriate 
control conditions. This is most commonly achieved using sham stimulation. Sham 
stimulation involves the same procedure as active conditions, but the electrical current 
is typically delivered for only 15-30 seconds. This allows the same initial sensations 
(e.g., mild scratching, tingling) to be experienced without inducing aftereffects. 
Evidence has shown that this procedure reliably blinds participants receiving tDCS 
(Gandiga, Hummel & Cohen, 2006; Nitsche et al., 2008; Poreisz et al., 2007) or tRNS 
(Ambrus, Paulus & Antal, 2010; Fertonani, Ferrari & Miniussi, 2015). 
 
2.6 Individual variability in tCS effects 
 
Recent research has raised the importance of individual variability in 
responsiveness to tCS (see Krause & Cohen Kadosh, 2014). Several studies have 
reported variable effects of tDCS in several domains, according to baseline ability (e.g., 
Hsu, Tseng, Liang, Cheng & Juan, 2014; Tseng et al., 2012), traits (e.g., Sarkar, 
Dowker & Kadosh, 2014), neuropsychological diagnosis (Boggio et al., 2006) 
neurophysiological state (e.g., Fresnoza, Paulus, Nitsche & Kuo, 2014; Labruna et al., 
2016), gender (e.g., Chaieb, Antal & Paulus, 2008; Kuo, Paulus & Nitsche, 2006), age 
(e.g., Moliadze et al., 2015; Ross, McCoy, Wolk, Coslett & Olson, 2011), and cranial 
anatomy (e.g., Datta, Truong, Minhas, Parra & Bikson, 2012; Opitz et al., 2015). To 
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give an example, Sarkar and colleagues (2014) show that tDCS targeted at dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex improved performance on a numerical task for individuals with high 
mathematics anxiety, but actually impaired performance for those with low anxiety. 
Some sources of variation can be controlled with careful experimental design, for 
example the age and gender of participants. Other factors, such as trait differences or 
baseline task ability, are more difficult to control but can be monitored to assess 
potential moderating effects (as for Sarkar et al., 2014). Future research should involve 
careful consideration of these additional sources of variance to avoid additional noise in 
the data, and to identify further potential sources of individual variability. 
 
2.7 Ethical and safety considerations  
 
In tCS research to date there has been no report of long-term side effects or 
seizures (Woods et al., 2016). Although rare, some cases of seizures have been reported 
following transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and tCS is considered to elevate the 
risk of seizure in those that are predisposed to them (for example, individuals with a 
history of epilepsy). To ensure that tCS is delivered safely, it is therefore essential to 
carry out careful screening of potential participants (Bikson et al., 2009). 
Contraindications to tCS and TMS include having any metal object in the body, such as 
a heart pacemaker, cochlear implant or aneurysm clip. Any individual with a personal or 
family history of epilepsy or any other medical, psychiatric or neurological disorders 
should also be excluded. Certain prescription medications, including antidepressants, 
also preclude participation in tCS (see Rossi, Hallett, Rossini & Pascual-Leone, 2009). 
Individuals who may be pregnant or have received any other brain stimulation (either 
tCS or TMS) within the previous 24 hours are excluded from participating. Participants 
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are also instructed to avoid any recreational drugs (including alcohol) for 24 hours prior 
to the stimulation.  
In terms of safe limits for stimulation parameters, Nitsche and colleagues (2003) 
recommend a maximum current density of 0.02857 mA/cm2 for tDCS; since stimulation 
above this level may be painful. In a recent review Bikson and colleagues (2016) 
suggest that this limit may now be too conservative, given that no irreversible injury has 
been sustained using intensities of up to 4mA, durations of 40 minutes, and a 
stimulation charge of up to 7.2 coulombs; in evidence from over 1000 participants. 
Since tCS remains a relatively new field, it is advisable to keep stimulation parameters 
well within these known limits. This is especially true for alternating current techniques 
(e.g., tRNS, tACS), for which no specific guidance currently exists. 
Although tCS is not associated with serious complications, some adverse short-
term effects are common, including itchiness, tingling or mild burning (e.g., Poreisz et 
al., 2007; Paneri et al., 2016). These sensations are more common for tDCS than tACS 
or tRNS (Fertonani et al., 2015). Minor discomfort such as this can be minimised by 
carefully cleaning the area of the scalp, and applying extra saline or gel to the electrode 
site to reduce electrical impedance (although care must be taken not to oversaturate 
sponges with saline, as leakage can cause the electrical current to spread beyond the 
area of the electrode). A gradual fade in and fade out of the stimulation (over 15-30 
seconds) should also minimise discomfort, and prevent the participant from 
experiencing flashes of light, which can occur if the stimulation is terminated abruptly 
(Nitsche et al., 2003). Minimising any sensations associated with stimulation has the 
additional advantage of impairing the participant’s ability to detect sham conditions in 
the experiment. Participants should also be fully informed regarding possible discomfort 
and all potential risks and benefits involved before they decide to participate in tCS 
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research. The experiments described in Chapter 3 of this thesis follow the precautions 
and guidance described here. The experimenter was trained in operating tCS as well as 
emergency first aid, to ensure ethical and safe practice. 
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Chapter 3 
Modulating Vicarious Tactile Perception with  
Transcranial Current Stimulation 
 
Recent work has attempted to induce conscious vicarious touch in those that do not 
normally experience these sensations, using transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS). Anodal tDCS applied to primary somatosensory cortex (SI) was found to induce 
behavioural performance akin to mirror-touch synaesthesia on a visuotactile 
interference task. In this chapter, two experiments were conducted that sought to 
replicate and extend these findings by examining: a) the effects of tDCS and high 
frequency transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS) targeted at SI and temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) on vicarious tactile perception, b) the extent to which any 
stimulation effects were specific to viewing touch to humans versus inanimate agents, 
and c) the influence of visual perspective (viewing touch from one’s own versus 
another’s perspective) on vicarious perception. In Experiment One, tRNS targeted at SI 
did not modulate vicarious tactile perception. In Experiment Two, tDCS targeted at SI, 
but not TPJ, resulted in some modulation of vicarious tactile perception, but there were 
important caveats to this effect. Implications regarding mechanisms of vicarious 
perception are discussed. Collectively, the findings do not provide convincing evidence 
for the potential to modulate vicarious tactile perception with transcranial electrical 
current stimulation. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Passively observing another person being touched appears to recruit overlapping 
brain regions as are involved in first-hand experiences of touch, including activity in 
primary (SI) and secondary (SII) somatosensory cortex (Keysers et al., 2010; see 
section 1.1 for further discussion). While vicarious tactile perception is common, there 
are important individual variability factors associated with this (Gillmeister et al., 
2017). One source of variation is a distinction between those who experience conscious 
as opposed to unconscious vicarious tactile responses. In particular, for a small minority 
of individuals (< 2%; Banissy, Cohen Kadosh, Maus, Walsh & Ward, 2009), with 
mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS), seeing another person being touched elicits a 
conscious sensation of touch on their own body, as if they were being touched 
themselves (see Ward & Banissy, 2015 for a review).  
One account explaining why some people experience conscious vicarious touch, 
but others do not (known as Threshold Theory; see Ward & Banissy, 2015), assumes 
that the conscious sensation of touch arises from hyperactivity in somatosensory cortex 
when viewing touch to others. This activity is thought to boost vicarious responses 
above a threshold for conscious perception. In line with this, individuals with MTS 
demonstrate greater activation compared to controls in SI and SII during the observation 
of touch (Blakemore et al., 2005; Holle et al., 2013). Further, there is some evidence 
suggesting that increasing cortical excitability in the somatosensory cortex of 
individuals that do not experience MTS can induce behavioural correlates of the 
experience, when viewing touch to others (Bolognini et al., 2013). In that study, 
participants were tested on an adapted version of a visuotactile interference task that had 
previously been shown to distinguish individuals with MTS from control participants 
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(Banissy and Ward, 2007). This task requires participants to state the location of a 
tactile stimulus on their own body while simultaneously observing another person being 
touched. The felt touch can either be congruent (in the same spatial location) or 
incongruent (on the opposite side of the body) to the observed touch. For individuals 
with MTS there are increased congruency effects, with incongruent trials producing 
longer reaction times and a greater number of errors consistent with their conscious 
vicarious touch (Banissy & Ward, 2007). Bolognini and colleagues report that greater 
congruency effects can be induced in non-synaesthetes on this task by increasing SI 
excitability using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS; see section 2.1). More 
specifically, participants showed increased congruency effects in their reaction times 
after tDCS over SI on the ipsilateral side to the tactile stimulus (and thus the 
contralateral side to the observed touch), when another hand was seen being touched, 
compared with an inanimate object (a lightbulb). Further, participants with higher self-
reported perspective taking (a subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index measure of 
empathy; Davis, 1980) showed a greater effect of stimulation, indicating that individual 
difference factors might mediate the effects of tDCS on task performance. The results 
suggest that increased excitability of SI underlies vicarious tactile experience, 
supporting a Threshold Theory account.  
While the study from Bolognini and colleagues (2013) points to cortical 
excitability in the somatosensory system playing a pivotal role in vicarious tactile 
perception, there are a number of important questions that need to be clarified. For 
example, since the only control task used in the experiment involved touch to a 
lightbulb, it remains unclear whether the effects are specific to human touch or whether 
a human form physically and spatially congruent with the participant’s own body is 
sufficient (e.g., dummy body parts). Previous behavioural research has also found that 
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viewing touch to hands in a first- versus third-person perspective can influence task 
performance (Vandenbroucke et al., 2015), but whether visual perspective influences 
performance change following brain stimulation has not been studied.  Additional work 
is therefore needed to a) examine the replicability of findings indicating that increasing 
excitability within the somatosensory system can induce MTS in non-synaesthete 
controls and b) consider how variations in stimulus presentation (e.g., animacy, 
perspective of viewed stimuli) contribute to previously reported effects.  
Further, in addition to tDCS, other forms of electrical current stimulation have 
recently been used to modulate perceptual and cognitive task performance, for example 
with transcranial alternating current stimulation (Kanai et al., 2008; Marshall, 
Helgadóttir, Mölle & Born, 2006; Benwell, Learmonth, Miniussi, Harvey & Thut, 2015; 
Janik et al., 2015) and with high-frequency transcranial random noise stimulation 
(tRNS; Cappelletti et al., 2013; Fertonani et al., 2011; Snowball et al., 2013; Romanska 
et al., 2015). Of relevance to the current study is high frequency tRNS. As with tDCS, 
this method involves passing a weak electrical current to the brain via electrodes placed 
on the scalp, but tRNS differs in delivery and inducing neural change. While tDCS 
involves passing a homogenous current leading to a unilateral increase or decrease in 
brain excitability, tRNS involves passing an alternating current at a range of frequencies 
(from 100-640 Hz in high frequency tRNS) that results in a bilateral increase in cortical 
excitability (e.g., Terney et al., 2008). Comparisons of the two techniques suggest that 
high frequency tRNS may exert greater effects on changing cortical excitability 
(Vanneste, Fregni & De Ridder, 2013), although different mechanisms of action may 
contribute to cortical excitability effects of tRNS and tDCS (Miniussi, Harris & 
Ruzzoli, 2013; Paulus, Nitsche & Antal, 2016). As yet, no study has examined if high 
frequency tRNS might be useful to modulate vicarious perception, but given that in 
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some circumstances bilateral somatosensory cortex activity is likely to contribute to 
perceiving touch to other people, then this technique may offer a useful approach to 
examine the effect of increasing bilateral cortical excitability in the somatosensory 
cortices on tactile perception. In light of this, in addition to re-examining prior effects 
suggesting that tDCS targeted at SI on the contralateral side to observed touch can 
induce MTS in non-synaesthetes, Experiment One also examined whether high 
frequency tRNS targeted at SI bilaterally would have similar effects. 
With the above in mind, the present experiments aimed to identify the 
contribution of body congruency and perception of animacy in modulating vicarious 
tactile perception following transcranial electrical stimulation. To study this, 
visuotactile interference tasks were administered in which touch is viewed to an object, 
to inanimate dummy hands, and to human hands in either a first-person or third-person 
perspective, relative to the observer. Experiment One examined the impact of tRNS 
targeted at bilateral primary somatosensory cortices (SI), and Experiment Two the 
effects of tDCS targeted at right somatosensory cortex (rSI) and the right temporo-
parietal junction (rTPJ). Based on prior research, increasing cortical excitability in SI 
was expected to increase vicarious tactile perception when viewing another person 
being touched.  
 
3.2 Experiment One 
 
Experiment One sought to extend prior findings regarding the effects of tDCS in 
vicarious tactile perception (Bolognini et al., 2013) by determining whether vicarious 
responses can also be enhanced following high frequency tRNS targeted at SI. Like 
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tDCS, tRNS has been shown to directly increase cortical excitability, but the 
mechanisms of action may differ (Miniussi et al., 2013; Paulus et al., 2016; Terney et 
al., 2008). Since tRNS can be used to stimulate the cortical region of interest bilaterally, 
the present experiment examined the effect of high frequency tRNS targeted at SI on 
vicarious tactile perception of touch applied to both left and right hands. This method 
therefore removes the need to compare trials where touch is ipsilateral or contralateral 
to the stimulation site that was a prerequisite in the study by Bolognini and colleagues 
due to the use of tDCS.  
A further difference between this experiment and prior work (Bolognini et al., 
2013; Vandenbroucke et al., 2016) was the inclusion of two novel tasks and increase in 
trial numbers on the vicarious touch tasks. More specifically, the effect of first- 
(egocentric) versus third-person (allocentric) perspective in vicarious tactile perception 
was assessed. For this, images of human hands were observed inverted so that they 
appear an allocentric position. An inanimate object control task with the same visual 
form as a hand (i.e., a dummy hand) was also created, in order to isolate the effects of 
animacy and human-like appearance in eliciting vicarious tactile response. In all tasks 
180 trials were presented, contrasting to 144 in prior studies. Since the use of tRNS 
removes the need to compare ipsilateral and contralateral trials, this increased the 
number of trials in each experimental condition to 60 compared with 24 in the previous 
method. 
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3.2.1 Materials and methods 
Participants 
24 healthy participants took part in both sessions of Experiment One (22F, 2M; 
24 right-handed; age 18-58 years, M = 21.7, SD = 8.2). All participants were paid £20 to 
take part, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and met the required safety 
precautions to take part in electrical brain stimulation outlined by Bikson, Datta and 
Elwassif (2009). Ethical approval was granted by the Department of Psychology at 
Goldsmiths, University of London. 
 
High-frequency transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS) protocol 
The experiment had a within-subjects design, with all participants completing 
the tasks under active SI tRNS and sham conditions. Bilateral stimulation was delivered 
with two 5x5cm saline-soaked sponge electrodes and a constant-current stimulator 
(NeuroComm, DC-Stimulator Plus). To target SI the electrodes were placed 2cm 
posterior to C3/C4, according to the 10-20 electroencephalography system (Herwig, 
Satrapi & Schönfeldt-Lecuona, 2003). High-frequency tRNS was delivered offline, 
immediately prior to the tasks. Since effects of offline tRNS have been shown to last up 
to one hour following 10 minutes of stimulation (Terney et al., 2008), this allowed a 
longer time window to complete the additional tasks discussed below. The current was 
ramped up for 15 seconds to 1.5mA (based on the intensity used in prior work – 
Bolognini et al., 2013) and was followed by ten minutes of stimulation, before ramping 
down again for 15 seconds. The sham protocol was identical to active stimulation, with 
the exception that the current was held constant for only 15 seconds before ramping 
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down (although the electrodes were left in place for 10 minutes). This allowed the same 
initial mild scratching sensation to be experienced in the same location as during active 
stimulation (Ambrus, Paulus & Antal, 2010; Fertonani et al., 2015). Participants 
received bilateral SI and sham high frequency tRNS across two separate sessions, 
conducted 3-7 days apart, with the order of the sessions counterbalanced between 
participants. 
 
Procedure 
There were two sessions to the experiment, one for sham and one for SI 
stimulation. Stimulation was delivered offline, immediately prior to the visuotactile 
tasks. The order of four tasks (‘self’, ‘other’, ‘dummy’ and ‘sponge’) was 
counterbalanced between participants. It took no more than 40 minutes to complete all 
four tasks. During the tasks participants were instructed to place their hands flat on the 
desk in front of them, in the same manner as the visual stimuli shown in the ‘self’ task 
(Figure 3.1a), and to keep their eyes focused on the screen. Participants completed items 
from the QMTS (Bolognini et al., 2013) at the end of both sham and active sessions, 
and the IRI (Davis, 1980) at the end of the sham session. 
 
Visuotactile Interference Tasks 
In each experimental session participants completed four visuotactile 
interference tasks (adapted from Banissy & Ward, 2007), the order of which was 
counterbalanced between participants in ABCD-BADC-DCAB-CDBA order. For each, 
participants were required to state the location of a tactile sensation on their own hand, 
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whilst simultaneously observing another agent (hand or object depending on task) being 
touched. Observed touch occurred either to another human hand in an egocentric body 
location (‘self’ task), an allocentric location (‘other’ task), to a dummy hand (‘dummy’ 
task), or to a sponge (‘sponge’ task). Visual stimuli are shown in Figure 3.1a. The tactile 
stimulus was delivered using two miniature solenoid tappers attached to the dorsum of 
the participant’s left and right hands with medical tape. A Dual Channel Solenoid 
Controller (MSTC3-2; M & E Solve) was used to control the tappers.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: a) Visual stimuli depicting the agent in the ‘self’, ‘other’, ‘dummy’ and 
‘sponge’ tasks, and b) Example trial structure from the ‘self’ task.  
 
 Tasks were presented in E-Prime 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 
Pittsburgh, PA), using a 19” Hannspree monitor placed approximately 50cm in front of 
the participant. On each trial, participants viewed three consecutive images displaying 
hands being approached and touched by an index finger (Figure 3.1b). Observed touch 
was shown on the left, right or both sides. Each trial was preceded by a 1500ms fixation 
cross. A tactile stimulus was delivered via the solenoid tappers attached to the hands 
10ms after the onset of observed touch. The observed touch then remained on the screen 
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until the participant gave a response. The tactile stimulus was either delivered on the 
left, right or both sides, or there was no touch at all. On 60 trials the felt touch was 
spatially congruent with the observed touch or flash, on 60 trials it was incongruent, and 
on 60 trials there was no touch. Participants gave verbal responses using a voice key by 
stating “left”, “right”, “both” or “none”, according to which location they felt the tactile 
stimulus. All participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
The order of trials was pseudorandomised over three blocks. White noise was played 
through headphones during each trial to mask the noise of the solenoid tappers. 
 
Self-report measures 
Self-reported mirror-touch synaesthesia   
 At the beginning of the first session of the experiment, participants were asked 
“Do you experience touch sensations on your own body when you see them on another 
person’s body?” (from Banissy et al., 2009), and could respond on a 5-point Likert scale 
from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. Responses were coded from -2 to +2, 
where a positive score indicates self-reported experience of synaesthesia. This was 
completed in order to screen participants for potential mirror-touch synaesthesia. 
 
Questionnaire of Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia  
Each participant’s experience during the interference tasks was assessed using 
items 1, 4 and 5 from the Questionnaire of Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia (QMTS) used by 
Bolognini and colleagues (2013). This was administered at the end of each session. 
Participants were required to state the extent to which they agreed with six statements 
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using a 5-point scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. Items 
comprised: 1) “I felt that I was touched when I saw the human hand/dummy hand being 
touched”, 2) “Seeing the human hand/dummy hand being touched made it difficult to 
localise the actual touch” and 3) “The observed touch to the human hand/dummy hand 
appeared to be very intense”. Again, scores for each item were coded from -2 to +2 
during data analysis. 
 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index  
The 28-item Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) was used to 
assess self-report trait empathy. This questionnaire asks participants to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with each of 28 statements, such as “I often have tender, 
concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”, using a 5-point scale ranging 
from “Does not describe me well” to “Describes me very well”. Total scores range from 
0-112, with a higher score indicating higher trait empathy. Scores can also be clustered 
into 4 subscales, reflecting ‘”Fantasy”, “Perspective Taking”, “Empathic Concern”, and 
“Personal Distress” Davis (1980) reports an acceptable internal consistency for each of 
the subscales (α = .70 - .78). 
 
3.2.2 Results  
Prior to analyses data was trimmed for each participant to exclude any reaction 
time (RT) that fell two standard deviations above or below the mean for each task and 
stimulation condition. This resulted in 5.0% of data removal.  Two participants were 
identified as significant outliers based on Grubb’s test calculations on RTs, and were 
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excluded prior to analysis. This resulted in the following demographic characteristics of 
the sample: 20 female, 2 male; age 18-58 years, M = 22.0, SD = 8.5. This did not differ 
significantly from the sample recruited by Bolognini and colleagues (2013) in terms of 
age (t[52] = 0.84, p = 0.41), but did differ in the proportion of males and females (χ²1 = 
6.97, [n = 54], p = 0.01), with fewer males participating in this experiment compared 
with the previous sample.   
 It was also necessary to calculate individual spatial reference frames for all 
participants, in order to categorise trials as either congruent or incongruent. There are 
two potential reference frames that can be adopted during the allocentric task: 1) 
anatomically congruent (where viewing touch to a left hand is matched to participants’ 
left hand) or 2) specular congruence (where viewing touch to a left hand is matched to a 
participants’ right hand). Congruency was defined for each participant depending on 
whichever mapping gave the largest congruency score in the sham condition of the 
‘other’ task, and this was used in analyses throughout a given participant (i.e., if the RT 
was longer for a specular mapping in the sham task then the participant was classified as 
a specular mapper, and vice versa). This analysis revealed 20 specular and 2 anatomical 
mappers. 
 
Individual differences in trait empathy and sham task performance 
To identify whether reaction times on the vicarious tactile perception tasks were 
related to individual differences in empathy, Pearsons’s correlation analyses were 
carried out between scores on the IRI subscales and RTs on each of the four tasks in the 
sham condition. A statistically significant correlation was found between scores on the 
‘perspective taking’ subscale and RTs on congruent trials of the ‘self’ task, in sham 
62 
 
stimulation conditions (r[20] = -0.43, p = 0.05). The negative correlation indicates that 
higher perspective taking ability facilitated tactile detection on the ‘self’ task when 
observed touched was spatially congruent with touch felt on the hand. 
 
Effects of high-frequency tRNS on task performance 
To examine the effects of high frequency tRNS on task performance a 4 x 2 x 2 
repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out to identify the effects of Task 
(‘self’/‘dummy’/‘other’/‘sponge’), tRNS Stimulation condition (sham/SI), and 
Congruency (congruent/incongruent) on reaction times. There was a significant main 
effect of Congruency (F[1,21] = 56.24, p < 0.01, ɳp² = 0.73), with longer reaction times 
on incongruent trials than congruent trials. However, there was no significant main 
effect of Task (F[3,63] = 1.48, p = 0.23, ɳp² = 0.07), or Stimulation condition (F[1,21] = 
0.03, p = 0.86, ɳp² < 0.01) or interactions between any of the three factors (ps > 0.12). 
In this regard, high frequency tRNS targeted over SI did not differentially modulate 
vicarious tactile perception relative to sham stimulation (Figure 3.2).   
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Figure 3.2: a) Mean reaction times for congruent and incongruent trials on each of the 
four visuotactile interference tasks following sham or tRNS targeted at SI. Significant 
congruency effects were found on all tasks. b) Individual stimulation effects (reaction 
time in tRNS condition – reaction time in sham condition) for congruent and 
incongruent trials on each task. Con, Congruent; Incon, Incongruent. Error bars 
represent +/- 1 S.E.M.  
 
To further assess any effects of stimulation, scores on the QMTS self-report 
measure of potential MTS experience on each task were also assessed. To do this, a 4 
(Task) x 2 (Stimulation) ANOVA was conducted on overall scores. This identified a 
significant main effect of Task (F[3,60] = 9.86, p < 0.01, ɳp² = 0.33), but no significant 
main effect of Stimulation condition (F[1,20] = 0.34, p = 0.57, ɳp² = 0.02), or interaction 
between Stimulation and Task (F[3,60] = 0.53, p = 0.66, ɳp² = 0.03). Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc t-tests demonstrated that the main effect of task was due to 
significantly lower scores (indicating reduced vicarious sensation) for the ‘dummy’ task 
compared with the ‘self’ (t[20] = 3.46, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.90) or ‘other’ task (t[20] 
= 3.19, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.80), and for the ‘sponge’ task compared with the ‘self’ 
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(t[20] = 3.43, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 1.01) and ‘other’ tasks (t[20] = 3.05, p < 0.01, 
Cohen’s d = 0.88). No significant difference in scores was found between the ‘dummy’ 
and ‘sponge’ tasks (t[20] = 1.09, p = 0.29, Cohen’s d = 0.27), or the ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
tasks (t[20] = 1.96, p = 0.06, Cohen’s d = 0.48). Means are displayed in Table 3.1. The 
pattern of results indicates a greater tendency towards conscious vicarious tactile 
perception on the tasks in which touch was viewed to another human hand, compared 
with an inanimate object, but that this was not modulated by high frequency tRNS 
targeted at SI. 
 
Table 3.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for QMTS items, following each tRNS 
stimulation session in Experiment 1. Possible scores range from -6 to +6, with higher 
scores indicating greater self-reported vicarious tactile perception 
 Active SI tRNS  Sham tRNS 
Visuotactile Interference Task M SD  M SD 
Self -2.05 2.85  -1.59 3.32 
Other -2.23 2.71  -2.14 3.14 
Dummy -3.10 2.21  -3.05 2.28 
Sponge -3.27 1.88  -3.23 1.90 
N  = 22 
 
Individual differences in trait empathy and effects of tRNS on task performance 
While tRNS stimulation targeted at SI did not significantly alter task 
performance at the group level, based on the results above and prior research (Bolognini 
et al., 2013) there was reason to predict that the effects of tRNS on task performance 
may interact with individual differences in trait empathy (specifically the perspective 
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taking subscale of the IRI). To examine this prediction, a series of correlations between 
scores on perspective taking subscale of the IRI and stimulation effect scores (the 
difference between congruency effects in the active tRNS and sham condition) on the 
‘self’, ‘other’, ‘dummy’ and ‘sponge’ tasks were conducted. This revealed no significant 
relationships (ps < . 40).  
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
Collectively the findings from Experiment One indicate that active compared to 
sham high frequency tRNS targeted at SI does not modulate vicarious tactile perception 
on tasks assessing visuotactile interference effects when observing touch to humans 
(from an allocentric and egocentric perspective) and objects. This result conflicts with 
prior findings suggesting that increasing excitability in SI can lead to greater vicarious 
tactile perception and induce behavioural performance consistent with that found in 
mirror-touch synaesthetes (Bolognini et al., 2013). In this context, it is also of note that 
no significant differences were found between active SI and sham tRNS conditions on 
self-reported mirror-touch synaesthesia experiences across the tasks or relationship 
between levels of perspective taking and performance change following stimulation (as 
was found in Bolognini et al., 2013).  
One reason why there may have been differences between the present high 
frequency tRNS results and those using tDCS to increase excitability in SI in prior work 
could relate to the mechanism of action of the different types of stimulation. Moreover, 
prior work suggests that high frequency tRNS and tDCS may influence brain 
excitability via different mechanisms (Miniussi et al., 2013; Paulus et al., 2016; Terney 
et al., 2008). As a consequence a second experiment was conducted, with a new group 
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of participants, more closely following the same brain stimulation procedure (i.e., using 
matched tDCS parameters) as that used in prior work in attempt to determine if it was 
possible to replicate the prior pattern of data.  
Experiment Two further extends prior work by considering extra questions 
related to vicarious tactile perception. In particular, in addition to SI, the study was 
designed to examine whether tDCS targeted at rTPJ may influence vicarious perception. 
The rationale for examining the effect of stimulating the rTPJ was to assess whether 
modulating a brain region linked to self-other control may also modulate vicarious 
tactile perception. Although excitability within the somatosensory system is likely to 
contribute to how we perceive tactile events to others, the ability to correctly distinguish 
and manipulate self-relevant or other-relevant representations is another mechanism 
which is thought to be involved. Appropriate levels of vicarious perception require 
enhancing representations of other people and inhibiting the representation of one’s own 
affective state; however in order to prevent excessive personal distress from another’s 
negative affective state, it can be adaptive to inhibit the representation of the other’s 
affective state and enhance the representations of the self (Cheng et al., 2007; Decety et 
al., 2010). In this regard, the interplay between mechanisms of vicarious perception and 
mechanisms of self-other representation has been highlighted as a crucial interaction in 
understanding other people’s experiences (Bird & Viding, 2014; Lamm, Bukowski & 
Silani, 2016; Ward & Banissy, 2015). Indeed, recent work suggests that training the 
ability to control self-other representations can result in modulation of vicarious pain 
perception (de Guzman, Bird, Banissy & Catmur, 2016). Crucially, tDCS targeted at the 
rTPJ has been shown to increase the ability to control self-other representations 
(Santiesteban et al., 2012), and modulate cognitive components of empathy for pain 
(Coll, Tremblay & Jackson, 2017). To date, a single study has attempted to examine 
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whether stimulating rTPJ can influence vicarious tactile perception. Vandenbroucke and 
colleagues (2016) repeated the visuotactile interference task used by Banissy and Ward 
(2007) and Bolognini and colleagues (2013), this time aiming to modulate performance 
following tDCS targeted at rTPJ. Since increasing cortical excitability in rTPJ has been 
shown to improve self-other control, the authors predicted that accuracy and reaction 
times would improve on the task following stimulation. However, this modulation was 
not found, in response to either viewed touch or pain (conflicting with Coll et al., 2017). 
One possible reason for this was that touch was always viewed to another human hand 
in a first-person perspective, which could conceivably be viewed as belonging to the 
self. This possibility was considered in Experiment Two by assessing whether any 
effect of stimulation targeted at rTPJ was specific to viewing touch to human versus 
inanimate agents by including a dummy hand control task – a question that has not been 
addressed in prior work. 
 
3.3. Experiment Two 
 
The present study aimed to replicate the procedure of Bolognini and colleagues 
(2013), assessing performance on two visuotactile interference tasks during active or 
sham right-hemisphere tDCS targeted at primary somatosensory cortex. Based on the 
results of Experiment One, observed touch to a dummy hand was selected as a control 
task for touch to a human hand. Additionally, to probe the potential role of self-other 
control in vicarious tactile perception, a third stimulation condition was added, in which 
stimulation was delivered to right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). 
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3.3.1 Materials and methods 
Participants 
24 participants (16F, 8M; 23 right-handed; age 20-29 years, M = 23.2, SD = 2.6) 
who did not take part in Experiment One were recruited from Goldsmiths College. All 
volunteers were paid £20 on completion of the study. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and met the required safety precautions to take part in 
electrical brain stimulation (Bikson et al., 2009). Ethical approval was granted by the 
Department of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London. 
 
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) protocol 
The experiment had a within-subjects design, with all participants completing 
the tasks under active right SI (rSI), active right TPJ (rTPJ) stimulation, and sham 
conditions. In contrast to Experiment One, stimulation was delivered unilaterally using 
tDCS. To target rSI the anodal electrode was placed 2cm posterior to C4, and for rTPJ, 
the anode was placed over CP6 (Herwig et al., 2003). A supraorbital reference on the 
contralateral hemisphere was used for both sites. For 50% of participants, the rSI site 
was used during sham, and for 50% the rTPJ site was used. Active stimulation was 
delivered online for 20 minutes during completion of the tasks. As before, the current 
was ramped up for 15 seconds to 1.5mA, based on prior work (Bolognini et al., 2013), 
and then held constant for 20 minutes. Stimulation was terminated if participants 
completed both tasks in less than 20 minutes. In the sham session stimulation was 
delivered for only 15 seconds (Gandiga, Hummel & Cohen, 2006; Nitsche et al., 2008; 
Poreisz et al., 2007). All aspects of the stimulation protocol were selected to match that 
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used by Bolognini and colleagues (2013), aside from the placement of electrodes for 
rTPJ stimulation, which was guided by consensus in previous tDCS research (e.g., 
Santiesteban et al., 2012, Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur & Bird, 2015; Vandenbroucke 
et al., 2016). Participants received rSI, rTPJ and sham stimulation across three separate 
sessions, scheduled approximately one week apart to avoid practice effects. The order of 
the three sessions was counterbalanced between participants in an ABC-BCA-CAB 
design. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment comprised three sessions: rSI, rTPJ and sham stimulation. In 
this procedure tDCS was delivered online whilst the two visuotactile interference tasks 
(‘self’ and ‘dummy’) were completed. Online tDCS was used to replicate prior work. It 
took no more than 20 minutes to complete both tasks. As in Experiment One, 
participants completed the QMTS (Bolognini et al., 2013) at the end of every session, 
and the IRI (Davis, 1980) at the end of the sham session. 
 
Visuotactile Interference Tasks 
Participants completed the ‘self’ and ‘dummy’ tasks as in Experiment One 
(Figure 3.1), with the order of tasks counterbalanced between participants.  
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3.3.2 Results  
Prior to analysis, data was trimmed for each participant to exclude any reaction 
time (RT) that fell two standard deviations above or below the mean for each task and 
stimulation condition. This resulted in 4.6% of data removal.  One participant was also 
excluded prior to the analysis, as they were identified as a significant outlier based on 
Grubb’s test calculations on RTs. This resulted in the following demographic 
characteristics of the sample: 15 female, 8 male; age 20-29 years, M = 23.3, SD = 2.7. 
This did not differ significantly from the sample recruited by Bolognini and colleagues 
(2013) in terms of age (t[53] = 0.63, p = 0.53) or gender (χ²1 = 0.38, [n = 55], p = 0.54). 
 
Individual variability in trait empathy and task performance in sham condition 
 Scores on the IRI (Davis, 1980), were first correlated against RTs in each of the 
stimulation, task and congruency conditions. Unlike Experiment One, no significant 
correlations were found. 
 
Effects of tDCS on task performance 
To examine whether active or sham tDCS to rSI or rTPJ resulted in differential 
effects on performance a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out to 
assess the effects of tDCS Stimulation condition (rSI/rTPJ/sham), Task 
(‘self’/‘dummy’), Congruency (congruent/incongruent) and Location of the tactile 
stimulus (left/right) on RTs. 
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The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Congruency (F[1,22] = 45.93, 
p < 0.01, ɳp² = 0.68) and Location (F[1,22] = 41.29, p < 0.01, ɳp² = 0.65) on RTs, with 
participants taking longer to respond when the tactile stimulus was incongruent with the 
visual stimulus, and when the tactile stimulus was presented on the right hand rather 
than the left. Main effects of Stimulation (F[2,44] = 0.47, p = 0.63, ɳp² = 0.02) and Task 
(F[1,22] = 0.30, p = 0.59, ɳp² = 0.01) were not significant. The interaction between 
Stimulation and Task was significant (F[2,44] = 3.37, p = 0.04, ɳp² = 0.13). Post-hoc t-
tests demonstrate a trend towards significance following rSI stimulation on the ‘self’ 
task (t[22] = 2.05, p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.43), but not the ‘dummy’ task (t[22] = 0.01, p 
= 0.99, Cohen’s d < 0.01), and no significant effects of rTPJ stimulation on either the 
‘self’ (t[22] = 1.54, p = 0.14, Cohen’s d = 0.32) or ‘dummy’ task (t[22] = 0.46, p = 0.65, 
Cohen’s d = 0.10). Together, this indicates that participants were slower to respond on 
the ‘self’ task following rSI stimulation. Crucially, the interaction between Stimulation 
and Congruency did not reach significance (F[2,44] = 2.51, p = 0.09, ɳp² = 0.10). In this 
regard, the evidence did not suggest a significantly different pattern of results between 
the size of congruency effects across the stimulation conditions. 
Despite the lack of interaction with regards to reaction time differences, there 
was rationale to consider a slightly less conservative approach to analysis given prior 
predictions regarding SI effects based on the previous study (e.g., Bolognini et al, 
2013). With this in mind, in order to further identify whether the results presented by 
Bolognini and colleagues had been replicated, a series of independent t-tests were 
carried out to assess whether RTs in each task, congruency, side and stimulation 
condition (rSI or rTPJ) significantly differed from sham. This revealed a significant 
increase in RT on incongruent trials of the ‘self’ task during rSI stimulation relative to 
sham, when touch was felt on the right and observed on the left (contralateral) side to 
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the stimulation (t[22] = 2.31, p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.51), although note that this would 
not survive correction for multiple comparison (Figure 3.3). Stimulation effects were 
not significant when observed touch was ipsilateral to stimulation, although there was a 
trend in this direction (t[22] = 1.97, p = 0.06, Cohen’s d = 0.41). A similar trend was 
found on congruent trials of the ‘self’ task, when viewed/observed touch was on the left 
(contralateral) side to both rSI (t[22] = 2.05, p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.43) and rTPJ (t[22] 
= 2.02, p = 0.06, Cohen’s d = 0.42) stimulation, relative to sham. No further 
comparisons reached significance (ps > 0.12). In this regard, although some evidence is 
provided which points towards data that is consistent with prior work suggesting that 
increasing cortical excitability in SI can modulate the degree of vicarious tactile 
perception, the present data struggle to provide strong evidence (e.g., differential effects 
across stimulation sites as supported by a top level ANOVA) to support this claim.  
There was also not sufficient evidence to suggest that rTPJ stimulation influences 
vicarious tactile perception.  
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Figure 3.3: a) Mean reaction times for each trial type on the ‘self’ task during sham 
conditions and tDCS targeted at rSI and rTPJ. A significant increase in RT was 
observed following SI stimulation, for incongruent trials where observed touch was 
contralateral to the stimulation site (*p < .05). b) Individual stimulation effects 
(reaction time in tDCS condition – reaction time in sham condition) for each trial type 
on the ‘self’ task. c) Mean reaction times for each trial and stimulation type on the 
‘dummy’ task. No significant effects of stimulation were observed on this task. d) 
Individual stimulation effects for each trial type on the ‘dummy’ task. Con, Congruent; 
Incon, Incongruent. L, Left; R, Right. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M.  
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 As with Experiment One, the effect of stimulation on the QMTS self-report 
measure of potential MTS experiences on each task was assessed. A further 2 (Task) x 3 
(Stimulation) ANOVA identified a main effect of Task on the QMTS, with higher 
ratings of conscious vicarious experience on the ‘self’ task than the ‘dummy’ task 
(F[1,21] = 13.57, p < 0.01, ɳp² = 0.39). However, there was no significant main effect 
(F[1,21] = 0.63, p = 0.54, ɳp² = 0.03) or interaction (F[2,42] = 0.65, p = 0.53, ɳp² = 0.03) 
with Stimulation condition, indicating that conscious vicarious experience during the 
tasks did not change substantially between sessions (means are displayed in Table 3.2). 
This is consistent with the lack of effect of tDCS on congruency reaction times reported 
above and the lack of effect of active high frequency tRNS in Experiment One. 
 
Table 3.2: Mean scores and standard deviations for QMTS items, following each tDCS 
stimulation session in Experiment 2. Possible scores range from -6 to +6, with higher 
scores indicating greater self-reported vicarious tactile perception. 
 Active rSI 
tDCS 
 Active rTPJ 
tDCS 
 Sham  
tDCS 
Visuotactile Interference Task M SD  M SD  M SD 
Self -1.57 2.45  -1.23 3.01  -1.74 2.40 
Dummy -2.78 2.15  -3.00 2.25  -3.17 2.08 
N = 23 
 
 
 
Individual Differences in Trait Empathy and Effects of tDCS on Task Performance 
As with Experiment One, it was considered that the effect of tDCS on task 
performance may interact with individual differences in trait empathy (specifically the 
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perspective taking subscale of the IRI). To examine this prediction, a series of 
correlations were conducted between scores on perspective taking subscale of the IRI 
and stimulation effect scores (the difference between congruency effects in the active 
tDCS and sham conditions) on the ‘self’ and ‘dummy’ tasks. This revealed no 
significant association between perspective taking and stimulation effects (ps > .26).  
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
Taken collectively, while the results from Experiment Two provide some 
evidence in support of the claim that increasing unilateral cortical excitability in rSI 
with anodal tDCS was able to increase vicarious tactile perception in typical adults, this 
was only apparent when using liberal statistical thresholds. Indeed, the overall pattern of 
the current data struggles to lend strong support to the possibility that increasing 
unilateral cortical excitability in rSI modulates vicarious tactile perception in a site or 
task specific manner. Instead, there is not clear evidence that increasing cortical 
excitability in rSI with tDCS leads to differential changes in vicarious tactile perception 
from sham stimulation or stimulation to rTPJ. 
 
3.4. General discussion 
 
The present studies aimed to build on past evidence suggesting that vicarious 
responses to touch may be enhanced by increasing excitability of SI. In Experiment One 
there was no evidence for modulation of vicarious response by raising bilateral cortical 
excitability with high frequency tRNS targeted at SI. Experiment Two attempted to 
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more directly replicate previous work using tDCS targeted at SI to modulate vicarious 
tactile perception, but did not find convincing evidence for the potential to modulate 
vicarious response with unilateral tDCS targeted at right SI in a task and site specific 
manner. In addition, no evidence was found to suggest that tDCS targeted at rTPJ could 
modulate vicarious tactile perception. 
The present findings conflict with a prior tDCS study, which suggests that tDCS 
targeted at SI can modulate vicarious tactile perception (Bolognini et al., 2013). In this 
previous study the authors claim to induce behavioural performance consistent with 
individuals that experience mirror-touch synaesthesia following anodal tDCS to 
somatosensory related regions. Although a similar task and identical stimulation 
parameters were used, this pattern of data could not be clearly replicated. Some 
evidence was found to support this account in Experiment Two, using tDCS targeted at 
right SI, but this relied on uncorrected statistical analyses and was not significantly 
different to the pattern of data following sham or rTPJ stimulation.  
Although stimulation parameters were the same between studies (at least in 
Experiment Two), subtle differences in procedure and individual variability in 
responsiveness of tDCS may explain this discrepancy. With regards to procedural 
differences it is of note that an additional brain stimulation condition and trials were 
included compared to Bolognini and colleagues. Different stimuli and tasks were also 
used (from Banissy & Ward, 2007) and a different control task involving dummy hand 
stimuli as opposed to light bulb stimuli that were used previously. While it seems 
unlikely that this should decrease the likelihood of finding an effect, it is possible that 
these subtle variations may have contributed to the different pattern of data between the 
studies. Another possible reason for the discrepancy between the studies may be 
individual variability in responsiveness of tDCS. As discussed in section 2.6 of this 
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thesis, several studies now point to the importance of individual variation in tDCS 
responsiveness, with differential effects being reported in other domains (i.e., not 
vicarious perception studies) according to baseline ability (e.g., Hsu et al., 2014; Tseng 
et al., 2012), traits (e.g., Sarkar et al., 2014), baseline level of neurophysiological state 
(e.g., Fresnoza et al., 2014; Labruna et al., 2016), gender (e.g., Chaieb et al., 2008; Kuo, 
Paulus & Nitsche, 2006), age (e.g., Moliadze et al., 2015; Ross et al., 2011), and 
anatomy (e.g., Datta et al., 2012; Opitz et al., 2015). While the age and gender of 
participants in Experiment Two is consistent with Bolognini and colleagues, it is 
possible that other individual difference factors that may distinguish the present sample 
from the participants used in the prior study. Some potentially relevant individual 
differences were found in the current study (e.g., trait empathy), but these did not 
modulate stimulation effects in a systematic fashion. Future work should more closely 
examine how individual variability may influence changes in vicarious tactile 
perception following tDCS targeted at somatosensory related areas. 
The lack of significant increase in vicarious tactile perception following high 
frequency tRNS or tDCS targeted at somatosensory regions also contradicts predictions 
based on a Threshold Theory account of mirror-touch synaesthesia, which suggests that 
increased baseline excitability in somatosensory regions may boost vicarious responses 
to observed touch over a threshold for conscious perception (see Ward & Banissy, 2015 
for review). In both experiments no strong evidence for modulation in conscious 
vicarious perception was found, either behaviourally or in self-reported experience, 
when excitability was increased in SI. Past research has identified structural brain 
differences associated with MTS that extend outside of the somatosensory system 
(Holle et al., 2013), suggesting a potentially contrasting neural profile between 
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individuals with and without MTS. For this reason it may be wrong to assume that this 
unique perceptual experience can be induced in controls. 
In line with the results of previous research (Vandenbroucke et al., 2016) 
enhancing excitability of rTPJ with tDCS also did not significantly modulate vicarious 
tactile perception. This region has previously been linked with self-other control 
mechanisms, and stimulation of rTPJ with tDCS has been shown to improve the ability 
to accurately switch between representations of self and others, according to task 
demand (Santiesteban et al., 2012; Santiesteban et al., 2015a). Individuals with MTS 
have been shown to have deficits in the ability to control self-other representations 
when there is a need to inhibit others and enhance the self (Santiesteban et al., 2015b). 
Further, training typical adults to become better able to control self-other 
representations can lead to modulation of vicarious pain perception, although the neural 
locus of how self-other control training contributes to this effect has not been 
investigated (de Guzman et al., 2016). With this in mind, it is perhaps surprising that 
tDCS targeted at rTPJ did not improve the ability to inhibit vicarious responses to 
observed touch to another person, when responding to felt touch on the participant’s 
own hands.  
The degree to which self-other control is pivotal to the particular tasks used is an 
important consideration. Participants were instructed to respond with the location where 
they felt touch on their own hands, but were not explicitly told to inhibit the touch they 
saw on the screen (i.e., there were no explicit self-other control demands). Further, it is 
possible that when viewing hands from an egocentric perspective, the hands are 
represented as part of the self rather than other (see section 1.2). In this case, there are 
fewer requirements to control self-other representations. In future it would be interesting 
to consider whether these mechanisms can be engaged to a greater extent by 
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manipulating task instructions and design. Behavioural differences in self-other control 
associated with conscious vicarious perception are explored further in the next chapter. 
Recent models of TPJ function have argued that this region is not solely 
involved in social processing, suggesting that anodal stimulation of rTPJ might facilitate 
task-relevant representations in a domain-general way (Carter & Huettel, 2013; Cook, 
2014; see section 1.2).  These models imply that modulation of task performance would 
be expected in the current experiment despite the possibility of low self-other control 
demands discussed above. Following this assumption, increasing excitability of the 
rTPJ might be expected to reduce reaction times for reporting the location of the tactile 
stimulus due to enhancement of this task-relevant representation over the task-irrelevant 
observed touch, rather than through improvements in specifically self-other control 
ability. Nevertheless, this pattern of results was not found. Carter and Huettel, among 
others, have argued that the TPJ should not be considered a unified region, due to the 
multiple functions thought to occur within distinct sub-regions. The use of 5x5 cm 
electrodes over rTPJ may therefore not have been sufficiently focal to target the most 
relevant sub-regions. Carter & Huettel suggest, for example, that the area of the TPJ 
within the angular gyrus is a likely candidate for where multimodal information is 
integrated to construct social context, and so provides a sub-region of interest to target. 
Future work could explore this possibility using more focal stimulation methods, such 
as neuronavigation-guided TMS. 
It should be noted that the tDCS parameters in the present study differed from 
those used in previous experiments modulating activity of rTPJ with tDCS. For 
instance, prior work examining self-other representation using tDCS targeted at rTPJ 
has stimulated offline at 1mA using 5x7 cm electrodes (e.g., Santiesteban et al., 2012; 
Santiesteban et al., 2015a; Sowden et al., 2015) or 5x7 cm and 10x10 cm electrodes 
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(e.g., Liepelt et al., 2016). Similarly, Coll and colleagues (2017) used 2mA tDCS with 
5x7cm electrodes to assess vicarious pain perception. Our decision to use a protocol 
involving online stimulation at 1.5mA using 5x5cm electrodes was selected to match 
that in the rSI stimulation condition (which was selected to replicate prior work - 
Bolognini et al., 2013). The differences between our rTPJ stimulation montage and 
those used in other studies may have affected the degree of modulation of rTPJ 
compared with past research. This could account for the lack of influence of rTPJ 
stimulation on vicarious perception in Experiment 2.  
It is also important to consider how the present findings relate to the broader 
literature regarding the role of sensorimotor contributions to social perception. For 
instance, recent evidence has indicated that a range of social perception abilities are 
linked with sensorimotor cortex activity (e.g., Adolphs et al., 2000; Banissy et al., 2010; 
Jacquet & Avenanti, 2015; Keysers et al., 2010; Paracampo et al., 2016; Pitcher et al., 
2008; Pourtois et al., 2004; Valchev et al., 2017). Several of these have used non-
invasive brain stimulation to show changes in social perception skills following 
sensorimotor cortex stimulation relative to appropriate control conditions (e.g., baseline, 
control brain stimulation conditions). There have, however, been few published 
replication attempts for these studies. The present study, together with the evidence of 
large inter-individual differences in the effects of non-invasive brain stimulation (e.g., 
Fertonani & Miniussi, 2017; Hsu et al., 2016; Ridding & Ziemann, 2010), calls for more 
systematic investigations and replications in this area. 
While stimulation effects were not observed, there were some behavioural 
effects of note. For example, the degree of vicarious touch perception was associated 
with self-reported perspective taking when viewing spatially congruent touch to another 
human hand (versus a dummy hand or object). Previous research has shown a positive 
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correlation between perspective taking scores and activation in SI (Schaefer et al., 
2012), as well as amplitudes of somatosensory-evoked potentials (Martínez-Jauand et 
al., 2012) when observing touch.  The present results are in line with these findings. 
Despite this association between perspective taking and vicarious tactile perception, this 
factor was not found to interact with the effects of tDCS or high frequency tRNS on 
task performance in the present studies. 
In summary, across two studies no clear evidence was found to support the 
suggestion that increasing cortical excitability in somatosensory regions of typical 
younger adult participants leads to differential changes in vicarious tactile perception 
from sham stimulation or stimulation to the rTPJ. These findings conflict with prior 
results and threshold based accounts of individual differences in vicarious perception. 
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Chapter 4 
Inhibitory Control in Vicarious Pain Responders 
 
Prior research has identified considerable variation in the vicarious perception of pain, 
with some individuals experiencing a conscious sensation on their own body when 
viewing another person in pain. Self-Other Theory could provide a potential 
explanation of conscious vicarious pain, suggesting that impairments in inhibiting 
representations of others and enhancing representations of the self may underlie 
atypical vicarious perception. Alternatively, Task Control Theory suggests that 
impairments in domain-general inhibitory control processes, rather than those specific 
to self and other can account for the perceptual and behavioural differences observed in 
MTS and conscious vicarious pain. In Chapter 3, enhancing excitability at the right 
temporo-parietal junction, a region previously associated with self-other control, did 
not modulate vicarious tactile perception. The present experiment aimed to follow-up 
claims of atypical self-other control in conscious vicarious perception with a 
behavioural task. It also aimed to clarify whether impairment in domain-general 
inhibitory control ability can provide a better account of how vicarious pain is 
experienced as a conscious percept. In this sample, no significant differences in either 
self-other control or domain–general inhibitory control were observed between 
Sensory-Localised or Affective-Generalised conscious vicarious pain responders and 
controls. Participants also completed a visuotactile interference task, similar to that in 
Chapter 3, involving images of pain. Again, conscious vicarious pain responders did 
not differ from controls in their performance on this task, but hypervigilance to pain 
was associated with greater congruency effects in control participants. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Vicarious perception of pain varies considerably from person to person, with 
some individuals reporting a conscious sensation of pain on their own body when seeing 
another person in pain. Conscious vicarious pain which evokes a physical response 
localised to the same body part as the observed pain (i.e., Sensory-Localised) is 
estimated at around 19% prevalence (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). Other individuals 
report a more affective vicarious pain response, which is generalised over the body 
(Affective-Generalised, estimated prevalence 12%); but for the majority of people 
observing pain does not elicit conscious vicarious experiences (estimated prevalence 
69%). Based on a procedure designed to verify mirror touch synaesthesia (MTS), a 
related form of conscious vicarious perception (Banissy & Ward, 2007), 
Vandenbroucke and colleagues (2013) developed a task to assess conscious vicarious 
pain experience. In this task participants were required to detect the location of a tactile 
stimulus on their right or left hand while concurrently viewing images of hands being 
pricked by a needle. This observed pain could either be spatially congruent (i.e., on the 
same hand) or incongruent (i.e., on the opposite hand) with the tactile stimulus. On 
incongruent trials, conscious vicarious pain responders were more likely than control 
participants to erroneously state that they felt the tactile stimulus in the same location 
that the visual stimulus was presented. This type of error indicates that viewing pain 
elicited a vicarious physical sensation on the participant’s own body which interfered 
with accurate detection of the tactile stimulus. Results from a previously used tactile 
version of this task indicate that greater visual interference is associated with higher 
self-reported empathy, specifically the perspective-taking subscale of the IRI (see 
Chapter 3; Davis, 1980) and the emotional reactivity subscale of the Empathy Quotient 
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(Banissy & Ward, 2007; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Hypervigilance to pain 
has also been suggested as a potential moderator of performance on the pain version of 
this task (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010; Vandenbroucke et al., 2013). 
Theories regarding the causes of MTS have been applied to account for 
individual variability in vicarious pain. In particular, the Self-Other Theory of mirror-
touch synaesthesia (MTS) proposes that impairment in controlling representations of the 
self and others underlies conscious vicarious perception (Ward & Banissy, 2015; see 
section 1.3 for a discussion). In line with this account, conscious vicarious pain 
responders (both Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised) show reduced grey 
matter density at the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) in comparison with controls 
(Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). Several studies indicate that the rTPJ is involved in the 
ability to represent and control representations of the self and others. For instance, 
anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over rTPJ improves performance 
on tasks of imitation-inhibition, which requires enhancing representations of the self 
and suppressing those of the other, and perspective-taking, which requires suppressing 
representations of the self and enhancing those of the other, but not on a non-imitative 
inhibitory control task, requiring inhibition of an irrelevant cue, but not the specific 
control of representations of self and other (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 
2012). 
An important contribution to the Self-Other Theory relative to MTS is provided 
by Santiesteban and colleagues (2015b). In this study, participants with MTS performed 
comparably with control participants on measures of perspective-taking and theory of 
mind. However, controls outperformed MTS on an imitation-inhibition task (matching 
that used by Santiesteban et al., 2012 and Hogeveen et al., 2015). The task requires 
participants to perform finger movements which are either congruent or incongruent 
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with the movements of a hand viewed on the screen. Enhancing representations of the 
self and inhibiting representations of the other are therefore required when actions are 
incongruent. In this condition participants with MTS made more errors and had slower 
reaction times than controls without MTS, indicating a specific difficulty with inhibiting 
other-relevant representations. 
Self-other control ability has also been linked to vicarious perception of pain. 
Training the ability to control representations of the self and other can enhance 
vicarious pain perception, leading to a greater decrease in MEPs when viewing others in 
pain (de Guzman et al., 2016). Derbyshire and colleagues (2013) provide evidence for 
impaired self-other control ability in conscious vicarious pain responders. The authors 
demonstrate this using the dot-perspective task, which presents participants with an 
image of an avatar placed in a room with three walls. On each trial, between 0-3 dots 
appear on the walls, either facing the avatar or away from the avatar. This meant that the 
number of dots the participant could see either matched the number the avatar could see 
(congruent trials) or was different (incongruent trials). Participants were cued to either 
confirm the number of dots that they could see themselves (self-perspective) or the 
number the avatar could see (other-perspective). When adopting a self-perspective, 
vicarious pain responders showed a significant increase in reaction times on incongruent 
trials compared with congruent trials, while controls did not. When adopting an other-
perspective, both groups showed a significant effect of congruency, although this 
difference was larger for controls than for vicarious pain responders. Impairment in 
inhibiting representations of others’ mental states when focusing on the self therefore 
appears to be shared by individuals with MTS and vicarious pain responders.  
However, the study by Derbyshire and colleagues (2013) has been criticised for 
reflecting domain-general cognitive processes rather than self-other control. 
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Santiesteban and colleagues (2014) conducted a version of this task in which the avatar 
was replaced with an arrow (i.e., a non-social agent) on 50% of blocks. Participants 
were again required to confirm the number of dots they could see, the number that the 
avatar could see, or the number that the arrow was pointing at. Comparable effects were 
found on both tasks, where reaction times were slower when the perspective of either 
the avatar or the arrow did not match the perspective of the participant. Differences in 
behavioural performance in and vicarious pain responders compared with controls 
reported by Derbyshire and colleagues may then reflect a deficit in domain-general 
inhibitory control rather than specific to self-other control.  
Heyes and Catmur (2015) extend this evidence to propose that vicarious touch 
and pain experiences may be better understood in terms of domain-general inhibitory 
control mechanisms (Task Control Theory). The authors highlight that prior evidence of 
atypical self-awareness in MTS and vicarious pain responders, including susceptibility 
to the rubber hand illusion (Aimola Davies & White, 2013; Derbyshire et al., 2013), 
could also be accounted for in terms of domain-general mechanisms of associative 
learning. The results presented by Santiesteban and colleagues (2015b) conflict with 
this theory, since no significant differences were found between individuals with MTS 
and controls on a perspective-taking task which required participants to enhance 
representations of the other and inhibit representations of the self. If MTS were 
associated with domain-general impairment in task control then we should also predict 
poorer performance on this task. However, whether this specificity also exists for 
vicarious pain responders is yet to be seen. In light of this, the present study aimed to 
identify whether those that experience conscious vicarious pain show similar 
performance to MTS on tasks which require self-other control, and the extent to which 
this reflects impairments in domain-general or purely social cognitive processes. 
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The present experiment compared the performance of conscious vicarious pain 
responders with non-responder controls on a visuotactile interference task, and across 
three tasks of inhibitory control: imitation-inhibition, perspective-taking, and a domain-
general stop-signal task.  All three tasks involve the need to switch between task-
relevant and task-irrelevant information, but vary in the focus of this switching (i.e., 
between representations of self and other, or in non-social information). Contrasting 
performance across these measures can therefore inform us about domain-general or 
domain-specific differences in inhibitory control in vicarious pain responders. Self-
report measures of empathy and hypervigiliance to pain were also administered.  Based 
on prior research with mirror-touch synaesthetes, it was predicted that vicarious pain 
responders would exhibit greater difficulty enhancing the self and inhibiting the other 
on the imitation-inhibition task, but comparable performance on the perspective-taking 
and stop-signal tasks compared with controls. It was also predicted that vicarious pain 
responders would show greater interference from the visual pain stimulus on the 
visuotactile interference task than controls, and that self-reported empathy and 
hypervigilance to pain would moderate interference effects on this task. 
 
4.2 Materials and methods 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
37 healthy participants took part in the experiment for course credit or £10 
payment. All participants were assigned to one of three pain responder groups on the 
basis of a cluster analysis of their responses on an online vicarious pain questionnaire 
(see section 5.2). This comprised 10 Sensory-Localised pain responders (8F, 2M; age 
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18-21 years, M = 19.3, SD = 0.8), 3 Affective-Generalised pain responders (3F, 0M; age 
20-34 years, M = 26.7, SD = 7.0), and 24 non-responder controls (21F, 3M; age 18-45 
years, M = 21.9, SD = 6.1). There were no significant differences in age (F[2,34] = 2.35, 
p = .110) between the pain responder groups. Gender differences between groups were 
also not significant, according to Fisher’s exact test (p = .756). Normal or corrected-to-
normal vision was a requirement to participate. The project was approved by the 
Goldsmiths Psychology department ethics committee. 
 
4.2.2 Procedure 
In the experimental session, participants first answered self-report measures 
assessing pain vigilance and empathy. Participants then completed four experimental 
tasks. The order of the first three tasks was counterbalanced, and included an imitation-
inhibition task, a perspective-taking task, and a stop-signal task as a measure of domain-
general inhibitory control. Following these tasks participants completed a pain version 
of a visuotactile interference task. This task was administered at the end of the session 
in case the sight of pain should cause distress, or synaesthetic sensations in the Sensory-
Localised responder group, which might affect performance on subsequent tasks.  
 
Stop-Signal Task 
The commonly used Stop-signal task (e.g., Logan & Cowan, 1984) was 
administered as a measure of domain-general (i.e., non-social) inhibitory control. 
Participants first complete one block containing 64 Go-trials, in which either a letter X 
or O appears on the screen. Participants are instructed to “press the Z key when you see 
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X and the M key when you see O”, and to respond as quickly as possible. The following 
three test blocks contain 144 Go-trials, and 48 Stop-trials, presented in random order. 
On Stop-trials, a red box occasionally appears around the letter, indicating that the 
participant must inhibit their response (i.e., refrain from the key press). The signal 
appears after a short stop-signal delay (SSD), which is staircased according to the 
participant’s performance, such that a correct inhibition of response leads to a 50ms 
increase in SSD, and failure to inhibit leads to a 50ms decrease. This ensured inhibition 
accuracy was maintained at around 50% across participants. If participants do not 
respond to Go-trials within two standard deviations of their median response time on the 
initial Go-trial block, they are prompted to “Go Faster!”. 
 
Imitation-Inhibition Task 
The imitation-inhibition task (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Prinz, 2000) 
required participants to move either their index or middle finger upwards as cued by a 
number (1 for index, 2 for middle) which appeared on the computer screen in front of 
them. Simultaneously, participants viewed a hand making finger movements on the 
screen that were either congruent (i.e., index finger moves when participant is instructed 
to move index finger) or incongruent (i.e., middle finger moves when participant is 
instructed to move index finger). The participant must then inhibit the imitation of the 
observed finger movement on incongruent trials. The task consists of 60 congruent and 
60 incongruent trials, which were randomised across two blocks. 
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Perspective-Taking Task 
Perspective-Taking ability was assessed using the ‘Director’ task (Keysar, Barr, 
Balin & Brauner, 2000). Each trial of this task depicts a shelf containing several items, 
with a figure (the director) standing behind the shelf facing the participant. The 
participant is instructed to move items on the shelf using the mouse, following 
directions from the perspective of the director. For instance, if the instruction is to move 
an item “left”, the correct response is to drag the item to the director’s left, meaning the 
participant’s right. In addition some items are apparently visible only to the participant, 
and not to the director, due to a panel at the back of the shelf. Participants must be 
aware that the director will not instruct them to move any item which he cannot see. For 
example, if they are instructed by the director to move the vase, the correct response is 
to move the vase which is visible to the director, not one which is blocked by a panel. 
On 36 experimental trials the perspective of the director is incongruent with the 
perspective of the participant, and on 72 control trials the participant and director’s 
perspectives are congruent. All trials were randomised across three blocks. 
 
Visuotactile Interference Task 
For this task participants were required to state the location of a tactile sensation 
on their own hand, while simultaneously observing another hand on the computer 
screen being pricked by a needle. The method was adapted from a version containing a 
non-painful touch stimulus by Banissy and Ward (2007), in light of recent work by 
Vandenbroucke et al., (2014). For each trial, participants viewed a 1500ms fixation 
cross, followed by three consecutive images showing the hands approached and 
penetrated by the needle. This observed painful event occurred either on the left, right or 
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both hands, which were presented in an egocentric perspective. The tactile stimulus was 
delivered to the participant’s hands 10ms after the onset of the needle prick. This image 
then remained on the screen until the participant gave a response. The tactile stimulus 
was delivered either to the participant’s left, right or both hands, or there was no 
stimulus at all. On 60 trials the felt sensation was spatially congruent with the observed 
pain, on 60 trials it was incongruent, and on 60 trials there was no tactile stimulus. The 
order of trials was counterbalanced across three blocks. Participants gave verbal 
responses using a voice key, by stating “left”, “right”, “both” or “none”, according to 
the location they felt the sensation, and were asked to respond as quickly and accurately 
as possible. The stimulus was delivered using 2 miniature solenoid tappers attached to 
the dorsum of the participant’s left and right hands with medical tape. A Dual Channel 
Solenoid Controller (MSTC3-2; M & E Solve) was used to control the tappers. During 
the task white noise was played through headphones during each trial to mask the sound 
of the tappers. 
 
4.2.3 Self-report measures 
Pain Vigilance and Awareness Questionnaire 
The Pain Vigilance and Awareness Questionnaire (PVAQ; McCracken, 1997) 
was administered as a measure of hypervigilance to pain. The 16-item questionnaire 
requires participants to consider their experience of pain over the past two weeks and to 
indicate how frequently each item, such as “I pay close attention to pain”, is true of 
them, on a six-point scale from “never” to “always”. Total scores can range from 0 to 
80, with a higher score indicating greater pain vigilance. The author reports good 
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internal consistency (α = .86) and validity for the scale as an indicator of attention to 
pain. 
 
Empathy Quotient 
The 40-item version of the Empathy Quotient (EQ-40; Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004) was used to assess self-report trait empathy. This questionnaire 
asks participants to indicate the extent to which they agree with each of 40 statements, 
such as “I find it easy to put myself in somebody else's shoes”, using a four-point scale 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Total scores range from 0 to 80, with a higher 
score indicating higher trait empathy. Scores can also be clustered into three subscales, 
reflecting ‘cognitive empathy’, ‘emotional reactivity’ and ‘social skills’ (Lawrence, 
Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004). The cognitive empathy subscale refers to 
the appreciation of others’ affective states, for instance “I can tell if someone is masking 
their true emotion”. Emotional reactivity reflects the emotional response to others’ 
states, for instance “Seeing people cry doesn’t really upset me”, while the social skills 
subscale refers to intuitive social understanding, such as “I often find it hard to 
understand whether something is rude or polite”. Lawrence et al. report good test-retest 
reliability (r = .84) and validity for the scale. 
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4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Data analysis 
Performance on the stop-signal task was analysed in terms of inhibition accuracy 
and stop-signal reaction time (SSRT). Accuracy scores represent the percentage of 
correct responses (i.e., response or inhibition), calculated individually for Go-trials and 
Stop-trials. Since SSRT cannot be directly recorded, a quantile method was used to 
estimate SSRT for each participant (see Figure 4.1). In this method, Go-trial reaction 
times (RTs) are sorted in ascending order, and SSRT is taken as the RT corresponding 
to the proportion of failed Stop-trials, minus the mean SSD (see methods). To give an 
example, if a participant failed to inhibit the button press on 30% of Stop-trials, the RT 
which is slower than 30% of Go-trial RTs would be selected. Under this model, the 30% 
of RTs faster than this would be those that were too fast to inhibit the stop-signal 
(represented by the shaded area in Figure 4.1). Mean SSD is then subtracted to give the 
time from when the stop-signal was first presented (see Congdon et al., 2012 for a full 
discussion of this method). 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of SSRT calculation on the stop-signal task (from Thakkar et al., 
2014) 
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One participant with Go-trial accuracy of less than 60% was excluded prior to 
further analysis on the stop-signal task, based on exclusion criteria recommended by 
Congdon and colleagues (2012).  
The ability to control representations of self and other on the imitation-inhibition 
and perspective-taking tasks was assessed with reaction times and percentage accuracy 
on congruent and incongruent trials. Increased reaction times and poorer accuracy on 
incongruent trials was taken as an indication of greater difficulty inhibiting task-
irrelevant representations (i.e., those relevant to the self on the perspective-taking task 
and those relevant to the other on the imitation-inhibition task), as per Santiesteban and 
colleagues (2015b).  
Performance on the visuotactile interference task was also assessed using 
reaction times and the number of errors on congruent and incongruent trials. In addition, 
mirror-pain errors were categorised as those on which the participant responded with the 
location of the visual stimulus rather than the tactile stimulus, or responded “Both”, on 
incongruent trials. For example, a response of either “Right” or “Both” when the 
stimulus is delivered on the left hand, but observed on the right, would be categorised as 
a mirror-pain error. Associations between self-reported empathy and hypervigilance to 
pain and interference on this task were examined using Pearson’s correlations. For this, 
congruency effects in reaction time (Incongruent RT – Congruent RT) and accuracy 
(Congruent Accuracy – Incongruent Accuracy) were also calculated. In both cases, a 
greater congruency effect indicates greater interference from the visual stimulus (as per 
Banissy & Ward, 2007; see Chapter 3). 
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4.3.2 Self-report measures 
Self-report measures were compared between pain responder groups with a 
series of univariate ANOVA tests. This revealed no significant differences  in emotional 
reactivity (F[2,34] = 0.32, p = .732, ɳp² = .02), cognitive empathy (F[2,34] = 0.36, p = 
.701, ɳp² = .02), social skills (F[2,34] = 0.30, p = .740, ɳp² = .02) or overall EQ scores 
(F[2,34] = 0.11, p = .898, ɳp² = .01). There were also no significant differences on the 
PVAQ (F[2,33] = 0.12, p = .884, ɳp² = .01). Mean questionnaire scores are displayed in 
Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Means and standard deviations of self-reported empathy and vigilance to 
pain for each of the three pain responder groups. No significant between-group 
differences were observed. 
 Controls Sensory-Localised Affective-Generalised 
Self-Report Measure M SD M SD M SD 
Empathy Quotient 48.7 13.0 48.7 9.9 52.3 22.1 
    Emotional Reactivity 14.7 5.6 15.8 2.4 16.7 8.4 
    Cognitive Empathy 14.0 4.7 14.6 4.3 16.3 5.5 
    Social Skills 
 
6.3 2.2 5.6 3.2 5.7 2.1 
Pain Vigilance and 
Awareness Questionnaire 
44.4 11.7 46.2 8.7 43.3 14.8 
Note: Controls N = 24, Sensory-Localised N = 10, Affective-Generalised N = 3. 
 
Inter-correlations between the self-report scales showed that high pain vigilance 
was significantly associated with higher emotional reactivity (r (34) = .47, p = .004), 
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while associations with cognitive empathy (r (34) = .22, p = .207) and social skills (r 
(34) = .25, p = .141) were not significant.  
 
4.3.3 Visuotactile Interference Task 
A 3 x 2 (Pain responder group x Congruency) mixed ANOVA was used to 
analyse reaction times on the visuotactile interference task. As shown in Figure 4.2a, 
there was a main effect of Congruency (F[1,34] = 14.25, p = .001, ɳp² = .30), where 
participants were slower to respond on incongruent trials than congruent trials. The 
main effect of Pain responder group was not significant (F[2,34] = 0.99, p = .382, ɳp² = 
.06), and there was no significant interaction between variables (F[2,34] = 1.31, p = 
.284, ɳp² = .07). 
Due to a negative skew present in accuracy scores on the visuotactile 
interference task, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H test was used to compare accuracy 
on the visuotactile interference task across pain responder groups. No significant effect 
of responder group was found for accuracy on congruent (H [2] = 1.71, p = .424) or 
incongruent (H [2] = 1.04, p = .595) trials (see Figure 4.2b). A further analysis 
compared the number of mirror-pain errors made in each responder group. Again, no 
significant between-group difference was found (H [2] = 3.10, p = .212). Results are 
shown in Figure 4.2c. 
 
 
97 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Reaction times (a), accuracy (b), and number of mirror-pain errors (c) on 
the visuotactile interference task. A significant congruency effect was found in reaction 
times on the task, but there was no significant effect of responder group. No significant 
effects of congruency or responder group were found in accuracy or the number of 
mirror-pain errors. C, Control; S-L, Sensory-Localised; A-G, Affective-Generalised. 
Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
Self-reported empathy on the EQ did not correlate significantly with congruency 
effects in RT (r [35] = .19, p = .252) or accuracy (r [35] = .20, p = .239), nor with the 
number of mirror-pain errors made (r [35] = .15, p = .380) across all participants 
combined. Correlations with each of the EQ subscales (Cognitive Empathy, Emotional 
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Reactivity and Social Skills) were also not significant (ps > .18). Hypervigilance to pain 
showed no significant association with congruency effects in RT (r [34] = .15, p = 
.385), accuracy (r [34] = -.07, p = .713) or mirror-pain errors (r [34] = .07, p = .675). 
 
Table 4.2: Pearson’s correlations between self-report measures and performance on the 
visuotactile interference task. For control participants there was a positive correlation 
between self-reported pain vigilance and congruency effects in reaction times, 
indicating an association between hypervigilance to pain and increased vicarious 
response. 
 CE RT CE Accuracy MP Errors 
Self-Report Measure C S-L C S-L C S-L 
Empathy Quotient .08 .55 .28 -.02 .20 -.23 
    Emotional Reactivity .02 .51 .18 -.19 .10 -.28 
    Cognitive Empathy .17 .35 .19 -.05 .12 -.35 
    Social Skills 
 
.06 .22 .26 .14 .31 -.16 
Pain Vigilance and 
Awareness Questionnaire 
.53* -.25 .01 -.37 .09 .04 
Note: Control N = 24, Sensory-Localised N = 10. C, Control; S-L, Sensory-Localised; 
CE RT, Congruency Effect in Reaction Times; CE Accuracy, Congruency Effect in 
Accuracy; MP Errors, Mirror-Pain Errors. * p < .05 
 
Since prior work found an association between hypervigilance to pain and vicarious 
perception only in conscious vicarious pain responders, correlations were examined in 
Sensory-Localised pain responders and control participant groups individually (the 
Affective-Generalised group were not analysed due to the low sample size). In this 
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analysis no significant correlations involving empathy were found. There was a positive 
correlation between vigilance to pain and congruency effects in reaction times, in the 
control participants but not Sensory-Localised pain responders, where there was a 
non-significant negative trend (see Table 4.2). Fisher’s r-to-z transformation 
revealed a marginally-significant difference between the correlations for Sensory-
Localised and control participants (z = 1.94, p =.052). All other correlations with pain 
vigilance were not significant. 
 
4.3.4 Stop-Signal Task 
First, inhibition accuracy on Go-trials and Stop-trials was analysed with a 3x2 
(Pain responder group x Trial Type) mixed ANOVA. The main effect of Trial Type was 
significant (F[1,33] = 120.24, p < .001, ɳp² = .79), where participants were more 
accurate on Go-trials than Stop-trials. However, the main effect of Pain responder group 
(F[2,33] = 0.90, p = .418, ɳp² = .05) and interaction between the two independent 
variables (F[2,33] = 1.73, p = .193, ɳp² = .10) were not significant (see Figure 4.3a). 
Between-group differences in SSRT for each of the pain responder clusters were 
then analysed using one-way independent ANOVA. Again, the effect of responder 
group was not significant (F[2,33] = 0.01, p = .990, ɳp² < .01). Results are shown in 
Figure 4.3b. Collectively, the results indicate that domain-general inhibitory control is 
comparable between all subtypes of vicarious pain responders. 
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Figure 4.3: Inhibition accuracy for Go Trials and Stop Trials (a) and SSRT (b) on the 
stop-signal task in each of the vicarious pain responder groups. Accuracy was higher 
on Go trials than Stop trials. No significant between-group differences were found in 
inhibition accuracy or SSRT. C, Control; S-L, Sensory-Localised; A-G, Affective-
Generalised. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
4.3.5 Imitation-Inhibition 
A 3x2 (Pain responder group x Congruency) mixed ANOVA was carried out on 
accuracy scores on the imitation-inhibition task, to address the prediction that pain 
responders would show reduced accuracy inhibiting imitation when finger movements 
were incongruent. The main effect of Congruency was significant (F[1,34] = 11.48, p = 
.002, ɳp² = .25), confirming that participants were less accurate when observed 
movements were incongruent with instructed movements. However, the main effect of 
Pain responder group (F[2,34] = 1.01, p = .376, ɳp² = .06) and crucially the interaction 
between Pain responder group and Congruency (F[2,34] = 2.04, p = .145, ɳp² = .11) 
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were not significant, indicating that vicarious pain responders did not differ from non-
responders in accuracy on this task (see Figure 4.4a). 
A second 3x2 (Pain responder group x Congruency) ANOVA was conducted on 
reaction times on the task. Again, a main effect of Congruency indicated that 
participants were slower to respond on incongruent than congruent trials (F[1,34] = 
33.18, p < .001, ɳp² = .49), but the main effect of Pain responder group (F[2,34] = 0.70, 
p = .505, ɳp² = .04) and the interaction between Pain responder group and Congruency 
(F[2,34] = 0.34, p = .715, ɳp² = .02) were not significant(see Figure 4.4b). 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Accuracy (a) and reaction times (b) on congruent and incongruent trials of 
the imitation-inhibition task in each vicarious pain responder group. Higher accuracy 
and faster reaction times were observed on congruent trials than incongruent trials 
overall. No significant differences in either accuracy or reaction time were found 
between the pain responder groups. C, Control; S-L, Sensory-Localised; A-G, Affective-
Generalised. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
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4.3.6 Perspective-Taking 
A 3x2 (Pain responder group x Congruency) mixed ANOVA was carried out on 
accuracy scores on the director task. In this case, the main effect of Congruency was not 
significant (F[1,28] = 0.84, p = .368, ɳp² = .03). Neither was the main effect of Pain 
responder group (F[2,28] = 0.05, p = .954, ɳp² < .01) or the interaction between 
variables (F[2,28] = 0.40, p = .677, ɳp² = .03). Results are displayed in Figure 4.5a. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Accuracy (a) and reaction times (b) on congruent and incongruent trials of 
the perspective-taking task in each vicarious pain responder group. Overall, faster 
reaction times were observed on congruent trials than incongruent trials, but the effect 
of congruency on accuracy was not significant. No significant between-group 
differences in either accuracy or reaction time were observed. C, Control; S-L, Sensory-
Localised; A-G, Affective-Generalised. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
A further 3x2 (Pain responder group x Congruency) ANOVA compared reaction 
times on the task. This revealed a significant main effect of Congruency (F[1,28] = 
103 
 
30.65, p < .001, ɳp² = .52), where participants were slower to respond where the 
perspective of the director was incongruent with the their own, than when it was 
congruent (see Figure 4.5b). Again, however, the effect of Pain responder group was not 
significant (F[2,28] = 1.66, p = .209, ɳp² = .11), and neither was the interaction between 
Congruency and Pain responder group (F[2,28] = 1.39, p = .265, ɳp² = .09). 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
The present study compared inhibitory control ability in Sensory-Localised and 
Affective-Generalised vicarious pain responders with controls who do not experience 
conscious vicarious pain. No significant differences between pain responder groups 
were found on tasks requiring the control of self-relevant and other-relevant 
representations, or on a non-social inhibitory control task. On a visuotactile interference 
task, conscious vicarious pain responders did not significantly differ from controls in 
their ability to detect a tactile stimulus on their own hand while viewing a painful 
stimulus delivered to another hand. No moderating effects of empathy were found on 
this task, but greater congruency effects were observed for control participants with 
higher self-reported vigilance to pain. 
The present results found no evidence for atypical self-other control abilities in 
either Sensory-Localised or Affective-Generalised vicarious pain responders. These 
results contrast with past research which has indicated that vicarious pain responders 
(Derbyshire et al., 2013) are impaired in inhibiting other-relevant representations. The 
dot-perspective task used in this prior work has been criticised for reflecting domain-
general processes rather than specifically self-other control mechanisms (Santiesteban et 
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al., 2014), which could account for the discrepancy with the current results. However, 
since conscious vicarious pain responders also did not significantly differ from controls 
on a domain-general inhibitory control task in the present study, this explanation is not 
supported. Further, individuals with MTS have previously shown impairments in self-
other control ability using the same tasks as the present study (Santiesteban et al., 
2015b), indicating that they are sensitive to the predicted differences in conscious 
vicarious pain responders. One potential implication of evidence for impaired self-other 
control in MTS but not in this conscious vicarious pain sample is that it may be over-
simplistic to assume that these two conditions share underlying mechanisms. While the 
Self-Other Theory of MTS (see Ward & Banissy, 2015) has also been applied to 
vicarious pain experience, differences in prevalence of the two conditions (Sensory-
Localised vicarious pain is thought to be over ten times more common than MTS, see 
section 1.3) suggest that additional factors may be important. The question of whether 
conscious vicarious pain is associated with impairments in self-other control 
mechanisms or domain-general inhibitory control processes is therefore worthy of 
further investigation.   
The results from the visuotactile interference task contrast with the results of 
studies from Vandenbroucke and colleagues (2013, 2014). Across two experiments, 
using a procedure similar in design to the method used here, the authors report a greater 
number of mirror-pain errors (referred to as vicarious pain errors) in vicarious pain 
responders compared with controls. No such difference was found here. There is one 
key methodological difference which could account for this discrepancy. While in the 
present study the tactile stimulus on the dorsum of the hand was a tap delivered using a 
miniature solenoid tapper, Vandenbroucke and colleagues used electrocutaneous 
stimulation to elicit a “pricking” sensation (2013), and in their second study vibrotactile 
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stimulation to elicit “tingling” (2014). It is possible that these stimuli may have 
generated a greater number of mirror-pain errors in the vicarious pain responders than 
found in the present study if they more closely matched the vicarious sensation elicited 
by the visual stimulus. It has been shown that conscious vicarious pain responders most 
commonly label their vicarious experience as “tingling”, when asked to choose 
descriptors from the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010), 
suggesting the vibrotactile stimulus may be most appropriate. Additionally, while the 
tactile stimulus in the present experiment was kept constant across participants, the 
intensity of the stimuli used in both experiments by Vandenbroucke and colleagues was 
individually determined using a thresholding process. The minimum intensity required 
to elicit a conscious sensation was selected. It may then be that the intensity of the 
present tactile stimulus was too high, such that any conscious vicarious sensation 
elicited by the images was not sufficiently intense to interfere with the tactile stimulus. 
Future work using this paradigm should pay close attention to the intensity and the 
subjective quality of tactile stimulus used.  
Performance on the visuotactile interference task was not related to individual 
variability in empathy, but was related to hypervigilance to pain cues, in control 
participants but not Sensory-Localised pain responders. Fitzgibbon and colleagues 
(2010) propose that hypervigilance to pain may underlie conscious vicarious pain 
experience in individuals with prior history of traumatic pain, such as amputees. The 
results provide some support for this suggestion, since increased vigilance to pain was 
associated with greater interference from the visual pain stimulus. However, this effect 
was only found for control participants, suggesting that while vigilance to pain 
increased interference on the task, it is not sufficient to elicit conscious vicarious 
perception. Prior work has also identified an association between pain vigilance and 
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performance on the visuotactile interference task in conscious vicarious pain 
responders, however in this case higher vigilance to pain was associated with reduced 
vicarious perception (Vandenbroucke et al., 2013). A similar negative trend was found 
in the current Sensory-Localised pain responder group. However, this negative 
correlation was not significant, and comparison of the correlations between pain 
vigilance and task performance in each responder group (Sensory-Localised responders 
and controls) found a marginal but not significant difference between the two. 
Collectively then, while the results of the current study and previous evidence from 
Vandenbroucke and colleagues point towards the opposite relation between 
hypervigilance and vicarious pain in conscious vicarious pain responders and in 
controls, this hypothesis does not receive strong statistical support in the current 
experiment. It should be noted that the present sample of Sensory-Localised pain 
responders was only ten, reducing the ability to detect significant differences between 
groups (see section 7.6 for further discussion of statistical power). The relation between 
pain vigilance and visuotactile stroop task interference therefore warrants further study 
on larger samples of Sensory-Localised pain responders to clarify this apparent 
distinction in the relation between pain vigilance and vicarious perception. 
The lack of observable between-group differences on either the visuotactile 
interference task or the inhibitory control tasks in the present study could be attributable 
to the lack of an objective measure of conscious vicarious pain experiences. This could 
mean that individuals were misclassified in terms of their vicarious pain perception. 
Banissy and colleagues (2009) report an inflated self-report rate for MTS (around 
10.8%) compared with the number of individuals that meet criteria for MTS on their 
objective behavioural measure (around 1.6%), indicating that self-report alone may not 
be sensitive enough to classify individuals. Vandenbroucke and colleagues (2013) do 
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find between-group differences on a visuotactile interference task following a more 
basic self-report measure of vicarious pain, however, this group effect was driven by 
just two conscious vicarious pain responders, who made 66% of all mirror-pain errors, 
suggesting that individuals without conscious perception may have been categorised 
into this group. However, prior work using the online assessment of vicarious pain used 
here has been effective in categorising individuals into groups which show quantitative 
differences in brain structure and function (Grice-Jackson et al, 2017). Future work 
should aim to combine detailed self-report measures, such as that used in the present 
experiment, with sensitive behavioural measures, as has been effective in confirming 
experience of MTS (Banissy et al., 2009). This method should allow accurate 
categorisation of individuals and increase the sensitivity to detect between-group 
differences in broader cognitive abilities. Since previous studies on conscious vicarious 
pain have used different methods to assess vicarious pain perception, researchers should 
also focus on consistency in their approach to categorisation in future replication 
attempts.  
In summary, the present study found no significant difference between two 
subtypes of vicarious pain responders and control participants, across two social and 
one domain-general measure of inhibitory control. There was also no significant 
difference observed in performance on a visuotactile interference task involving 
observed pain. Greater interference on this task, indicative of heightened vicarious pain 
perception, was associated with hypervigilance to pain. However, this relation was only 
present for control participants and not conscious vicarious pain responders, and no 
significant differences in trait hypervigilance to pain were found between responders 
and controls. The results therefore provide little support for the role of pain vigilance in 
eliciting conscious vicarious perception, proposed by Fitzgibbon and colleagues (2010). 
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The findings highlight the need for sensitive self-report and behavioural measures of 
conscious vicarious pain perception. 
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Chapter 5 
Atypical Bodily Self-Awareness in Vicarious Pain Responders 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis have provided little additional support for the role of 
self-other control mechanisms in vicarious perception of touch and pain, using 
neuroscientific and behavioural approaches. The current chapter therefore aims to 
explore alternative self-other distinction processes proposed under Self-Other Theory, 
in particular those relevant to maintaining a coherent sense of the bodily self. Past 
research has indicated increased susceptibility to illusions of body ownership and 
agency in individuals who experience conscious vicarious touch and pain, indicating 
atypical bodily self-awareness. Trait differences in bodily self-awareness have also 
been linked to impairments in self-other distinction.  However, little work has been done 
to assess trait differences in bodily self-awareness associated with conscious vicarious 
perception. The present experiment compared trait depersonalisation, associated with a 
detachment from the bodily self, interoception, associated with a focus on internal 
bodily signals, and alexithymia, associated with a focus on external stimuli and a 
difficulty identifying and labelling own emotions, in conscious vicarious pain 
responders and control participants. The results demonstrated increased self-reported 
depersonalisation as well as interoceptive sensibility in conscious vicarious pain 
responders than controls, but no significant differences in alexithymia. The results 
provide evidence for broader differences associated with self-other distinction in 
conscious vicarious pain, providing support for a Self-Other account.  
 
 
 
 
110 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The passive observation of touch or pain experienced by another individual 
appears to elicit vicarious activity in somatosensory cortices similar to when these 
sensations are experienced first-hand (see Keysers et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2011 for 
reviews). This evidence has led to the assertion that we are able to understand and 
empathise with the sensory experiences of others by representing them ourselves, and as 
such this vicarious activation is a requirement for effective social interaction. Vicarious 
perception can therefore provide a useful model for studying complex social processes 
such as empathy (Bird & Viding, 2014). Previous research has identified individual 
variability in vicarious responses to others’ sensory experiences. For some individuals, a 
conscious percept is elicited on their own body purely from the observation of sensation 
experienced by another individual. Subtypes of this condition include mirror-touch 
synaesthesia (MTS) and conscious vicarious pain. A prevalence rate of 33-34% is 
reported for conscious vicarious pain in healthy individuals, although this figure is 
based on liberal cut-offs (Giummarra et al., 2015; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010). Grice-
Jackson and colleagues (2017) provide confirmation for this prevalence rate using a 
cluster analysis method, estimating the number of responders at around 31%. The 
authors also provide further sub-categories to vicarious pain perception, identifying a 
Sensory-Localised responder group who tended to use sensory descriptors to describe 
their experience, and report that it was localised to a particular body part (estimated 
prevalence 19%) and an Affective-Generalised group who used more affective 
descriptors and reported a more generalised bodily sensation (estimated prevalence 
12%).  
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While strong support for individual variability in vicarious pain has been 
reported, so far the mechanisms that underlie it are not as well understood. Explanations 
for the experience have adopted some of those used to explain a related experience, 
mirror-touch synaesthesia. In particular, Threshold Theory (Blakemore et al., 2005; 
Ward & Banissy, 2015) proposes that conscious vicarious perception is caused by 
hyperactivity in somatosensory cortex, which boosts vicarious activation in response to 
observed sensation above a threshold for conscious perception. While there is evidence 
for somatosensory hyperactivity in vicarious pain responders (Grice-Jackson et al., 
2017; Holle et al., 2013; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010); further evidence suggests a 
broader pattern of underlying mechanisms, including those relevant to maintaining a 
coherent sense of the body. For instance, vicarious pain responders are more susceptible 
to illusions of body ownership, including the rubber-hand illusion (Derbyshire et al., 
Osborn & Brown, 2013) in which a sensation of ownership over the rubber hand is 
elicited without the synchronous tactile stimulation necessary for most participants. 
These results indicate an extended plasticity of bodily self-awareness associated with 
conscious vicarious pain. Self-Other Theory (see Ward & Banissy, 2105) provides an 
account for these broader differences observed in vicarious pain responders, proposing 
that impairments in the ability to effectively distinguish and switch between self- and 
other-relevant representations underlies conscious vicarious experience. In support of 
this, vicarious pain responders show reduced grey matter density in the right temporo-
parietal junction (rTPJ) compared with controls (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). This 
region has repeatedly been linked with the ability to represent and control 
representations of the self and other (e.g., Blanke & Arzy, 2005; Hogeveen et al., 2015; 
Ruby & Decety, 2004; Santiesteban et al., 2012; Tsakiris, Costantini & Haggard, 2008). 
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While the evidence discussed above points towards atypical representations of 
the bodily self in individuals who experience conscious vicarious pain, there has thus 
far been little investigation into the extent to which traits and abilities related to bodily 
self-awareness differ between these individuals and those who do not experience 
conscious vicarious sensations. The current study sought to address this gap in the 
literature by examining trait differences in three constructs previously linked to the 
sense of bodily self-awareness: depersonalisation, interoception and alexithymia. Below 
is explained why each of these factors may be of theoretical interest for bodily self-
awareness and conscious vicarious pain. 
Depersonalisation is a clinical trait characterised by a feeling of detachment 
from one’s own bodily self (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In a recent study 
by Adler and colleagues (2016) individuals with low self-reported depersonalisation 
showed differences to vicarious tactile perception compared to individuals with high 
self-reported depersonalisation. More specifically, low self-reported depersonalisation 
was linked with attenuation of the P200 somatosensory-evoked potential component in 
response to observed touch seen on the participant’s own versus another person’s face. 
This distinction between the self and other was not reflected in the P200 component of 
the high depersonalisation group, indicating that depersonalisation may be associated 
with reduced self-other distinction, which, as proposed by Ward and Banissy (2015) 
may play a key role in vicarious tactile perception. Individuals with higher levels of 
depersonalisation are also more susceptible to the rubber hand illusion (Kanayama et al., 
2009), suggesting that this construct might be interesting to examine in conscious 
vicarious pain responders, given prior work highlighting altered body ownership in the 
rubber hand illusion for this group (Derbyshire et al., 2013). 
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Interoception refers to the awareness and perception of one’s own internal 
bodily states (Brewer et al., 2016). Recent work has proposed three distinct components 
to interoception, namely interoceptive accuracy (the ability to accurately detect internal 
sensations, e.g., heartbeats), interoceptive sensibility (self-perception of this trait, e.g., 
reporting a focus on internal sensations), and interoceptive awareness (the 
metacognitive awareness of one’s own interoceptive accuracy, e.g., knowing that you 
can accurately detect your own heartbeat) (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki and 
Critchley, 2015). Complementing earlier work on depersonalisation, which is associated 
with a reduction in bodily self-awareness, individuals with lower interoceptive accuracy 
are also more susceptible to illusions of body ownership, including the rubber hand 
(Tsakiris et al., 2011) and enfacement illusions (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014), 
indicating that vicarious pain perception may also be associated with reduced 
interoception in addition to higher depersonalisation. Although, at present there does not 
appear to be a direct relation between interoception and depersonalisation: Sedeño and 
colleagues (2014) report reduced interoceptive accuracy for a single case study of an 
individual with depersonalisation disorder, while Michal and colleagues (2014) find 
comparable interoceptive accuracy and sensibility in a larger sample of participants with 
high depersonalisation. Of particular relevance to the present studies, individuals with 
higher interoceptive accuracy show greater difficulty in inhibiting the imitation of 
others’ actions when required (Ainley, Brass & Tsakiris, 2014). Prior work has 
indicated that imitation-inhibition is impaired in MTS (Santiesteban et al., 2015b), and 
it has been suggested that similar difficulties may be observed in conscious vicarious 
pain (Ward & Banissy, 2015; Derbyshire et al 2013). With this in mind, assessing 
interoception in conscious vicarious pain responders is of theoretical interest, and there 
is a need to identify the nature of any trait differences in interoception which may exist 
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in conscious vicarious pain, since previous evidence leads to contradictory predictions 
(i.e., either improved or impaired interoceptive abilities in this group). 
Alexithymia is a subclinical trait encompassing difficulties with identifying and 
describing emotions, as well as a tendency to reduce emotional experiences and focus 
attention externally (Bagby et al., 1994). Past research has shown that alexithymia is 
associated with impaired interoceptive accuracy (Herbert, Herbert & Pollatos, 2011; 
Shah, Hall, Catmur & Bird, 2016), but increased interoceptive sensibility (i.e,, a greater 
focus on internal sensations; Ernst et al., 2014). There is also evidence to suggest that 
individuals high in alexithymia show reduced imitation on imitation-inhibition tasks 
(Sowden et al., 2016) and reduced activity in neural networks linked to empathy for 
pain (Bird et al., 2010). This contrasts with suggestions that conscious vicarious 
perception may be linked to increased imitation (Santiesteban et al., 2015b) and that 
vicarious pain responders show greater activity in neural networks associated with 
empathy for pain (Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). 
Collectively, this provides rationale for studying alexithymia in conscious various pain 
responders, with a prediction of lower alexithymia and heightened interoception in 
individuals that experience conscious vicarious pain. 
To summarise, prior literature suggests that there may be trait differences 
associated with conscious vicarious pain which have thus far not been studied. Here, the 
aim was to identify differences in self-reported traits relevant to bodily and emotional 
self-awareness in vicarious pain responders for the first time. This was carried out with 
a view to understanding the broader traits associated with conscious vicarious pain, and 
informing theoretical explanations of the condition. On the basis of previous research, 
heightened depersonalisation and reduced alexithymia were predicted in conscious 
vicarious pain responders compared with non-responders. Atypical interoceptive 
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sensibility was also predicted in conscious vicarious pain responder groups, although a 
specific prediction was not made regarding the direction of this difference, based on 
prior research.  
 
5.2. Materials and methods 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
183 healthy participants completed the online questionnaire. (131F, 52M; age 
18-66 years, M = 28.1, SD = 10.9). Normal or corrected-to-normal vision was required 
to participate. Ethnicity was classified into Asian (N = 32), Black (N = 10), Caucasian 
(N = 131), or mixed/other ethnic background (N = 10) Participants were either recruited 
through Prolific.ac and paid £5, or recruited from undergraduate Psychology students at 
Goldsmiths in return for course credit. The project was approved by the Goldsmiths 
Psychology Department Ethics Committee. 
 
5.2.2 Procedure 
Testing was conducted online using Qualtrics online survey software. The online 
questionnaire was based on the procedure used by Grice-Jackson and colleagues (2017), 
and comprised four main sections. Participants were first given a description of mirror-
sensory synaesthesia. Video screening procedures for the occurrence of conscious 
vicarious touch experience, and for vicarious pain experience, followed this. Lastly, 
self-report questionnaires of interoceptive sensibility, depersonalisation and alexithymia 
were completed. All participants completed the tasks in the order stated. The pain 
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screening procedure was chosen to occur after the touch screening to avoid emotional or 
physical reactions to the mildly unpleasant stimuli affecting responses to later videos. 
 
Vicarious touch video screening  
To capture the subjective experience of vicarious touch, participants were 
required to view 15 short (3-5 second) videos of touch to a human body part or an 
object, delivered by the index finger of another human hand. Videos were displayed in 
pseudo-random order. Three videos contained touch to a female face, three to a male 
face, three to human hands shown from an egocentric perspective, and three from an 
allocentric perspective, and three videos showed touch to two cups placed adjacent to 
each other (selected stimuli are shown in Figure 5.1, and all videos can be viewed 
online using the following link: 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCL5K0hDB7fg9XdYPjAUw2qQ/videos?sort=dd&
shelf_id=0&view=0). For each body part or object, touch was shown to the right cheek, 
hand or cup, the left, and both sides. Participants were asked to view each video in full 
screen and then respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question “Did you experience any bodily 
sensation of touch whilst observing this video”.  Participants who responded ‘yes’ to the 
first question were given two further questions. The first asked them “Please rate the 
intensity of the touch sensation you experienced” on a 10-point scale from 1 (not at all 
intense) to 10 (highly intense). The second asked “Did you feel this pain in a specific 
location or was it a more general bodily feeling?” Participants could select either 
“Generalised”, “Localised but not in the same body part as the observed touch”, or 
“Localised to the same body part as observed touch”. If “localised to the same body part 
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as the observed touch” was selected, the participant was also asked to indicate whether 
the touch sensation was on the left or the right side of their own body.  
 
Vicarious pain video screening  
The procedure for assessing vicarious pain experience matched the procedure for 
vicarious pain, with some minor differences. In this case 16 pseudo-randomised videos 
(10-13 seconds) were observed, each depicting painful events. Eight of these videos 
portrayed sports injuries (e.g., a cyclist falling from a bike) and eight showed injections 
to various parts of the body. Videos were obtained with permission from Grice-Jackson 
and colleagues (2017), and can be viewed using this link 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCT8goTgWGRsu14NjVaPCSGw/videos (example stimuli 
are shown in Figure 5.1). After each video participants were asked “Did you experience 
any bodily sensation of pain whilst observing the [e.g., arm injection]?” All participants 
were also asked to rate “How unpleasant did you find the experience of watching this 
video?” on a 10-point scale from 1 (not unpleasant) to 10 (highly unpleasant). If the 
response was ‘yes’, three further questions appeared. As for the touch videos, 
participants were asked to rate the intensity and the location (generalised vs. localised) 
of the vicarious pain they experienced. Finally, participants could select up to 23 
descriptive words (10 affective, 10 sensory, 3 cognitive) from the McGill Pain 
Questionnaire (Melzack, 1975) to describe their experience. If the participant felt that 
none were appropriate there was also an option to add their own words. 
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Figure 5.1: Stills from four of the video stimuli used in the online questionnaire. Shown 
are examples of touch to a) the face and b) the hands, and pain by c) injection and d) 
sports injury.  
 
5.2.3 Self-Report Measures 
Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale 
The Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS; Sierra & Berrios, 2000) was 
administered to assess depersonalisation symptoms experienced in the past six months. 
Participants are presented with 29 statements, such as “Parts of my body feel as if they 
didn’t belong to me” and should rate the frequency of this experience on a five-point 
scale from “never” to “all the time”. Unless the participant responds “Never”, they then 
also rate of the typical duration of the experience, on a six-point scale from “few 
seconds” to “more than a week”. Possible scores range between 0 and 290, with higher 
scores indicating greater depersonalisation. Sierra and Berrios report good internal 
119 
 
consistency (α = .89) and excellent split-half reliability (α = .92) for the scale as well as 
good validity, shown in a specific correlation (r = .80) with the depersonalisation 
subscale of the Dissociative Experiences Scale (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). High 
internal consistency is also found in the current sample (α = .94). 
 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness 
Interoceptive sensibility was measured using the Multidimensional Assessment 
of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling et al., 2012). The scale contains 32 items, 
including “When I am tense I notice where the tension is located in my body”. 
Participants respond to indicate the extent to which the statement applies to them, on a 
six-point scale from “never” to “always”. Scores can be combined into eight subscales, 
including Noticing: “awareness of uncomfortable, comfortable and neutral body 
sensations”;  Not-Distracting: “tendency to ignore or distract oneself from sensations of 
pain or discomfort” (reversed), Not Worrying: “emotional distress or worry with 
sensations of pain or discomfort” (reversed), Attention Regulation: “ability to sustain 
and control attention to body sensation”, Emotional Awareness: “awareness of the 
connection between body sensations and emotional states”, Self-Regulation: “ability to 
regulate psychological distress by attention to body sensations”, Body Listening: 
“actively listens to the body for insight”, and Trusting: “experiences one’s body as safe 
and trustworthy”. Scores on each subscale can range between 0 and 5, with a higher 
score indicating greater interoceptive awareness. Mehling and colleagues demonstrate 
construct validity for the scale and acceptable to good internal consistency on five of the 
eight subscales (α = .79 - .87). However, they note that for the ‘Noticing’, ‘Not-
Distracting’, and ‘Not-Worrying’ subscales internal consistency was lower (α = .66 - 
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.69) Similar results are reported in the current sample, with good internal consistency on 
five subscales (α = .83 - .86), and questionable internal consistency on the ‘Not-
Distracting’ subscale (α = .63), although for the ‘Noticing’ subscale, internal 
consistency in the present sample was acceptable (α = .71). Internal consistency for the 
‘Not-worrying’ subscale was poor (α = .50), and so the present results for this subscale 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
Alexithymia was assessed with the twenty item Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994). The questionnaire requires participants to indicate the 
extent which they agree with each of 20 statements on a five-point scale from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree.” Three subscales represent Difficulty Describing Feelings, 
e.g, “It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings”, Difficulty Identifying 
Feelings, e.g., “I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling”, and Externally-
Oriented Thinking, e.g., “Looking for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts 
from their enjoyment”. Total scores range from 20 to 80, with a higher score 
representing greater alexithymia. Bagby and colleagues confirm the validity of the 
three-factor structure and report acceptable internal consistency for the Difficulty 
Describing Feelings (α = .75) and Difficulty Identifying Feelings (α = .78) subscales, 
although reliability for Externally-Oriented Thinking’ was slightly lower (α = .66). The 
same pattern of results is found in the present sample (α = .60 - .82). 
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5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Individual Variability in Vicarious Pain 
Participants were assigned to pain responder groups according to their responses 
on the vicarious pain screening questionnaire, using a two-step cluster analysis, adapted 
from the procedure used by Grice-Jackson and colleagues (2017; see also Zhang et al., 
1996). This involves an initial clustering of participants to produce cluster centroids, 
and then categorises participants into groups based on these centroids. Since this 
method produces optimal results using large data sets, data from the 183 participants 
was combined with previous responses from Grice-Jackson and colleagues.  
The first step comprised a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method 
(Ward, 1963) to identify the number of clusters and cluster centroids. This was based on 
three input variables: 1) Mean pain intensity (the average intensity rating across all 16 
videos), 2) Sensory-Affective (the total number of sensory descriptors used to describe 
the pain – the total number affective descriptors, and 3) Local-General (the total number 
of localised pain responses – the total number of generalised responses). This step 
confirmed a three-factor solution, in line with prior work (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). 
The second step involved a non-hierarchical k-means cluster analysis, which assigned 
participants into one of the three groups, based on the cluster centroids from the first 
step. 
The analysis resulted in a non-responder group (N = 153; 107F, 46M; age M = 
28.6, SD = 11.1), who did not tend to report conscious vicarious experiences, a Sensory-
Localised responder group (N = 15; 13F, 2M; age M = 22.5, SD = 7.0) who tended to 
report conscious vicarious experiences localised to the same body part as the observed 
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stimulus, and use sensory descriptors, and an Affective-Generalised responder group (N 
= 15; 11F, 4M; age M = 29.0, SD = 11.8), who tended to report conscious vicarious 
experiences more generalised over the whole body, and to use more affective than 
sensory descriptors. 
Since the actors receiving pain in the video stimuli were all Caucasian, vicarious 
responses were compared according to participants’ ethnicity. A chi-square analysis 
found no significant relation between ethnic group and pain responder cluster (χ² [6] = 
6.70, p =.349). Vicarious responses to the stimuli do not therefore appear to have been 
influenced by whether the subject was of the participant’s own or another ethnic 
background. In addition, responder groups did not significantly differ in age (F [2,180] 
= 2.33, p = .111, ɳp² =.02) or gender (χ² [2] = 2.06, p =.356). 
The relatively low number of conscious vicarious pain responders in the present 
sample (N = 15 in both Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised sub-types) 
precluded a systematic analysis of within-group differences in bodily self-awareness 
related to vicarious responses to touch.  For this reason, individuals were classified only 
in terms of their vicarious pain responses, rather than creating further subgroups of, for 
instance, those who experience conscious vicarious pain and touch, and those who 
experience only conscious vicarious pain. 
 
5.3.2 Trait Measures 
Correlations for all participants between trait measures are reported in Table 5.1. 
Higher depersonalisation was associated with higher scores on the ‘Describing 
Feelings’ and ‘Identifying Feelings’ subscales of the TAS. A more mixed pattern of 
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results was observed regarding the relation between depersonalisation and interoceptive 
sensibility. While a negative correlation was found between for the Trusting subscale, 
moderate positive correlations were found for the Noticing, Not-Worrying, and 
Emotional Awareness subscales. Between alexithymia and interoception, negative 
correlations were observed for the majority of subscales, indicating a general 
association between lower interoceptive sensibility and higher alexithymia (in line with 
previous work). 
No significant associations were found with age for any of the self-report trait 
measures (ps > .06). However, gender differences were observed in the data. Correcting 
for multiple comparisons, a significant effect of gender was found on the Trusting 
subscale of the MAIA (t [181] = 3.82, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.61), where male 
participants scored higher than females, indicating greater interoceptive sensibility. 
 
 
 
 
1
2
4 
Table 5.1: Pearson’s coefficients for correlations between the self-report measures. 
Self-Report Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
1.CDS 
 
- 
           
             
TAS             
2. Describing Feelings .43*** -           
3. Identifying Feelings .54*** .65*** -          
4. Externally Oriented Thinking -.05 .24** .04 -         
             
MAIA             
5. Noticing .18* - .04 .13 - .20** -        
6. Not-Distracting -.08 .07 - .02 - .01 .04 -       
7. Not-Worrying .20** .15* .11 .10 .06 .01 -      
8. Attention Regulation .07 - .15* - .15* - .08 .49*** .05 .10 -     
9. Emotional Awareness .28** - .04 .25*** - .22** .55*** .12 .00 .38*** -    
10. Self-Regulation .03 - .16* - .09 - .13 .39*** .06 .02 .59*** .45*** -   
11. Body Listening .12 - .16* .02 - .23** .46*** .11 .01 .47*** .59*** .52*** -  
12. Trusting -.17* - .14 - .29*** - .02 .22** - .01 - .05 .49*** .18* .49*** .38*** - 
*p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
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5.3.3 Trait Differences associated with Vicarious Pain 
Depersonalisation 
The distribution of depersonalisation scores showed a significant positive skew 
(z = 11.69). This pattern is typical for the CDS when administered in the general 
population rather than clinical groups (Sierra & Berrios, 2000). Due to the distribution 
of the data a Kruskal-Wallis H test was used to compare CDS scores in each of the pain 
responder groups (Sensory-Localised vs. Affective-Generalised vs. Control). In this 
case, the main effect of group was significant (H [2] = 6.28, p = .043). Pairwise 
comparisons, using a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of p < .017, show that this 
reflected significantly higher depersonalisation in Sensory-Localised group compared 
with controls (U = 35.92, z = 2.51, p = .012, r = .18) (see Figure 5.2). Depersonalisation 
in this group was also higher than the Affective-Generalised group, although this 
comparison did not reach significance (U = 33.40, z = 1.73, p = .084, r = .13). There 
was also no significant difference between the Affective-Generalised group and controls 
(U = 2.52, z = 0.18, p = .861, r = .01).  
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Figure 5.2: Self-reported depersonalisation in each of the pain responder groups. 
Higher CDS total scores were found for Sensory-Localised pain responders than for 
controls (* p < .05). C, Control; S-L, Sensory-Localised; A-G, Affective-Generalised. 
Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
Interoceptive Sensibility 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was carried out to explore 
differences in interoceptive sensibility between the pain responder groups. Each of the 
eight subscales of the MAIA were entered as dependent variables in the analysis, with 
pain responder group (Sensory-Localised vs. Affective-Generalised vs. Control) as the 
independent variable. While there was not a significant effect of pain responder group 
on MAIA scores overall (F [16,348] = 1.02, p = .432, ɳp² =.05), there was a specific 
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effect on the ‘Noticing’ subscale (F [2,180] = 4.10, p = .018, ɳp² =.04), which refers to 
the “awareness of uncomfortable, comfortable, and neutral body sensations” (Mehling 
et al., 2012, p.10). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons, using Games-Howell’s correction for 
unequal variances, demonstrate that the Sensory-Localised responder group obtained 
significantly higher scores on this subscale than controls (t [30] = 4.52, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.88). Responses in the Affective-Generalised group did not significantly 
differ from controls (t [169] = 1.68, p = .096, Cohen’s d = 0.46) or the Sensory-
Localised group (t [19] = 0.64, p = .528, Cohen’s d = 0.25) (see Figure 5.3). Effects for 
all other subscales were not significant (ps > .15). Mean scores are shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Scores on each subscale of the MAIA in each pain responder group. Higher 
interoceptive sensibility was found on the ‘noticing’ subscale for Sensory-Localised 
pain responders compared with controls (*** p < .001). Error bars represent +/- 1 
S.E.M. 
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Alexithymia 
A MANOVA was also used to compare TAS scores in each of the pain 
responder groups. The effect of group on TAS scores overall was not significant (F 
[6,358] = 1.06, p = .384, ɳp² =.02) and there were no significant effects on the 
Describing Feelings (F [2,180] = 0.81, p = .445, ɳp² =.01), Identifying Feelings (F 
[2,180] = 1.66, p = .192, ɳp² =.02), or Externally-Oriented Thinking (F [2,180] = 1.36, p 
= .258, ɳp² =.01) subscales.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
The present study provides evidence of heightened depersonalisation and 
interoceptive sensibility associated with Sensory-Localised vicarious pain. The findings 
support hypotheses that vicarious pain perception is associated with atypical bodily self-
awareness. 
The initial prediction that vicarious perception would be associated with 
increased depersonalisation was supported. Sensory-Localised pain responders reported 
greater experience of depersonalisation symptoms than non-responders. This result is in 
line with prior research linking both depersonalisation (Adler et al., 2016; Kanayama et 
al., 2009) and conscious vicarious pain perception (Derbyshire et al., 2013; Grice-
Jackson et al., 2017) with impairments in self-other distinction and a tendency towards 
self-other merging of body-relevant information. The results also demonstrate increased 
interoceptive sensibility in Sensory-Localised pain responders compared with non-
responders. This difference was present on the ‘noticing’ subscale of the MAIA 
(Mehling et al., 2012), which refers to the “awareness of uncomfortable, comfortable 
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and neutral body sensations”, indicating a greater tendency for vicarious pain 
responders to focus attention on internal bodily states. The result complements previous 
work reporting an association between interoceptive accuracy and difficulty inhibiting 
imitation, in the motor domain (Ainley et al., 2014). However, it is important to note the 
distinction between interoceptive sensibility and accuracy. High interoceptive 
sensibility, referring to the tendency to focus on internal bodily states, does not 
necessarily imply accuracy, the ability to correctly identify these states (Garfinkel et al., 
2015). Further research is therefore required to establish whether observed differences 
associated with conscious vicarious pain extend to other dimensions of interoception - 
for example using a heartbeat detection task (e.g., Schandry, 1981) to measure 
interoceptive accuracy - or are limited to interoceptive sensibility.  
With this caveat in mind, the collective evidence of altered bodily self-
awareness in conscious vicarious pain responders adds to growing evidence 
highlighting that individuals who experience conscious vicarious sensations show 
broader differences that extend beyond simple mirroring of sensorimotor consequences. 
As noted, Self-Other Theory (see Ward & Banissy, 2015) provides a potential 
framework from which to understand these broader differences in self-awareness 
experienced by vicarious pain responders. While the present results provide novel 
insight into the broader phenomenal experience of conscious vicarious pain, conclusions 
cannot be drawn regarding causal relationships from this data alone. In the case of 
depersonalisation, a sense of detachment from the bodily self may cause the individual 
to incorporate other-relevant information into the self-concept, leading to the conscious 
percept of pain when observing another person in pain. However, it is also conceivable 
that the shared experience of vicarious pain could lead to a self-other blurring (similar to 
that induced by synchronous touch in the rubber hand and enfacement illusions – 
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Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 2008), and that this could increase feelings of 
detachment from the self. Similarly, a greater focus on internal bodily states 
(interoceptive sensibility) could lead to increased detection of physical sensations 
induced by observing pain, leading to a conscious vicarious percept. Alternatively, 
individuals that experience vicarious pain may be more likely to attend to bodily states, 
due to increased sensation from both self- and other-focused stimulation. Future work 
should aim to establish the causal mechanisms underlying the associations between 
depersonalisation, interoceptive sensibility and vicarious pain are seen here. 
It will also be interesting for future work to assess the extent to which the pattern 
of data that is observed in individuals who experience conscious vicarious pain is also 
observed in other groups linked to conscious vicarious perception. One example would 
be mirror-touch synaesthesia. While self-reported responses to vicarious touch were 
examined in the present questionnaire, there was not a large enough sample of 
individuals reporting conscious vicarious tactile responses to make systematic 
comparisons to the current conscious vicarious pain groups. Future work should seek to 
examine similarities and differences in the traits identified here between individuals 
who experience only conscious vicarious pain, individuals who experience only 
conscious vicarious touch, and individuals who experience both types of conscious 
vicarious experience. 
Despite trait differences in bodily self-awareness in Sensory-Localised pain 
responders compared with controls, no such differences were found for Affective-
Generalised responders, across both interoceptive sensibility and depersonalisation. 
This result is perhaps surprising, considering both subtypes of vicarious pain response 
are associated with increased grey matter in left AI compared with controls (Grice-
Jackson et al., 2017), a region previously linked with bodily self-awareness and 
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interoception (e.g., Craig, 2003, 2009, Critchley, 2005). In the current study, Affective-
Generalised responders also showed a trend towards increased depersonalisation and 
interoceptive sensibility, with no significant differences found for these measures 
compared with either non-responders or Sensory-Localised responders. In this regard, 
Affective-Generalised responders appear to lie somewhere between Sensory-Localised 
responders and non-responders in terms of their bodily self-awareness and capacity for 
self-other distinction. However, the precise differences underlying these two forms of 
conscious vicarious pain responses remains a key question for future research. 
Contrary to predictions, no significant differences in alexithymia were found 
between vicarious pain responder groups. It was hypothesised that individuals reporting 
vicarious pain may show fewer alexithymic traits than controls, since alexithymia is 
associated with reduced empathy for pain, driven by reduced activity in AI when 
observing pain (Bird et al., 2010).  In fact, eight out of thirty conscious vicarious pain 
responders met the clinical cut-off for alexithymia in the current sample (TAS Total 
Score ≥ 61; Taylor, Bagby & Parker, 1999), slightly above the 17.9% prevalence rate 
reported in a British undergraduate sample (Mason, Tyson, Jones & Potts, 2005). The 
results suggest that although reduced vicarious pain response has previously been linked 
to high trait alexithymia (Bird et al., 2010), individuals who experience heightened or 
conscious vicarious perception may not necessarily score low on the TAS. It should also 
be noted that although Bird and colleagues report reduced vicarious activity in AI in 
individuals with high trait alexithymia, another study has reported the opposite pattern, 
where alexithymia is associated with greater activation in AI when explicitly viewing 
others’ pain (Moriguchi et al., 2006). The relation between alexithymia and vicarious 
perception is therefore not so clear. Future research should study vicarious perception in 
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individuals with both high and low levels of alexithymic traits to clarify any potential 
connection. 
To summarise, the present results show increased depersonalisation and 
interceptive sensibility in Sensory-Localised conscious vicarious pain responders 
compared with Affective-Generalised or non-conscious responders. This has important 
implications for understanding the mechanisms contributing to conscious vicarious pain 
and vicarious perception in the wider population by indicating that processes related to 
maintaining the sense of bodily self, and relevant to self-other distinction, may be 
necessary to regulate vicarious perception of others’ pain. The results highlight the need 
for future research into mechanisms of vicarious perception to take a broader focus, 
beyond sensorimotor mirroring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
Chapter 6 
Effects of Stimulus and Perceiver Variability on  
Perception of Animacy 
 
Discriminating real human faces from artificial can be achieved quickly and accurately 
by face-processing networks, and may modulate vicarious perception of touch and pain. 
However, little is known about what stimulus qualities or inter-individual differences in 
the perceiver might influence whether a face is perceived as being alive. With this in 
mind, this chapter aimed to establish factors affecting the perception of animacy, with a 
view to informing future work regarding the role of animacy perception in modulating 
vicarious perception. Morphed stimuli differing in levels of animacy were created, and 
participants made judgements about whether the face appeared animate at different 
levels along the morph continuum. The faces varied in terms of emotional expression 
(happy vs. neutral) and gender. Male faces were judged to be animate at a lower 
threshold (i.e., closer to the inanimate end of the continuum) than female faces.  
Animacy was also perceived more readily in faces with happy expressions than neutral. 
These effects were observed across two separate studies involving different participants 
and different sets of stimuli. The influence of inter-individual variability on animacy 
perception was also examined. This revealed that an externally-oriented cognitive style, 
a component of alexithymia, was associated with lower thresholds for perceiving 
animacy, for animate faces morphed with dolls. MTS was not associated with systematic 
differences in the perception of animacy. The findings are discussed in relation to inter- 
and intra-individual variability in animacy perception and social interaction, and 
potential future directions for understanding individual variability in vicarious 
perception of touch and pain. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Along with other mechanisms of self-other distinction, the accurate 
identification of animate (i.e., living beings capable of independent actions, thoughts, 
and emotions) human faces from inanimate objects is vital for social interaction and 
carries a key evolutionary advantage. Perception of animacy is thought to play a key 
role in action observation (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Press, 2011) and mentalizing (Cross, 
Ramsey, Liepelt, Prinz & Hamilton, 2016), as well as vicarious tactile and pain 
perception. For instance, specific behavioural and neural responses have been reported 
for observed touch and pain to animate human bodies and to inanimate objects 
(Avenanti et al., 2005; Bolognini et al., 2013; Costantini, Galati, Romani & Aglioti, 
2008). However, since this previous work has compared responses to animate body 
parts with objects rather than inanimate body parts, it remains unclear whether different 
response patterns are related to perception of animacy or to differences in visual form. 
One study by Deschrijver, Wiersema and Brass (2015) addresses this issue, showing 
SEP modulation while viewing the tapping finger of a wooden hand compared with an 
animate human hand. This indicates that vicarious somatosensory representations 
involve a process of distinction between other animate agents with the capacity for 
physical sensation and inanimate objects. However, in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the 
animacy of a hand being touched (i.e., human hand vs. dummy hand) did not modulate 
conscious vicarious perception. Further work is needed to identify the potential 
modulating effect of stimulus animacy in vicarious perception. 
Previous experiments on the perception of animacy have used stimuli that are 
morphed between human and dolls’ faces, and report a threshold for perceiving life at 
67% (Looser & Wheatley, 2010). Several studies also compare the ‘Point of Subjective 
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Equality’ (PSE). This refers to the point on the morph continuum at which stimuli are 
judged to be 50% animate. A stimulus at this point on the continuum is therefore 
equally likely to be perceived as either animate or inanimate. This point consistently 
falls closer to the animate end of the stimulus continuum, and ranges between 56-68% 
(Balas, 2013; Balas & Horski, 2012; Hackel et al., 2014; Looser & Wheatley, 2010). 
Two stimulus factors that have been shown to influence the PSE are the social identity 
of the stimulus (e.g., Hackel et al., 2014; Swiderska, Krumhuber and Kappas, 2012) and 
stimulus gender (e.g., Balas, 2013). With regards to gender, Balas demonstrated that 
female faces are less likely to be perceived as animate than male faces; and animate 
faces less likely to be perceived as female than male. These results have led to 
suggestions that they reflect the dehumanisation or objectification of the faces of 
women (Balas, 2013), but this has not yet been empirically tested for animacy 
perception. A purely perceptual account of why the gender of a face may influence 
animacy judgments can also be made. Female faces are associated with narrower 
jawlines and lighter skin pigmentation compared with male faces (Brown & Perrett, 
1993; Frost, 1988) and as such share a closer similarity with the doll faces typically 
used in animacy experiments than male faces do. This may result in female face stimuli 
being rated as less animate than male stimuli. These differing hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive, and it is possible that both processes contribute to the reported 
gender differences in animacy perception. Experiment One in this chapter sought to 
investigate both the objectification and perceptual hypotheses of gender difference. 
Objectification is addressed by incorporating a measure of the extent to which 
participants objectify women’s bodies. If objectification underlies the gender 
differences seen in animacy perception, then participants who demonstrate greater 
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objectification of women should show higher animacy thresholds for female faces than 
those who score low on objectification of women.  
In addition to gender and social identity a number of other factors may be 
important to animacy perception. For example, face perception research frequently uses 
achromatic stimuli to avoid confounding effects of differences in facial pigmentation. 
However, the majority of previous facial animacy perception studies (Balas, 2013; 
Hackel et al., 2014; Looser & Wheatley, 2010; Powers, Worsham, Freeman, Wheatley 
& Heatherton, 2014; Swiderska et al., 2012; Wheatley et al., 2011) have used chromatic 
stimuli. It is therefore unclear how important colour cues such as skin pigmentation are 
for detecting animacy in a face. This casts some doubt on the validity of comparing 
animacy thresholds for different stimulus faces (e.g., gender and racial groups) where 
colour cues have not been controlled. Where achromatic stimuli have been used (Balas 
& Koldewyn, 2013; Balas & Tonsager, 2014; Looser et al., 2013), there has been no 
direct comparison of achromatic and chromatic stimuli, and so it remains unclear 
whether the results can be applied to animacy judgements made with chromatic stimuli, 
either in previous studies or real-world perception. 
Further, no published research on animacy perception has considered the effect 
of the emotional expression of the stimulus on animacy thresholds. The studies 
mentioned above have averaged together ratings for several different stimuli, regardless 
of the emotion expressed. Given the social significance of emotion expression (Keltner 
& Kring, 1998), it seems likely that this factor may influence animacy perception from 
faces. More specifically, if animacy reflects a capacity for experiencing emotion 
(Looser et al., 2013), it follows that a face expressing emotion would be more likely to 
be perceived as animate than a face with neutral expression. Two features of particular 
importance for animacy perception are the eyes and mouth (Looser and Wheatley, 
137 
 
2010), which lends further support to this hypothesis, since these features are also 
particularly relevant for conveying and perceiving emotion (Eisenbarth & Alpers, 2011; 
Emery, 2000; Langton, Watt & Bruce., 2000; Yuki, Maddux & Masuda, 2007). 
Collectively, this evidence indicates that emotional expression may influence animacy 
perception judgements. 
In conjunction with properties of the stimulus, individual differences in the 
observer can influence animacy perception judgements. For example, the readiness with 
which facial animacy is perceived has recently been linked to the desire for social 
connection. In this study by Powers and colleagues (2014), scores on a Need to Belong 
Scale (NTBS; Leary, Kelly, Cottrell & Schreindorfer, 2013) correlated with animacy 
perception thresholds, such that individuals with a greater desire for social acceptance 
and belonging perceived animacy at a lower threshold. Further, participants subjected to 
an experimental manipulation to induce feelings of social disconnection also judged 
animacy to occur at a lower threshold than those who received a ‘socially connected’ 
induction. The authors proposed that these results reflect an adaptive strategy on the part 
of individuals who feel socially isolated, where perceiving animacy more readily 
increases the likelihood of valuable social interaction. This idea ties in with the 
suggestion that animacy is perceived more readily for in-group members than out-group 
due to a greater motivation for social interaction with the in-group (Hackel et al., 2014). 
If attributing animacy to an ambiguous stimulus indeed reflects a strategy to gain social 
interaction, then thresholds should also be lower for individuals with increased 
loneliness. Epley, Akalis, Waytz and Cacioppo (2008) report that self-reported 
loneliness correlates positively with mental state attribution in objects. In this study 
more lonely individuals were more likely to describe an inanimate object as having “a 
mind,” “intentions,” and “emotions.” Further, experimentally induced social 
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disconnection led to greater attribution of anthropomorphic traits related to social 
connection to their pets. As yet the relation between loneliness and animacy perception 
has not been explored. 
Previous results linking desire for social connection with increased animacy 
perception (Powers et al., 2014) suggest that other social factors may also influence how 
animacy is perceived. Individuals with high trait social anxiety appear to demonstrate 
attentional biases towards socially relevant stimuli. However, the direction of this bias 
is not yet clear, with increased attention observed in certain contexts, and avoidance in 
others (for reviews see Bogels & Mansell, 2004; Heinrichs & Hoffman, 2001). In either 
case socially anxious individuals could be predicted to demonstrate altered detection of 
animacy in human faces, compared with controls. In the case of increased attention, 
individuals with social anxiety may identify animacy more readily, leading to lower 
animacy thresholds; and in the case of avoidance individuals may be less likely to detect 
animacy in the face, leading to higher thresholds. Evidence from Epley and colleagues 
(2008) favours the former hypothesis, demonstrating that experimentally induced fear 
leads to greater likelihood of perceiving faces in ambiguous line drawings, compared 
with induced social disconnection. The hypothesised relation between social anxiety 
and animacy perception therefore provides an interesting research question, as well as a 
tool for understanding the cognitive biases associated with the condition. 
A final trait factor that could be implicated in the detection of animacy is 
alexithymia. Alexithymia is a subclinical personality trait reflecting difficulties 
identifying and describing emotions, and the tendency to focus attention externally, 
while reducing emotional experiences (Bagby et al., 1994). It is reported in higher levels 
in males than females (Franz et al., 2008). Alexithymia is thought to involve deficits in 
processing emotion information (Lane et al., 1996) and in facial emotion recognition 
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specifically, though studies of the latter have so far yielded mixed results (Cook, 
Brewer, Shah & Bird, 2013; Grynberg et al., 2012; Jongen et al., 2014; Pandey & 
Mandal, 2011; Parker, Taylor & Bagby, 1993). If, as hypothesised, emotion recognition 
is involved in detecting animacy, then it may follow that individuals high in alexithymia 
show differential facial animacy processing, compared with those who score low. 
Alexithymia has also been associated with impairments in empathy (Bird et al., 2010; 
Parker, Taylor & Bagby, 2001) and in ‘mentalizing,’ understanding the mental states of 
others (Moriguchi et al., 2006). Since animacy perception involves making a judgement 
about whether a stimulus has the capacity to possess mental states, this provides further 
support for the notion that alexithymia would be associated with reduced perceptions of 
animacy. 
With the aforementioned studies in mind, the current online study compared the 
effect of stimulus qualities and individual differences of the perceiver on perception of 
animacy in ambiguous face stimuli. These stimuli were created by morphing images of 
human faces with visually matched doll faces that varied in colour (achromatic vs. 
chromatic), gender (male vs. female) and emotional expression (happy vs. neutral). The 
influence of individual differences in the perceiver relevant to social interaction on 
animacy judgements was also assessed. The relation between inter-individual variability 
in the following traits and facial animacy perception were examined: ‘Need to Belong’ 
(as per Powers et al., 2014), loneliness, social anxiety, alexithymia and objectification. 
Specifically, the following predictions were made: 
1. Male faces would be judged to appear animate at a lower threshold than female 
faces. 
2. Faces displaying emotion would be perceived to be animate at a lower threshold 
than faces with neutral expression. 
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3. Facial animacy judgements would rely on colour cues in the face, such as skin 
pigmentation. 
4. Perception of animacy would be influenced by individual variability in traits 
including need to belong, loneliness, social anxiety, alexithymia and 
objectification. 
 
6.2 Experiment One 
 
The first experiment aimed to address each of the above hypotheses, using a 
novel stimulus set formed of doll-human morphs. 
 
6.2.1 Materials and methods 
Participants 
The target sample size was 90. This target was calculated using an a priori 
power analysis for a within-subjects t-test with 0.8 power and 0.05 alpha level, based on 
the effect size previously obtained by Hackel and colleagues (2014; Cohen’s d = 0.3) 
when comparing within-subjects animacy perception judgements of two stimulus types. 
105 participants were then recruited online using the University College London Sona 
System, to account for some attrition from the online task. Volunteers were given a 
£7.50 Amazon voucher for completing the study. Data from one participant was 
excluded as the individual completed the study twice, leaving 104 participants (49 
female, 55 male, age range 18-39 years, M = 26.6, SD = 6.7). Ethnicity was classified 
into Asian (N = 43), Black (N = 5), Caucasian (N = 48), or mixed/other ethnic 
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background (N = 8). One participant chose not to complete the ‘alive’ rating task, 
resulting in 103 participants for this section only. Some participants also missed or 
chose to omit items on the self-report scales, meaning that overall scores could not be 
calculated. This resulted in only 102 completing participants for the Need to Belong and 
Loneliness scales, and 103 participants for ‘Difficulty Identifying Feelings’ and total 
scores on the Toronto Alexithymia Scale. No further data was collected following 
analysis for these participants. 
 
Stimuli 
Face stimuli were created by morphing together images of human faces from the 
Radboud Faces Database (RaFD; Langner et al, 2010) with images of dolls, using 
FantaMorph software (Version 4; Abrosoft Co., Beijing, China). Dolls were selected to 
represent male and female faces, with happy and neutral expressions (Male, neutral N = 
6; Male, happy N = 3; Female neutral N = 4; Female happy N = 6). All stimuli (both 
dolls and human faces) were Caucasian and human faces wore no cosmetics, piercings, 
facial hair or other distinguishing features. Stimuli were 596x736 pixels and displayed 
in an oval frame, removing external features (hair, ears, neck, etc.; see Figure 6.1a). All 
stimuli are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.204416.  
Three rating tasks were completed. In each task still images were selected from 
each morph at 10% intervals, creating 11 still images representing different levels of 
animacy for each morph, and 209 stimuli in total per block. For animacy threshold 
judgements, stills were selected at 2% intervals, creating 50 images for each of the 19 
morphs. 
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Procedure 
The online experiment comprised five main sections, running as follows. All 
questionnaire measures and experimental tasks are listed here: 
1. Self-report questionnaires (see details below for information on each) 
a. Demographic information 
b. Need to Belong Scale 
c. UCLA Loneliness Scale 
d. Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
e. Social Interaction Anxiety and Social Phobia Scales (short versions) 
f. Objectification Questionnaire (Male) 
g. Objectification Questionnaire (Female) 
2. Rating Task 1: Whether the face appears to be alive 
3. Animacy threshold judgements 
4. Rating Task 2: Whether the face is able to feel pain 
5. Rating Task 3: Whether the face has a ‘mind’ 
All participants completed the tasks in the order above. The order of rating tasks 
followed that used by Looser and Wheatley (2010). As the authors suggest, ratings of 
whether the face had a mind were blocked last, to avoid this influencing other animacy 
judgements. The threshold task was given after the ‘alive’ rating task to avoid 
influencing these ratings, since a similar judgement is being made, but mid-way through 
the longer rating task blocks to prevent participant fatigue. All tasks followed the 
procedure used by Looser and Wheatley. On starting the experiment, participants were 
randomly assigned to either the chromatic (N = 53) or achromatic (N = 51) condition. In 
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the chromatic condition stimuli were viewed in their original colour, and in the 
achromatic condition stimuli were seen at 0% saturation.  
 
Animacy thresholds 
To set thresholds for perceived animacy, participants were able to scroll through 
each morph at 2% intervals. They were asked to “scroll along until you find the point 
where you think the face changes from having the appearance of being alive to not 
having the appearance of being alive. Then select the first image on the alive side of 
that threshold” (see Figure 6.1b for an example). Faces were seen as fully inanimate 
when the scroll bar was on the left, and animate when on the right. Starting positions of 
the scrollbar were randomised so that they first appeared at each end point on 50% of 
trials.  
 
Rating tasks 
For each rating task participants were required to make a response on the given 
criteria for each of the 209 stimulus faces. Responses were given on a 7-point Likert 
scale, with 1 meaning definitely appears alive/feels pain/has a ‘mind’ and 7 meaning 
definitely doesn’t appear alive/feel pain/have a ‘mind’. Each face was shown on screen 
for 500 ms, after which participants responded by pressing 1-7 on their keyboard (see 
Figure 6.1c for an example trial). 
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Figure 6.1: a) example male/neutral (upper row) and female/happy (lower row) morph 
stimuli used in Experiment One. Stimuli are shown here at 20% intervals along the 
morph continuum, and desaturated as seen in the achromatic condition. b) Example 
trial on the threshold task. Participants could use the slider to move up and down the 
morph continuum at 2% intervals, to select the threshold at which the face first 
appeared to be animate. c) Example trial on the rating task. Stimuli were displayed for 
500 ms before a response was given using the 1-7 number keys. 
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Self-report measures 
 
Need to Belong Scale 
In an attempt to replicate the findings of Powers and colleagues (2014), the 
Need to Belong Scale (NTBS; Leary et al., 2013) was used as a measure of desire for 
social connections. Participants were required to rate the extent to which 10 statements, 
such as “I do not like being alone,” were characteristic of them, using a 5-point scale 
ranging from ‘Not At All’ to ‘Extremely.’ Possible scores range from 10-50, with a 
higher score indicating greater desire for social connection. Leary and colleagues report 
good construct validity for the scale as well as good reliability (α = .81). Internal 
consistency was also good in the current sample (α = .83). 
 
UCLA Loneliness Scale 
To further assess the effect of social connection, the UCLA Loneliness Scale 
(Version 3; Russell, 1996) was used. Participants were shown 20 statements, such as “I 
lack companionship” and asked to indicate how often they felt the way being described, 
on a 4-point scale from ‘Never’ to ‘Often.’ Possible scores range from 20-80, with a 
higher score representing greater loneliness. The scale has been shown to have excellent 
reliability (α > .90), as well as construct and convergent reliability. Internal consistency 
was also excellent in the current sample (α = .91). 
 
Social Interaction Anxiety and Social Phobia Scales 
Short versions of the Social Interaction Anxiety and Social Phobia Scales 
(SIAS-6 & SPS-6; Peters, Sunderland, Andrews, Rapee & Mattick, 2012) were 
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administered to account for other possible influences on motivation for social 
interaction. Each scale comprises six statements, and as for the NTBS, participants are 
required to rate the extent to which each is characteristic of them, using a 5-point scale 
ranging from “Not At All” to “Extremely”. Statements for the SIAS-6 included “I have 
difficulty making eye contact with others,” and for the SPS-6 included “When in an 
elevator I am tense if people look at me.” Each scale generates a score between 0 and 
24, with a higher score indicating greater anxiety. Peters and colleagues demonstrate 
that the validity of these measures is not sacrificed in the shortened versions. In this 
sample, good internal consistency was found for both SIAS (α = .82) and SPS (α = .85). 
 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS; Bagby et al., 1994; see section 5.2) 
requires participants to indicate the extent which they agree with each of 20 statements, 
including “I often don’t know why I am angry,” on a 5-point scale from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” Overall scores can range between 20 and 80, with a 
higher score indicating more alexithymic traits. Responses can be grouped into three 
subscales, measuring ‘Difficulty Describing Feelings’ (5 items), ‘Difficulty Identifying 
Feelings’ (7 items), and ‘Externally-Oriented Thinking’ (8 items), which refers to a 
tendency to focus attention outwards rather than inwardly and includes items such as “I 
prefer to just let things happen rather than to understand why they turned out that way”. 
The authors report good reliability (α = .81) as well as validity for the scale. The current 
sample also reports good internal consistency (α = .83). 
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Self-Objectification Questionnaire 
Objectification of men and women was assessed separately with modified 
versions of the Self-Objectification Questionnaire (Noll & Fredrickson, 1998; Strelan & 
Hargreaves, 2005). In this task participants were required to rank 10 qualities in order of 
importance, first for men and then for women. These included 5 appearance-based, such 
as ‘physical attractiveness,’ and 5 competence-based traits, such as ‘physical 
coordination’. Ranks for competence items can be deducted from appearance items, to 
obtain an overall objectification score between -25 and 25, with a higher score 
representing increased objectification. Noll (1996, as cited in Noll & Fredrickson, 1998) 
reports that the Self-Objectification Questionnaire demonstrates acceptable construct 
validity. 
 
6.2.2 Results 
Self-report measures 
Self-report questionnaires demonstrated a wide range of responses in all the 
measured constructs. Correlations between the measures are displayed in Table 6.1. 
Moderate to strong positive correlations were found between subscales of the TAS, 
between the social anxiety measures SIAS and SPS and between male and female 
objectification scores. In addition, a significant positive correlation was found between 
NTBS and male objectification, where those with a greater need to belong reported 
greater objectification of men. The same relation was not found for female 
objectification; however, this scale showed a significant positive correlation with the 
Externally-Oriented Thinking subscale of the TAS. Individuals who objectified women 
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more also report a more externally-oriented cognitive style. Loneliness showed a 
significant positive correlation with both SIAS and SPS, with more lonely individuals 
reportedly more socially anxious. Loneliness, SIAS and SPS all correlated positively 
with total TAS scores, as well as the ‘Identifying’ and ‘Describing’ subscales. Increased 
loneliness and social anxiety appears to be associated with a difficulty labelling 
identifying and describing emotions. However, of the three, only SPS resulted in a 
significant positive correlation with EOT. 
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Table 6.1: Pearson’s coefficients for correlations between the self-report measures. 
Self-Report Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
1.NTBS -          
2.Loneliness -.08 -         
3.SIAS .07 .51*** -        
4.SPS 
 
.05 .31** .62*** -       
Objectification           
5. Male .22* -.02 .17 .13 -      
6.Female 
 
.08 -.11 .04 .02 .45*** -     
TAS           
7. Identifying Feelings .05 .40*** .34*** .31** -.04 -.02 -    
8. Describing Feelings -.01 .43*** .47*** .38*** -.00 -.03 .70***    
9. Externally-Oriented Thinking -.12 .12 .10 .21* -.09 .23* .23* .25* -  
10.Overall Score -.03 .41*** .39*** .39*** -.05 .07 .87*** .83*** .62*** - 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Prior to examining the influence of trait differences on animacy perception, the 
influence of participant demographic (age and gender) on the trait measures were 
examined. Contrary to prior research (Franz et al., 2008), male and female participants 
showed no significant difference in overall alexithymia scores (t[101] = .30, p = .762, 
Cohen’s d = 0.06). However, male participants received significantly higher scores on 
the EOT subscale (t[102] = 2.49, p = .014, Cohen’s d = 0.49). No gender differences 
were found on the ‘Identifying Feelings’ (t[101] = -1.21, p = .230, Cohen’s d = 0.24) or 
‘Describing Feelings’ subscales (t[102] = -0.09, p = .929, Cohen’s d = 0.02). Gender 
differences were found in NTBS (t[100] = -3.72, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.74) and male 
objectification (t[102] = -3.01, p = .003, Cohen’s d = 0.59) with female participants 
demonstrating higher scores than males in both cases. Female objectification did not 
significantly differ across male and female participants (t[102] = 1.25, p = .215, 
Cohen’s d = 0.24). No further gender differences were found on the remaining measures 
(SIAS: t[102] = -1.26, p = .210, Cohen’s d = 0.25; SPS: t[102] = -1.80, p = .076, 
Cohen’s d = 0.35; Loneliness: t[100] = -0.26, p = .794, Cohen’s d = 0.04). The effect of 
participant age on trait measures was significant only for female objectification, where 
objectification scores were negatively correlated with age, such that younger 
participants scored higher than older participants (r[102] = -.23, p = .018). Inspection of 
this effect in each gender group showed that this effect was driven by a highly 
significant correlation in the female participant group only (r[47] = -.39, p = .006), with 
a nonsignificant effect in the male group (r[53] = -.09, p = .521). 
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Threshold task 
The point on the morph continuum (ranging from 0-100% human) at which the 
participant reported that the stimulus face first appeared to be animate on the threshold 
judgement task was combined for each of the 19 stimuli, to calculate a mean animacy 
threshold for each participant (M = 68.70, SD = 10.96)]. To analyse the effect of the 
gender and emotional expression of the stimulus on perceived animacy thresholds, 
mean thresholds were also calculated for each gender/emotion group, i.e., male/neutral 
(M = 68.29, SD = 12.82), male/happy (M = 63.63, SD = 13.96), female/neutral (M = 
71.36, SD = 12.78), female/happy (M = 69.86, SD = 11.76). 
 
Inter-individual variability in animacy perception 
To examine how inter-individual variability on traits of interest influenced 
animacy perception, scores on each of the self-report questionnaires were correlated 
with mean animacy thresholds. Pearson’s correlation coefficients are reported in Table 
6.2. All correlations were nonsignificant, with the exception of the EOT subscale of the 
TAS, which showed a negative correlation with animacy thresholds (r[101] = -.29, p = 
.003). A more externally-oriented cognitive style was associated with a lower threshold 
for perceiving animacy, closer to the inanimate end of the continuum. To identify 
whether this relation was consistent for all subgroups of face stimulus, EOT was 
correlated with animacy thresholds in each group individually. Significant negative 
correlations were found for all stimulus subgroups (male/neutral: r[101] = -.26, p = 
.008; female/neutral: r[101] = -.24, p = .013; female/happy: r[101] = -.33, p = .001) 
except male/happy stimuli, although this correlation showed a negative trend (r[101] = -
.13, p = .204). 
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Table 6.2: Pearson’s correlations between self-report measures and animacy threshold 
judgements. 
 Animacy Threshold 
Self-Report Measure df r 
 
  
NTBS 99 -.04 
Loneliness 99  .09 
SIAS 101 .04 
SPS 
 
101  .02 
Objectification 
     Male 
 
101 
 
-.12 
     Female 
 
101  .04 
TAS   
     Identifying Feelings 100 -.03 
     Describing Feelings 101   .06 
     Externally-Oriented Thinking 101    -.29** 
     Overall Score 100 -.15 
** p < .01 
 
A further analysis was conducted to assess the effect of participant 
demographics (gender and ethnicity) on animacy threshold judgements. Ethnicity was 
originally grouped into one of four broad categories: (Asian, Black, Caucasian, and 
mixed/other ethnic background. Since there were relatively few participants with black 
or mixed/other ethnic background, only Asian and Caucasian groups were compared in 
this analysis (N = 91, 20 Asian males, 23 Asian females, 27 Caucasian males, 21 
Caucasian females). A 2 (gender) x 2 (ethnicity) x 2 (stimulus gender) mixed ANOVA 
was therefore used. Stimulus gender was added as a third factor to identify any 
interaction effects between the gender of the participant and stimulus. The analysis 
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revealed a main effect of stimulus gender (F[1,87] = 25.82, p < .001, ɳp² = .23), but no 
significant main effects or interactions for participant gender or ethnicity (ps > .05). The 
effect of stimulus gender was consistent across male and female participants. Participant 
gender and ethnicity variables were therefore removed from the remaining analyses. 
 
Effects of stimulus variability on animacy perception 
The effect of stimulus qualities on threshold judgements was analysed with a 2 
(stimulus gender) x 2 (emotion type) x 2 (chromatic condition) mixed ANOVA, with 
stimulus gender and emotion as within-subjects factors, and chromatic condition as the 
between-subjects factor (N = 104). Main effects of both stimulus gender and emotion 
type were found, with thresholds for male faces closer to the inanimate end of the 
continuum than female faces (F[1,101] = 42.04, p < .001, ηp² = .29), and thresholds for 
happy faces closer to the inanimate end than neutral (F[1,101] = 13.88, p < .001, ηp² = 
.12). A further interaction effect was found between stimulus gender and emotion 
(F[1,101] = 5.00, p = .027, ηp² = .05). Post-hoc t-tests indicate that happy faces were 
judged to be alive at a significantly lower threshold than neutral faces, for male stimuli 
only (t[102] = 3.88, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.38), and not for female stimuli (t[102] = 
1.56, p = .121, Cohen’s d = 0.16). A significant gender difference was observed in both 
neutral (t[102] = -3.11, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.30) and happy stimuli (t[102] = -6.07, p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = 0.62) (see Figure 6.2). All main effects and interactions involving 
chromatic condition were nonsignificant (ps > .05). 
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Figure 6.2: Mean animacy thresholds for each stimulus subtype, according to emotional 
expression and gender. Male stimulus faces were perceived to be animate at a lower 
threshold than female faces, across both emotion groups. Animacy thresholds for male 
faces were also lower for stimuli with a happy than neutral expressions (*p<.05, ** 
p<.01, ***p<.001). Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
Rating tasks 
Participants’ ratings for whether the stimulus face ‘appears to be alive,’ ‘is able 
to feel pain’ and ‘has a mind’ were first subject to a linear transformation to convert 
scores from a 1-7 Likert scale to a score between 0 and 1, with 1 representing most 
animacy, and 0 least animacy. Scores were then combined as for the threshold values, to 
give a mean rating for each participant, at each animacy level, in each gender/emotion 
group and overall. 
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Mean ratings across participants were fitted with a single-term Gaussian 
function in the curve fitting toolbox for Matlab, using the following equation:  
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑎𝑒
[−(
𝑥−𝑏
𝑐 )
2
]
 
A good fit was achieved for all models (?̅?2> .96). This allowed the Point of 
Subjective Equality (PSE) to be calculated, reflecting the point on the morph continuum 
at which stimuli were judged to appear 50% animate. 
 
Alive ratings 
As found on the threshold judgement task, PSEs highlight that male faces were 
judged to appear alive at lower morph levels (i.e., when ‘less human’) than female 
faces, and happy faces at a lower level than neutral faces.  
Figure 6.3a demonstrates that male stimuli were judged to appear more alive 
than female stimuli at the majority of morph levels, but this difference is not apparent 
when stimuli are 0% human or 80%-90% human. Holm-Bonferroni-corrected t-tests 
allowed for paired comparisons between ratings for male and female stimuli at each of 
the 11 animacy levels. This analysis confirmed that the gender difference in ‘alive’ 
ratings was significant only for morph stimuli between 10 and 70% human (ps < .001), 
and also just reached significance at 100% human (t[102] = -2.63, p = .010, Cohen’s d = 
-.22), although at this level female faces were judged to appear more animate than male 
faces. 
Figure 6.3b illustrates a greater effect of emotion occurring at higher morph 
levels, i.e., when the stimuli were more human. This pattern is reflected in Holm-
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Bonferroni-corrected t-tests, which demonstrate a significant emotion effects at 40% 
human and above (ps < .016). 
 
Mind ratings 
PSEs for the ‘mind’ task follow the same pattern as the ‘alive’ task, 
demonstrating that participants thought male stimuli and happy stimuli were perceived 
to ‘have a mind’ at a lower animacy level than for female or neutral stimuli. 
As shown in Figure 6.3d, the gender difference in ratings to whether the face 
‘has a mind’ follow the same pattern as ‘alive’ ratings, with male faces receiving higher 
ratings and differences decreasing as the stimulus becomes more human. Overall, the 
gender difference appears less pronounced than for the ‘alive’ ratings. Nevertheless, 
Holm-Bonferroni-corrected t-tests between ratings for male and female stimuli on the 
‘mind’ task report a significant gender difference between 0 and 70% human (ps < 
.002). 
Similar to the gender difference data, emotion effects follow a similar pattern to 
ratings on the ‘Alive’ task, with larger differences observed for more human stimuli 
(Figure 6.3e). Again, the differences appear less pronounced on this task than for the 
‘Alive’ task, but Holm-Bonferroni-corrected t-tests report significant differences at the 
same animacy levels as the previous task, at 40% and above (ps < .001). 
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Figure 6.3 (previous page): Mean ratings from Experiment One of (a-c) “whether the face appears to be alive”, (d-f) “whether the face has a 
mind” and (g-i) “whether the face is able to feel pain” at each level of animacy, from 0% human/100% doll to 0% doll/100% human. Y-axis 
shows ratings from 0 (completely inanimate, e.g., definitely not able to feel pain) to 1 (completely animate, e.g., definitely able to feel pain). 
Ratings are shown for a,d,g) each stimulus gender, b,e,h) each stimulus emotion c,f,i) each stimulus gender/emotion group. In both emotion 
groups, male stimuli were perceived to be more alive, more likely to have a mind, and more able to feel pain than female stimuli, from 0 to 
around 80% human. In both gender groups, happy stimuli were judged to appear more alive, and more likely to have a mind than neutral 
stimuli, from around 40% human. In contrast, neutral faces were perceived to be more able to feel pain than happy faces, at both extremes of the 
continuum. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
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Pain ratings 
As for previous tasks, PSEs on the pain task indicate that male faces are judged 
to be animate at a lower level (less human) than female faces. However, in contrast with 
results from the threshold task and PSE analysis on the ‘Alive’ and ‘Mind’ tasks, in this 
task happy faces were judged ‘able to feel pain’ at a higher threshold than neutral faces. 
Figure 6.3g highlights that in the case of the pain task, a more consistent gender 
effect appears, at all morph levels, rather than being more evident at mid-low morph 
levels. Holm-Bonferroni-corrected t-tests comparing the gender difference confirm a 
significant effect at every level (ps < .006). 
  The effect of emotional expression on stimulus ratings on the pain task also 
show a different pattern to the alive and mind tasks (Figure 6.3h). In this case a greater 
difference is observed at either end of the morph continuum than in the mid-range. This 
is confirmed by Holm-Bonferroni-corrected t-tests, which confirm a significant emotion 
effect at 0-30% human and 90-100% human only (ps < .007).  The graph also illustrates 
that neutral faces were judged as being more ‘able to feel pain’ than happy faces. 
 
6.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment One demonstrates that the perception of animacy in stimuli morphed 
between human and doll faces is influenced by the gender and emotional expression of 
the stimulus face, but does not appear to rely on colour cues present in the stimulus. The 
present evidence also shows that Externally-Oriented Thinking is associated with 
reduced animacy perception thresholds.  
160 
 
The effect of stimulus gender on perceived animacy in this study supports the 
findings of Balas (2013). Balas proposed that the effect of stimulus gender may be 
driven by objectification of female faces. The present study provides the first attempt at 
testing this hypothesis. Scores on a scale of female objectification showed no significant 
correlation with animacy perception thresholds, and thus the current results do not 
support this account. In view of this, an alternative perceptual account of gender 
difference in animacy perception should also be considered. Human female faces share 
a closer similarity to the doll stimuli used in animacy experiments than male faces, due 
to narrower jawlines and lighter skin pigmentation than males (Brown & Perrett, 1993; 
Frost, 1988). This could be the factor that leads to increased animacy thresholds for 
female stimulus faces.  
Male stimuli were also judged to appear more ‘alive’ and more likely to have a 
‘mind’ than female stimuli at the majority of morph levels, but not when stimuli were 
80% human or above. This is unlikely to represent a ceiling effect, since ratings do not 
reach 100% (consistent with Looser & Wheatley, 2010). The lack of gender difference 
at the more human end of the morph continuum can possibly be explained by 
differences in use of cosmetics. All human faces used to create the experimental stimuli 
wore no make-up. However, many of the female dolls used gave the appearance of 
wearing make-up, including lipstick and eyeliner, where male dolls did not. These 
cosmetics can increase the local contrast of the eyes and lips, and in this case could have 
affected female stimuli at the inanimate end of the spectrum (Balas, 2013). This could 
lead to female morphed stimuli appearing less realistic than male stimuli at the same 
animacy level. It is interesting to note that in Balas’ (2013) study following the same 
procedure, human faces were also photographed without removing cosmetics (i.e., 
cosmetics were present for both doll and human faces), this may explain why a 
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consistent gender difference in animacy judgements was found across the morph 
continuum.  
Experiment Two aimed to test this alternative perceptual explanation of gender 
differences in animacy perception, by creating a set of stimuli which overcame these 
potential biases. 
 
6.3 Experiment Two 
 
In Experiment Two the threshold and rating tasks from the first experiment were 
repeated using morphed stimuli that combined animate human faces with computer 
generated inanimate faces. This removed the issue of the exaggeration of feminine 
facial features and make-up cues present in doll faces, and so allowed an assessment of 
whether the observed gender differences in Experiment One were influenced by these 
perceptual factors. 
 
6.3.1 Materials and methods 
Participants 
Target sample size for the second experiment was 103, to match those collected 
in Experiment One. 100 participants who did not take part in Experiment One (30 
female, 70 male, age range 18-61 years, M = 29.2, SD = 9.2) were recruited online from 
the website Prolific.ac. Ethnicity was classified into Asian (N = 30), Black (N = 4), 
Caucasian (N = 60), or mixed/other ethnic background (N = 6). All participants were 
paid £5 for taking part.  
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Figure 6.4: Example stimuli as used in Experiment Two. The upper row depicts 
female/neutral stimuli and the lower row male/happy. Stimuli are shown here at 20% 
intervals along the morph continuum, and desaturated as seen in the achromatic 
condition. 
 
Stimuli 
For Experiment Two, a new set of stimuli were created using FaceGen Modeller 
(Singular Inversions, Toronto, Canada). FaceGen was used to create computer 
generated inanimate versions of human faces from the RaFD (Langner et al, 2010). 
These inanimate versions were then morphed with the originals to make a set of stimuli 
highly controlled to match features across the morph continuum (see Figure 6.4). As in 
Experiment One, stimuli were selected to represent four categories: male, neutral 
expression (N = 4), male happy expression (N=4), female neutral expression (N = 4), 
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female happy expression (N = 4). Faces were all Caucasian and without make up or 
other distinguishing features, and were displayed in a frame removing external features. 
All stimuli were 400x400 pixels. All stimuli are available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.204453.  
 
Procedure 
Participants completed all tasks as described in Experiment One, in the same 
order, with two exceptions. Since in the previous experiment the Externally-Oriented 
Thinking subscale of the TAS (Bagby et al., 1994) was the only trait variable found to 
be correlated with animacy thresholds, only this questionnaire measure was retained for 
the second experiment. Additionally, as colour condition (chromatic vs. achromatic) did 
not significantly influence animacy judgements in the previous experiment, stimuli were 
displayed in colour for all participants.  
 
6.3.2 Results 
Self-report measures 
Internal consistency on the TAS (Bagby et al., 1994) was again shown to be 
good in this second sample of participants (α = .83). Overall scores on the TAS (M = 
51.09, SD = 11.97), and scores on the describing feelings (M = 14.29, SD = 4.35), 
identifying feelings (M = 17.24, SD = 6.23), and Externally-Oriented Thinking (M = 
19.56, SD = 4.45) subscales were calculated for each participant. Firstly, individual 
differences in TAS scores were analysed in terms of age and gender. Pearson’s 
correlation analyses showed no significant relation between age and overall TAS scores 
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(r[98] = -.14, p = .165), or with Externally-Oriented Thinking (r[98] = .07, p = .498), 
but scores on the describing feelings subscale did reach significance (r[98] = -.20, p = 
.043), and for identifying feelings was marginally significant (r[98] = -.18, p = .079). In 
both cases TAS scores decreased with age. Gender differences in TAS scores were 
compared with independent t-tests. This revealed no significant gender differences in 
overall scores (t[99] = 1.05, p = .298, Cohen’s d = 0.22) or any of the subscales 
(Identifying Feelings: t[99] = 0.92, p = .363, Cohen’s d = 0.19; Describing Feelings: 
t[99] = 1.45, p = .151, Cohen’s d = 0.30; Externally-Oriented Thinking: t[99] = 0.12, p 
= .904, Cohen’s d = 0.03).  
 
Threshold task 
Mean threshold judgements were calculated for all stimuli (M = 58.96, SD = 
15.76), and for each stimulus category, including male/neutral (M = 58.46, SD = 17.67), 
male/happy (M = 59.06, SD = 21.71), female/neutral (M = 59.64, SD = 17.02), and 
female/happy faces (M = 58.67, SD = 21.57).  
Comparison of threshold judgements with those made in Experiment One 
showed heterogeneity of variances between the two groups, according to Levene’s test 
(F[1,201] = 8.78, p = .003). With degrees of freedom adjusted for unequal variances, an 
independent samples t-test showed that thresholds for perceiving animacy were 
significantly lower (closer to the inanimate end of the continuum) in Experiment Two 
than in Experiment One (t[176] = 5.10, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .73). This indicates that 
the FaceGen faces used to create the second set of stimuli appeared more animate than 
the previous doll faces, shifting thresholds closer to the centre of the morph. 
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Inter-individual variability in animacy perception 
Scores on the TAS (Bagby et al., 1994) were correlated with mean animacy 
thresholds to identify the relation between these variables. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients were not significant for total scores (r[98] = -.04, p = .705), or for the 
describing feelings (r[98] = -.01, p = .978), identifying feelings (r[98] = -.10, p = .309) 
or Externally-Oriented Thinking subscales (r[98] = .04, p = .668). Animacy perception 
thresholds do not appear to be related to traits of alexithymia in this sample.  
As in Experiment One, the effect of participant age, gender and ethnicity on 
animacy thresholds was analysed. Pearson’s correlation coefficient between participant 
age and mean threshold was not significant (r[98] = -.16, p = .104), indicating that 
threshold judgements were consistent across age groups. An ANOVA was carried out to 
compare thresholds across male and female participants, and across ethnic backgrounds. 
Firstly, participants were grouped into categories based on ethnicity, resulting in Asian, 
Black, Caucasian and mixed/other background. As in Experiment One, Asian (male N = 
21, female N = 9) and Caucasian (male N = 41, female N = 19) participants represented 
the largest groups, and were compared in this analysis due to the very limited number of 
participants in other categories (N = 10). A 2 (participant ethnicity) x 2 (participant 
gender) x 2 (stimulus gender) mixed ANOVA showed no significant main effects of 
ethnicity (F[1,86] = 0.46, p = .499, ηp² = .01) or participant gender (F[1,86] = 0.51, p = 
.479, ηp² = .01), or interaction between the two (F[1,86] = 1.25, p = .267, ηp² = .01). 
There were also no significant main effects or interactions with stimulus gender (ps > 
.27). The results suggest that participants perceived similar thresholds for animacy 
whether they had the same or other gender and ethnicity to the stimulus face. 
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Effects of stimulus variability on animacy perception 
To identify the effect of stimulus gender and emotional expression on threshold 
judgements a 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out comparing responses for 
male and female, and happy and neutral stimuli. Neither the effect of stimulus gender 
(F[1,99] = 0.15, p = .702, ηp² < .01) or emotion (F[1,99] = 0.01, p = .919, ηp² < .01) 
were significant in this analysis. The interaction term was also nonsignificant (F[1,99] = 
0.63, p = .428, ηp² = .01). Threshold judgements appear to be fairly consistent across 
stimulus categories. 
 
Rating tasks 
Following the procedure for Experiment One, ratings of the extent to which the 
stimulus ‘appears to be alive,’ ‘is able to feel pain’ and ‘has a mind’ were linearly 
transformed to give a score between 0 and 1, with 1 representing most, and 0 least 
animacy. Mean ratings in each of the stimulus and emotion categories, at each animacy 
level were then calculated for each participant. Data from three participants was 
excluded from the ‘mind’ task prior to analysis, as they had given either the maximum 
or minimum rating possible to every stimulus face within one or more gender/emotion 
categories. This was taken as an indication of a technical difficulty or fatigue on the 
task. This resulted in 100 participants for the ‘alive’ and ‘pain’ rating tasks, and 97 
participants on the ‘mind’ task only (30 female, 67 male, age range 18-61 years, M = 
29.3, SD = 9.4). 
As shown in Figure 6.5, ratings on all three dimensions showed relatively little 
change across the animacy morph continuum. This meant that PSE values could not be 
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calculated from the data. Comparison of mean ratings at each animacy level are 
therefore described below. 
 
Alive ratings 
Ratings of the extent to which the stimulus face appeared to be alive were 
compared in a 2 (gender) x 2 (emotion) x 11 (animacy level) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. This revealed significant main effects of gender (F[1,99] = 31.90, p < .001, 
ηp² = .24), with male faces rated as appearing more alive than female faces, and emotion 
(F[1,99] = 200.41, p < .001, ηp² = .67), with happy faces appearing more alive than 
neutral faces. The main effect of animacy level was also significant (F[1,99] = 21.51, p 
< .001, ηp² = .18), with faces rated as appearing more alive towards the animate end of 
the continuum, although it should be noted that this effect was smaller than that of 
emotion or gender. The analysis also revealed a significant interaction between gender 
and emotion (F[1,99] = 10.34, p = .002, ηp² = .10), and between gender and animacy 
(F[10,990] = 2.76, p = .002, ηp² = .03). Holm-Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests 
demonstrate that the effect of gender on ratings for happy faces was significant only at 
the 70% level of animacy (t[99] = 3.23, p = .002, Cohen’s d = .35). However, the 
gender effect was significant for neutral faces at 0-50 and 70-80% human (ps < .009), 
indicating that the effect of gender was present more for neutral faces, towards the 
inanimate end of the continuum. 
 
Mind ratings 
Ratings for whether the stimulus face appeared to have a mind also showed a 
main effect of gender (F[1,96] = 5.04, p = .027, ηp² = .05), with higher ratings 
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associated with male stimuli than female, and emotion (F[1,96] = 54.22, p < .001, ηp² = 
.36), with higher ratings given to stimuli with happy expressions than neutral. The main 
effect of animacy level was also significant, with ratings increasing across the morph 
continuum (F[10,960] = 32.46, p < .001, ηp² = .25). In this task no significant 
interactions between the three variables were found (ps > .11). 
 
Pain ratings 
For the rating task requiring participants to decide whether the stimulus face was 
capable of experiencing pain, again a main effect of gender (F[1,99] = 16.69, p < .001, 
ηp² = .14), and emotion (F[1,99] = 51.50, p < .001, ηp² = .34) were observed. However, 
in this case the effects were reversed compared with previous tasks, where a greater 
capacity to experience pain was attributed to neutral faces than happy, and to female 
faces than to male. The main effect of animacy was also significant (F[10,990] = 3.11, p 
= .001, ηp² = .03). Again, no significant interaction effects were shown (ps > .13). 
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Figure 6.5 (previous page): Mean ratings from Experiment Two of (a-c) “whether the face appears to be alive”, (d-f) “whether the face has a 
mind”, and (g-i) “whether the face is able to feel pain, at each level of animacy from 0% human/100% computer generated to 0% computer 
generated/100% human. Y-axis shows ratings from 0 (completely inanimate, e.g., definitely not able to feel pain) to 1 (completely animate, e.g., 
definitely able to feel pain). Ratings are shown for (a,d,g) each stimulus gender, (b,e,h) each stimulus emotion (c,f,i) each stimulus 
gender/emotion group.  Male faces were perceived as more likely to be alive and to have a mind than female faces, but (in contrast with 
Experiment One) less likely to be able to feel pain. Faces with happy expression were also perceived as more likely to be alive and to have a 
mind than neutral faces, but less likely to be able to feel pain. Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
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6.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment Two partially replicate the findings from Experiment 
One and show that the effects of stimulus gender and emotional expression on animacy 
perception are consistent across varying stimulus types. In this regard, the hypothesis 
that gender differences in animacy judgements are driven by exaggeration of facial 
features and apparent cosmetics present in female dolls was not supported. When 
participants were required to rate the extent to which stimulus faces appeared to be 
alive, or to have a mind, female faces were again perceived as less animate using highly 
controlled computer generated stimuli without the bias of feminised facial features or 
apparent cosmetics. This reaffirms a small but robust effect of gender in animacy 
perception, although the cause of this effect remains unclear. 
One may note that the effects of gender and emotion were only found on the 
rating tasks, and not on the threshold setting task in which participants could freely 
select the point at which animacy was first perceived. The realistic nature of the 
inanimate stimuli used in Experiment Two may suggest a reason for the lack of gender 
and emotion effects on this task. Thresholds were strikingly consistent across each 
gender and emotion category, with animacy first perceived when the stimulus was 
approximately 58-59% human. Thresholds for the morphed FaceGen stimuli were 
significantly lower (closer to the inanimate end of the continuum) than for the morphed 
doll stimuli in Experiment One. This is perhaps unsurprising, since programs such as 
FaceGen aim to create a more realistic face stimulus than the dolls used in the previous 
experiment. A more realistic stimulus at the inanimate end would therefore shift 
thresholds closer to this end of the continuum. As can be observed from the rating task 
results (see Figure 6.5), stimuli were rated fairly consistently across each level of 
animacy. This indicates that it may have been difficult for participants to distinguish 
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between the animacy levels, and therefore to select the point at which animacy was first 
perceived. Participants may then have been more likely to select a similar threshold on 
every trial, closer to the middle of the continuum, if they found the stimuli too similar to 
distinguish between.  
In the case of rating whether the stimulus face was able to feel pain, effects of 
gender and emotion were also observed in Experiment Two. However, female stimuli 
were rated as more able to feel pain (i.e., more animate) than male faces, in contrast 
with the ‘alive’ and ‘mind’ tasks, and with the results of Experiment One. This effect 
may have arisen from pre-existing assumptions regarding gender differences in 
sensitivity to pain. Research using the Gender Role Expectations of Pain (GREP) 
questionnaire (Robinson et al., 2001) demonstrates that both male and female 
participants rate women as more sensitive to, and less enduring of pain than men. 
Perhaps this gender bias influenced rating judgements on the task. While this bias did 
not appear to influence ‘pain’ judgements in the first experiment, perhaps this 
discrepancy can also be attributed to differences in the perceived animacy of the two 
stimulus sets. If participants found it difficult to distinguish faces at different animacy 
levels in Experiment Two, then perhaps they were more likely to rely on gender 
information than animacy to make rating judgements. 
The relation between higher levels of Externally-Oriented Thinking and lowered 
animacy perception thresholds was not replicated in Experiment Two. This does not 
seem to be a result of the range of TAS scores obtained from the second participant 
group, as this was consistent with those in Experiment One. Again, since this 
correlation measure was based on threshold judgements, the relation between variables 
may have failed to arise in this case if participants found the stimuli too difficult to 
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distinguish between. Further research is necessary to clarify the link between animacy 
perception and Externally-Oriented Thinking.   
 
6.4 Experiment Three 
 
Experiments One and Two established variability in animacy perception 
thresholds related to both stimulus and perceiver. This inter-individual variability in the 
readiness with which animacy is perceived could underlie differences in vicarious 
responses to inanimate objects and body parts within MTS and conscious vicarious pain 
(see section 1.3 and Chapter 3 of this thesis). In typical adults vicarious tactile 
perception is enhanced for animate compared with inanimate body parts (Deschrijver et 
al., 2015). Vicarious perception may therefore vary between individuals according to 
individual animacy perception thresholds, where perception should be heightened for 
stimuli above the threshold for animacy compared with below-threshold stimuli. As 
noted previously, a minority of individuals with MTS report vicarious sensations of 
touch for inanimate body parts (Banissy & Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009). Individual 
differences in the perception of animacy could therefore underlie this variability. In 
order to investigate this potential moderating effect, it is important to first examine 
whether MTS is associated with general differences in the perception of animacy, 
compared with typical adults. Individual difference factors related to social cognition 
have previously been linked to variability in animacy perception thresholds (i.e., 
alexithymia, Experiment One; need to belong, Powers et al., 2014, but see Experiment 
One). Given that MTS has been linked to broader changes in social perception and 
cognition associated with some of these characteristics (see Banissy, 2013 for a review) 
there is potential for variability in animacy perception in MTS compared with typical 
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adult controls. In Experiment Three, participants with MTS completed the Threshold 
Task using the doll-human morph stimuli from Experiment One, to identify whether 
animacy perception differed in this group compared with non-synaesthetes. 
 
6.4.1 Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Seven participants who report experiencing MTS were recruited from an 
existing database at Goldsmiths, University of London. All participants had previously 
had their experiences verified on a visuotactile interference task (described in section 
1.3). 
 
Procedure 
Participants completed only the Threshold Task described in Experiment One. 
The experiment was again completed online. Again, since colour condition did not 
affect animacy perception thresholds in Experiment One, chromatic stimuli were 
displayed for all participants.  
 
6.4.2 Results 
Mean threshold judgements were calculated for all stimuli (M = 69.11, SD = 
7.90), and for each stimulus category, including male/neutral (M = 67.54, SD = 11.00), 
male/happy (M = 66.08, SD = 12.26), female/neutral (M = 72.08, SD = 13.68), and 
female/happy faces (M = 70.21, SD = 10.11). Mean animacy thresholds are displayed 
with those made by controls (in Experiment One) in Figure 6.6. This figure 
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demonstrates the same pattern of results obtained from control participants in the 
previous experiment, with higher thresholds obtained for female faces than male, and 
for faces with neutral expressions than happy expressions. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Mean animacy thresholds for each stimulus type in MTS participants 
(Experiment Three) and controls (Experiment One). MTS participants did not 
significantly differ from controls for any stimulus type. 
 
Comparison of overall threshold judgements with those made by control 
participants in Experiment One showed no significant effect of participant group (t[108] 
= 0.10, p = .922, Cohen’s d = .04). Again, no significant differences were found for 
male/neutral (t[108] = 0.15, p = .880, Cohen’s d = .06), male/happy (t[108] = -0.45, p = 
.651, Cohen’s d = -.19), female happy (t[108] = -0.14, p = .886, Cohen’s d = -.05) or 
female neutral (t[108] = -0.08, p = .938, Cohen’s d = -.03) stimulus faces specifically. 
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The results therefore indicate that participants with MTS did not differ from control 
participants in the threshold at which they perceived animacy to occur. 
 
6.4.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment Three extend the findings reported in Experiments 
One and Two of this chapter to confirm typical animacy perception thresholds in 
individuals with MTS. The same pattern of variability in animacy thresholds is observed 
for MTS participants as controls, with animacy perceived more readily in male faces 
than female, and in happy faces than neutral.  
The present results provide useful implications for further research into the role 
of animacy perception in vicarious tactile response. Variability in conscious vicarious 
response has been observed within individuals with MTS, where some report vicarious 
sensations in response to inanimate stimuli while others do not (Banissy & Ward, 2007; 
Banissy et al., 2009). Individual variability in the perception of animacy therefore 
provides a candidate mechanism by which this heterogeneity within MTS may occur. 
The results of Experiment Three establish that animacy perception in MTS does not 
differ in a systematic fashion. Research should now focus on examining whether 
conscious vicarious responses differ as a function of individual animacy thresholds, 
using morphed stimuli such as those created here. 
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6.5 General Discussion 
 
The present research aimed to elucidate the extent to which facial animacy 
judgements are influenced by a) the gender of the face, b) the emotional expression of 
the face, c) colour cues and d) inter-individual variability relevant to social interaction, 
across varying stimulus sets. The results demonstrate for the first time that the 
emotional expression of the stimulus face modulates animacy perception, with happy 
male faces perceived as being animate at a lower level than neutral male faces. The 
present results also provide further evidence that animacy is perceived more readily in 
male faces than in female faces. This effect was not driven by objectification of female 
faces or by cosmetic features associated with inanimate female stimuli that have been 
used in the past. Animacy judgements were also not affected by whether the stimulus 
was chromatic or achromatic, but were found to correlate with an externally-oriented 
cognitive style. Together the results provide important implications for understanding 
variability in animacy perception and social interaction. 
 
6.5.1 Stimulus Variability Factors that Contribute to Animacy Judgments 
The mean animacy perception threshold across all stimuli in Experiment One 
was 69%. This lies very close to the 67% threshold reported by Looser and Wheatley 
(2010). The sigmoid function observed in animacy ratings across the morph continuum, 
and PSE values shifted towards the animate end of the continuum also align with results 
from previous studies (Balas, 2013; Balas & Horski, 2012; Hackel et al., 2014; Looser 
& Wheatley, 2010). The similarity between animacy thresholds and PSE values in this 
study and previous studies indicates a reliable and consistent animacy boundary across 
experimental procedures, and testing environments (either online or in the laboratory). 
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However, animacy thresholds using morphed computer generated stimuli in Experiment 
Two were significantly lower, around 58% human. This suggests that threshold values 
previously reported may be limited to stimuli morphed from dolls or statues, as have 
been consistently used in previous literature. Research should now be extended to other 
types of inanimate stimuli to identify the extent to which this perceptual threshold may 
vary.  
The hypothesis that animacy perception from faces would be enhanced for 
stimuli expressing emotion was supported in both experiments. It appears that 
emotional expressions indicate a capacity to experience emotions. This evidence 
provides an additional suggestion of why the eyes disproportionately influence animacy 
judgements, as they convey information about emotional state (Eisenbarth & Alpers, 
2011; Yuki, Maddux & Masuda, 2007). The role of emotional expression highlights the 
importance of social cues, in addition to the featural and structural properties of the 
face, in perceiving animacy. This finding does come with a caveat, as the current study 
used only happy and neutral expressions. It therefore cannot be determined whether the 
observed effect was a product of emotion expression in general; or of positively-
valenced emotion specifically. Future research should aim to establish the role of 
positive and negative emotion in attributing animacy to faces. 
Across both experiments evidence is provided in support of the effect of 
stimulus gender in animacy perception (Balas, 2013), with male faces tending to appear 
more animate than female faces. These findings are extended to show that both male 
and female participants judge male faces to appear more animate than female. No 
support was found in this study for Balas’ suggestion that gender differences may be 
caused by objectification of female faces, as animacy threshold judgements were not 
significantly correlated with individual variability in objectification. The effect of 
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gender also cannot be reduced to biases in the doll stimuli used by Balas, or in 
Experiment One of this paper. It was proposed that the appearance of cosmetics present 
in female dolls, or the feminine facial features of doll stimuli, such as lightened skin 
pigmentation and narrow jawlines could have driven the gender effects observed in 
these experiments. However, in Experiment Two comparable gender effects were found 
for computer generated inanimate stimuli without such biases. Further research is 
needed then, to identify the mechanisms behind the influence of gender in animacy 
perception.  
When rating whether a stimulus was able to feel pain, the effect of emotional 
expression was reversed compared with ‘alive’ and ‘mind’ judgements, with lower 
ratings given to happy faces than neutral. Participants were less likely to attribute the 
capacity to feel pain to faces that were expressing an emotion incongruent with the 
experience of pain. In Experiment Two, female faces were judged to be more able to 
experience pain than male faces, also in contrast with judgements of animacy on the 
‘alive’ and mind’ tasks. This difference may reflect a gender bias in the perception of 
others’ sensitivity to pain, since both men and women tend to attribute greater pain 
sensitivity to women than to men (Robinson et al., 2001). While these explanations 
seem straightforward, the findings suggest that deciding whether or not a face is capable 
of experiencing pain relies on different stimulus cues to deciding whether the face 
appears alive or has a mind, and therefore these may reflect two distinct processes. 
Gray, Gray and Wegner (2007) propose two core dimensions to mind perception: 
experience and agency. This account fits with the results of the ‘alive’ and ‘mind’ rating 
tasks. If a face was perceived as experiencing emotion, then it was associated with 
appearing more alive, and more likely to have a mind. However, if the capacity to feel 
pain is to be considered an aspect of the mind, then the experience of emotion should 
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also increase mind perception in this aspect, according to Gray and colleagues. In the 
current stimuli the opposite effect was observed, with emotion expression resulting in 
reduced perception of the capacity for pain. Further investigation is required to establish 
whether animacy and the capacity to feel pain reflect separable perceptual judgements. 
Finally, in Experiment One, animacy judgements were not significantly affected 
by whether the stimulus was chromatic or achromatic. This suggests that skin 
pigmentation is not a vital cue for animacy perception. It should be noted that 
pigmentation is not the only cue that can be gained from the skin. Texture and shading 
details are also relevant for other aspects of face processing (Bruce & Langton, 1994; 
Meinhardt-Injac, Persike & Meinhardt, 2013), suggesting that these cues may have 
influenced animacy judgements on the task. However, Looser and Wheatley (2010) 
show that while animacy ratings for the eyes alone accounted for 75% of the variance of 
whole-face ratings in their experiment, ratings for skin patches did not account for a 
signicant proportion of this variance. In fact, animacy ratings for the morphed skin 
patch stimuli increased only by around 10% between 100% inanimate and 100% 
animate stimuli. This indicates that skin properties do not provide a particularly useful 
cue to animacy. Overall, the present findings support the validity and generalisability of 
previous studies which have used chromatic images to compare animacy judgements for 
different stimulus groups (Balas, 2013; Hackel et al., 2014; Looser & Wheatley, 2010; 
Powers et al., 2014; Swiderska et al., 2012; Wheatley et al., 2011). This provides useful 
implications for future animacy research, as it appears equally valid to present 
chromatic or achromatic stimulus faces. 
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6.5.2 Perceiver Variability Factors that Contribute to Animacy Judgments 
Prior work has suggested that an individual’s desire for social connection may 
influence the threshold at which animacy is perceived. Powers and colleagues (2014) 
report a negative correlation between scores on the NTBS and animacy thresholds, 
indicating that animacy was perceived more readily by participants with a greater need 
to belong. This correlation was not replicated for the participant sample in Experiment 
One. It is worth noting that the present sample was larger (104 vs. 30) and showed a 
wider range of NTBS scores than the sample recruited by Powers and colleagues. It is 
possible that the extra anonymity provided by an online experiment increased the 
honesty of participants’ responses on this self-report measure. Comparison of Internet 
and lab-based self-report measures indicates that online tests are as reliable as those 
conducted under controlled conditions (Buchanan & Smith, 1999) and are likely to 
result in more honest self-disclosure (Joinson, 1999). There was also no significant 
correlation between self-reported loneliness and animacy perception, as predicted based 
on the research of Epley and colleagues (2008). However, the studies conducted by 
Epley and colleagues focussed on the attribution of anthropomorphic traits to animals 
and objects, rather than human faces. It appears that the modulating effect of loneliness 
may be limited to these kinds of stimuli. Overall, while the present findings contradict 
those previously reported, further research is necessary to establish the link between 
desire for social interaction and the readiness with which animacy is perceived. 
In Experiment One, higher levels of Externally-Oriented Thinking, a subscale of 
the TAS measure of alexithymia (Bagby et al., 1994) were associated with increased 
likelihood of perceiving animacy. However, this effect was not replicated in Experiment 
Two, which may be related to the difficulty of making threshold judgements using this 
stimulus set. The Externally-Oriented Thinking subscale is associated with focussing 
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attention on external events rather than inner feelings and emotions (Bagby et al., 1994). 
It is possible that individuals scoring highly on this subscale may be less influenced by 
the emotional and social cues in the stimuli, and more influenced by low-level 
perceptual differences when making animacy judgements. This could result in reduced 
thresholds for perceiving animacy. The second point to consider is that a lower animacy 
PSE is also closer to the true point of equality (50%) than a higher PSE. An alternative 
explanation of the data is therefore that lower animacy thresholds reflect more accurate 
animacy judgements. Those with an externally-oriented cognitive style may therefore be 
more accurate at animacy perception as a result of relying more on perceptual than 
social cues. In this study, for instance, a stimulus face that was smiling was no more 
likely to be animate than a stimulus with neutral expression. Therefore allowing social 
cues to influence animacy judgements would not improve accuracy. One way of 
exploring this hypothesis would be to design an animacy task with ‘correct’ responses. 
This could involve, for example, a sorting task in which participants must arrange 
stimulus faces at different animacy levels into the correct answer. This would allow 
conclusions to be made regarding whether cognitive style and stimulus qualities 
modulate the accuracy, as well as the likelihood, of animacy perception. At present, 
however, the link with animacy perception indicates wider differences in face 
processing in alexithymia than previously thought, which carries important implications 
for understanding underlying mechanisms of the condition. 
 
6.5.3 Implications for vicarious perception of touch and pain 
The present results provide interesting future directions for the study of 
vicarious perception. Evidence of individual variability in thresholds for perceiving 
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animacy (e.g., in relation to Externally-Oriented Thinking) suggests that this variability 
may be an important factor in modulating vicarious responses to touch and pain, given 
that the vicarious somatosensory responses appear to be enhanced for animate compared 
with inanimate agents (Deschrijver et al., 2015). If vicarious perception is enhanced for 
stimuli that are perceived as animate, then it may also vary according to individual 
animacy thresholds, where vicarious responses to an ambiguous stimulus may be 
enhanced for individuals with lower animacy thresholds. Further, prior evidence of 
individuals with MTS who experience conscious vicarious sensations in response to 
inanimate dummies (Banissy & Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009) may reflect these 
individual differences in the readiness with which animacy is perceived. Experiment 
Three identified that MTS is not associated with general differences in animacy 
perception thresholds. Future research should next examine animacy perception in MTS 
at the individual level, by comparing vicarious tactile experiences for morphed stimuli 
above and below individual animacy thresholds. 
 
6.5.4 Conclusions 
Across two experiments, effects of both stimulus and individual variability in 
making animacy judgements are established. The findings corroborate previous 
evidence that the threshold at which animacy is perceived along a continuum is 
influenced by the gender of the stimulus face (Balas, 2013). In addition, novel evidence 
is provided to suggest that this threshold is also influenced by the emotional expression 
of the stimulus, with happy faces perceived as being animate at a lower threshold than 
neutral faces. With regards to individual variability, some evidence was found to 
suggest that an Externally-Oriented Thinking style was associated with lower animacy 
thresholds. However, animacy perception did not significantly differ for participants 
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with MTS compared with typical adults. Taken as a whole, these findings provide vital 
guidance for the careful control of stimuli in future facial animacy perception research. 
They also give rise to broader implications for the role of cognition, emotion and gender 
in social perception, and future directions for the study of vicarious touch and pain.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides an overview of empirical findings regarding the contribution of 
self-other distinction to vicarious perception of touch and pain reported in this thesis. 
Each of the main aims of the thesis will be addressed, along with possible limitations of 
the present research and future directions for the field.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has investigated two important processes for social interaction: self-
other distinction and vicarious perception of touch and pain. Previous research has 
indicated that self-other distinction may modulate typical vicarious perception (e.g., 
Adler et al., 2016; Deschrijver et al., 2015; de Guzman et al., 2015; Serino et al., 2008, 
2009), and that atypical self-other distinction may underlie conscious vicarious 
perception (e.g., Derbyshire et al., 2013; Santiesteban et al., 2015b; but see Chapter 1 
for a full discussion). However theoretical questions remain regarding the extent to 
which mechanisms of self-other distinction are required for vicarious perception of 
touch and pain. With these in mind, the main aims of this thesis were as follows: 
1. To examine the extent to which vicarious tactile perception can be modulated 
by increasing excitability in primary somatosensory cortex or the right temporo-parietal 
junction with transcranial current stimulation (Chapter 3) 
2. To clarify the contribution of self-other control and domain-general inhibitory 
control mechanisms to vicarious perception by comparing the performance of conscious 
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vicarious pain responders and controls on an imitation inhibition and a domain-general 
task (Chapter 4). 
3. To assess the involvement of self-other distinction processes with regard to 
bodily self-awareness in vicarious pain perception, comparing trait levels of 
depersonalisation and interoceptive sensibility in conscious vicarious pain responders 
and controls (Chapter 5). 
4. To identify individual and stimulus factors which contribute to the distinction 
between animate and inanimate human faces, with the aim of designing future studies to 
examine the role of animacy perception in modulating vicarious perception (Chapter 6). 
In this chapter, the results of these research questions will be discussed in 
relation to theories of conscious vicarious touch and pain perception, and implications 
for understanding vicarious perception and social cognition more generally. Future 
directions for the field are also considered. 
 
7.2 Modulating vicarious tactile perception with transcranial current stimulation 
 
Chapter 3 addressed the question of whether vicarious tactile perception on a 
visuotactile interference task could be modulated using transcranial current stimulation 
(tDCS or tRNS) to increase excitability at either primary somatosensory cortex or the 
right temporo-parietal junction. In this way, assumptions of both the Threshold Theory 
and Self-Other Theory of MTS (see Ward & Banissy, 2015 for a review) were 
investigated across two experiments. Behaviourally, greater vicarious perception was 
found for individuals with higher self-reported perspective taking, when observing a 
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spatially congruent human hand being touched (compared with a dummy hand or 
object). However, modulation of vicarious perception was not observed following tDCS 
over rTPJ. While some evidence indicating enhancement of vicarious tactile perception 
as a result of tDCS (but not tRNS) targeted at right hemisphere somatosensory cortex 
emerged, this was only found using liberal statistical thresholds. The evidence therefore 
does not provide convincing support for the potential to enhance vicarious tactile 
perception by enhancing somatosensory excitability. Nevertheless, the effect is 
interesting given that it fits the pattern of results of prior work (Bolognini et al., 2013). 
The question of whether vicarious tactile perception can be modulated with transcranial 
current stimulation therefore seems worthy of further investigation. 
Future research using this experimental paradigm could identify potential 
individual variability factors which may moderate the effects of stimulation on vicarious 
perception. In the present studies, trait empathy was not found to moderate stimulation 
effects. However, recent research in other cognitive domains has highlighted the 
variability of tCS responsiveness in relation to several factors, such as (but not limited 
to) trait differences, anatomy and baseline ability (see Krause & Cohen Kadosh, 2014 
for a review). It therefore seems likely that certain factors could influence the 
modulating effects of stimulation on vicarious perception. Further, variability between 
experimental participant samples could potentially account for the different results 
observed in the current work and those previously reported (Bolognini et al., 2013). 
The lack of convincing stimulation effects in the present experiments could also 
be related to structural brain differences associated with MTS outside of somatosensory 
cortex (Holle et al., 2013). It may be over-simplistic to attempt to induce conscious 
vicarious perceptual experiences in control participants by targeting one brain region in 
isolation, these additional differences considered. In this regard, the present results do 
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not necessarily contradict a Threshold Theory of MTS (see Ward & Banissy, 2015). 
Although boosting somatosensory excitability was not sufficient to induce conscious 
vicarious tactile perception, somatosensory activity may represent only one of several 
mechanisms which contribute to the experience. 
A candidate mechanism proposed within Self-Other Theory is an impairment in 
the ability to control representations of the self and others, a process which appears to 
be enhanced by tDCS targeted at the rTPJ (Santiesteban et al., 2012; Hogeveen et al., 
2015). However, vicarious tactile perception was not modulated by tDCS over this 
region in the current study, therefore contrasting with the assumptions of Self-Other 
Theory. However, it should be noted that there were no explicit self-other control 
demands in the vicarious perception task. While vicarious perception in everyday 
scenarios involves a distinction between self and other, participants may incorporate the 
visual stimuli in the visuotactile interference task into their own self-concept, since they 
were presented in a first-person perspective (see arguments in section 1.2), resulting in a 
lack of self-other conflict. Further, task instructions did not create additional self-other 
control demand, for example by asking participants to imagine that the viewed body 
part belonged to either themselves or to a stranger (see Vistoli et al., 2016). The 
requirement of self-other control mechanisms in completing the current task may 
therefore have been insufficient to be modulated by stimulation of rTPJ. Further, it 
should be noted that in order to best match the procedure of Bolognini and colleagues 
(2013) the present stimulation parameters differed from those used in prior work which 
has effectively modulated self-other control ability following tDCS over rTPJ (see Coll 
et al., 2017; Santiesteban et al., 2012, 2015a; Sowden et al., 2015). Future work should 
consider manipulations to task instructions and design to increase self-other control 
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demands and follow guidance from prior research for stimulation protocol, in order to 
identify whether performance can be modulated according to excitability of rTPJ.  
 
7.3 Inhibitory control in vicarious pain responders 
 
 The lack of support for mechanisms of self-other control in vicarious perception 
found in Chapter 3 was followed up using a behavioural design in Chapter 4, comparing 
self-other control ability in conscious vicarious pain responders and control participants. 
No further support was provided by the results of this next experiment. Neither 
Sensory-Localised nor Affective-Generalised conscious vicarious pain responders 
showed impairments in self-other control ability on imitation inhibition or perspective-
taking tasks. Further, no significant differences in domain-general inhibitory control 
ability were observed between the groups, as proposed by Task Control Theory (Heyes 
& Catmur, 2015). These results contrast with past evidence indicating that both 
conscious vicarious pain responders (Derbyshire et al., 2013) and individuals with MTS 
(Santiesteban et al., 2015b) show a specific impairment in inhibiting other-relevant 
representations. The task used by Derbyshire and colleagues has been criticised for 
assessing domain-general mechanisms rather than self-other control. However, the fact 
that significant between-group differences were also not observed on a domain-general 
inhibitory control task in the present study indicates that this cannot fully account for 
the discrepancy between the current and previous results regarding self-other control. 
Further research is needed to establish the reason for this discrepancy with prior work, 
and whether previously reported effects reflect domain-general or specifically self-other 
control mechanisms. 
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On a visuotactile interference task involving observed pain, again no between-
group differences were found, contrasting with the results of previous work 
(Vandenbroucke et al., 2013, 2014). It is possible that subtle differences in tactile 
stimulation in the present experiment accounted for this discrepancy. However, for 
control participants greater vigilance to pain was associated with increased vicarious 
pain perception. This finding supports suggestions made by Fitzgibbon and colleagues 
(2010) that conscious vicarious pain is driven by hypervigilance to painful stimuli, in 
individuals with a history of traumatic injury or chronic pain. However, since no 
between-group differences in vigilance to pain were detected, this trait may be sufficient 
to modulate vicarious perception on the interference task but not to induce conscious 
perception of the stimulus. As discussed above, additional factors are likely to be 
involved in conscious vicarious perception. 
 It is possible that the method of participant recruitment could explain why 
predicted differences in self-other control and visuotactile interference in vicarious pain 
responder groups were not found in this experiment. One issue could be the sample 
sizes of Sensory-Localised (N = 10) and Affective-Generalised responders (N = 3). 
Conscious vicarious touch and pain responders are relatively rare, which makes 
recruitment of large sample sizes challenging. A full discussion of the impact of 
statistical power on the experimental results contained in this thesis is provided in 
section 7.3. Alternatively, differences between groups may not have been detected due 
to the lack of an objective measure of conscious vicarious pain experience. The 
classification measure used in Chapter 4 relies on self-report rather than an objective 
measure as used to verify MTS in previous studies (Banissy & Ward, 2007; 
Santiesteban et al., 2015b). It is important to note that self-report classification measures 
of MTS have not been found to be sensitive in the past (although see Ward et al., 2018). 
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For instance, Banissy and colleagues (2009) identify a self-reported prevalence rate of 
MTS of 10.8%, compared with an objectively-verified prevalence of 1.6%. Self-report 
measures rely on accurate introspective ability, and these results indicate that many 
individuals who self-report conscious vicarious perception may not meet objective cut-
offs. The current self-report measure involves responses to visual stimuli and more in-
depth questions than previous studies of conscious vicarious pain (e.g., Vandenbroucke 
et al., 2013, 2014), providing a more nuanced investigation of participants’ experiences. 
Previous research into conscious vicarious pain has typically made a distinction only 
between conscious responders and controls. The distinction between Sensory-Localised 
and Affective-Generalised responders according to this classification method has only 
been made recently, and thus received limited confirmation of the validity and 
reliability of this classification structure. Nevertheless, responder groups based on the 
current screening measure have shown quantitative differences in brain structure and 
function (Grice-Jackson et al, 2017), adding validity to the three-factor structure. 
Specifically, while both responder groups show structural differences in the insula, 
somatosensory cortex and rTPJ compared with controls, only the Sensory-Localised 
group demonstrate sensorimotor mu suppression when viewing others in pain. The 
cluster analysis reported in Chapter 5 of this thesis replicated the original three-factor 
structure identified by Grice-Jackson and colleagues in a new sample, highlighting the 
reliability of the method. Collectively, this evidence of the validity and reliability of the 
scale provides support for its sensitivity to identify pain responder groups in the current 
thesis. Future work should focus on consistency in the recruitment of conscious 
vicarious pain responders to allow comparison between studies. Combining self-report 
with objective measures of vicarious pain, as is considered best practice in the study of 
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MTS (Banissy & Ward, 2007) could also be effective in identifying conscious 
responders. 
 
7.4 Atypical bodily self-awareness in vicarious pain responders 
 
 In addition to impairments in self-other control ability, Self-Other Theory (see 
Ward & Banissy, 2015) proposes that conscious vicarious perception of touch and pain 
may be related to an extension of bodily self-awareness. To address this proposition in 
Chapter 5, individuals with Sensory-Localised or Affective-Generalised conscious 
vicarious pain, and control participants without conscious vicarious pain, were asked to 
complete a battery of self-report measures related to bodily self-awareness. Atypical 
responses were found for Sensory-Localised vicarious pain responders, specifically 
heightened depersonalisation (related to a detachment from the bodily self) and 
interoceptive sensibility (related to a focus on internal bodily sensations). This evidence 
supports Self-Other Theory, suggesting that broader differences beyond somatosensory 
mirroring may contribute to atypical conscious vicarious perception. Specifically, a 
detachment from one’s own body as observed in depersonalisation is thought to be 
associated with impairments in self-other distinction, and a greater tendency to extend 
representations of the bodily self to incorporate others (Adler et al., 2016; Kanayama et 
al., 2009). Impairments in self-other distinction have previously been linked to 
conscious vicarious pain perception (Derbyshire et al., 2013; Grice-Jackson et al., 
2017), suggesting that this could mediate the relation between depersonalisation and 
conscious vicarious perception reported here. In terms of interoceptive sensibility, a 
heightened focus on internal bodily sensations could increase detection of vicarious 
physical sensations induced by observing others’ pain, leading to conscious perception. 
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 Future work is necessary to further explore the trait differences found in 
this study. For instance, while this data provides evidence of broader trait differences 
associated with conscious vicarious pain, it cannot inform theory regarding the direction 
of the relation between these variables. It is conceivable that atypical bodily self-
awareness could be either a cause or a consequence of conscious vicarious perceptual 
experience. Causal relationships regarding interoception could potentially be assessed 
by training attention towards bodily states, and examining subsequent changes in 
vicarious pain experience. For instance, some mindfulness-based therapies involve a 
focus on internal bodily sensations, and have been shown to increase neural activity 
associated with interoceptive attention (e.g., in anterior insula; Farb, Segal & Anderson, 
2012). Increased grey-matter density in the TPJ has also been reported following long-
term mindfulness training, suggesting potential implications for self-other control 
(Hӧlzel et al., 2011). This form of training could therefore provide a useful avenue for 
future research on vicarious perception. 
Before extending these findings beyond conscious vicarious pain responders, it 
will be important to also assess bodily self-awareness in individuals with MTS. 
Following evidence of vicarious body ownership and agency in MTS (e.g., Aimola 
Davies & White, 2013; Cioffi et al., 2016), Self-Other Theory predicts that vicarious 
touch may also be associated with the sense of bodily self-awareness, but this is yet to 
be examined in terms of trait differences in depersonalisation and interoception, and the 
sample of individuals reporting conscious vicarious responses to touch in the present 
study was not large enough to make systematic comparisons with conscious vicarious 
pain responders. The extent to which vicarious perception of touch and pain involve 
overlapping mechanisms requires further examination. 
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7.5 Effects of stimulus and perceiver variability on perception of animacy 
 
Perception of animacy is an important factor for self-other distinction, and 
previous work has indicated that vicarious perception of touch and pain may be 
modulated by whether an observed body part is perceived as animate or inanimate 
(Deschrijver et al., 2105; see section 1.2). This is a pertinent research question, since 
vicarious perception is thought to act as a mechanism for social cognition and empathy 
(e.g., Bird & Viding, 2014; de Guzman et al., 2016; Gallese and Goldman, 1998). If 
vicarious perception facilitates the representation and understanding of the states of 
others, then these responses should be specific to other animate beings. Given the 
proposed link between animacy and vicarious perception but the relative lack of direct 
evidence, Chapter 6 aimed to first investigate the processes underlying how animacy is 
perceived, in order to inform future research. This chapter explored stimulus and 
perceiver characteristics which may modulate perception of animacy from faces. Two 
separate studies revealed that animacy is perceived more readily in male faces than 
female faces, and in human faces displaying emotional expressions. Higher Externally-
Oriented Thinking (a component of alexithymia) was also associated with perceiving 
animacy more readily. 
The present studies provide interesting future directions regarding the role of 
animacy perception in modulating vicarious perception, giving rise to testable 
hypotheses for future research. For instance, individual variability was present in the 
threshold at which animacy is perceived. If, as previous evidence has suggested (e.g., 
Deschrijver et al., 2015) vicarious perception is enhanced for animate compared with 
inanimate body parts, then it should also be enhanced for individuals who perceive 
animacy more readily in ambiguous stimuli (i.e., morphed faces around the threshold 
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for detecting animacy). Further, in Experiment One individuals with higher Externally-
Oriented Thinking scores showed lower animacy thresholds, and so it follows that 
vicarious perception in response to ambiguous stimuli may be greater for individuals 
with higher Externally-Oriented Thinking. In Chapter 5 of this thesis self-reported 
conscious vicarious pain was not associated with differences in alexithymia or 
Externally-Oriented Thinking specifically. However, observed pain stimuli in this 
chapter were either clearly human body parts or objects. Responses to ambiguous 
morphed stimuli may be more closely linked to alexithymic traits. In this way, inter-
individual differences in animacy thresholds and Externally-Oriented Thinking provide 
potential explanations for why some (but not all) individuals with MTS report vicarious 
sensations to dummy body parts (Banissy & Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009). Future 
research should consider trait differences such as these in assessing the effect of 
perceived animacy in modulating vicarious perception of touch and pain. 
 
7.6 Theoretical implications for vicarious perception of touch and pain 
 
 The experimental work reported in this thesis contributes to understanding the 
role of self-other distinction in vicarious touch and pain. Support is provided for the 
suggestion that vicarious pain is associated with broader mechanisms beyond 
somatosensory mirroring, as proposed by the Self-Other Theory of MTS (see Ward & 
Banissy, 2015). In particular, processes relevant to maintaining the sense of bodily self, 
discussed in Chapter 5, may play an important role in modulating vicarious pain 
perception. 
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Less support is provided for the involvement of other self-other distinction 
processes in modulating vicarious pain perception. Stimulus variability factors, 
specifically animacy (human vs. dummy) and visual perspective (1st vs. 3rd person) were 
not found to modulate performance on an objective measure of conscious vicarious 
tactile perception in a bottom-up way, in Chapter 3. However, this lack of modulation 
may be explained by the non-synaesthete participant sample who took part in the study. 
Since these individuals were not expected to experience conscious vicarious sensations 
of touch under sham stimulation conditions, any modulating effect of animacy or 
perspective may not be detected on this particular task. Indeed, previous research which 
has recorded neural responses to stimuli varying in animacy (Deschrijver et al., 2015) 
and visual perspective (Canizales et al., 2013) has indicated a modulating effect on 
unconscious vicarious perception of touch and pain. Future research should continue to 
vary self-other distinction factors such as animacy in both a bottom-up (e.g., using 
visibly inanimate body parts) and a top-down way (e.g., using a gloved hand and 
instructing participants that the hand belongs to either a human or a robot, see Liepelt & 
Brass, 2010), and also incorporate individual variability factors relevant to animacy 
perception to effectively assess the modulating effect on vicarious perception. 
  Furthermore, in Chapter 4 self-other control ability was comparable 
across conscious vicarious pain responders and controls, on a task requiring the 
inhibition of other-relevant and promotion of self-relevant representations. Investigating 
the functional role of rTPJ in modulating vicarious tactile perception also provided little 
support for the involvement of self-other control processes. Increasing excitability in 
this region with tDCS has previously been linked with improved self-other control 
ability (Santiesteban et al., 2012; Hogeveen et al., 2015), but did not have a significant 
effect on conscious vicarious tactile perception in Chapter 3. These results contrast with 
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predictions based on Self-Other Theory, and with prior evidence indicating impairments 
in self-other control associated with MTS (Santiesteban et al., 2015b) and conscious 
vicarious pain (Derbyshire et al., 2013).  
Evidence for Threshold and Task Control theories was lacking in the present 
studies. While vicarious pain responder groups did not show differences in self-other 
control ability, these groups also performed comparably on a domain-general inhibitory 
control task. The question of whether previously observed impairments in self-other 
control in conscious vicarious responder groups (Derbyshire et al., 2013; Santiesteban et 
al., 2015b) reflect domain-general deficits in inhibitory control, as proposed by Task 
Control Theory (Heyes & Catmur, 2015), therefore remains unclear. 
Additionally, attempts to modulate vicarious perception using transcranial 
current stimulation in Chapter 3 did not provide strong support for a Threshold Theory 
of conscious vicarious experience (see Ward & Banissy, 2015). Conscious vicarious 
perception of touch did not significantly increase (after correction for multiple 
comparisons) following tDCS or tRNS aimed at increasing cortical excitability in 
primary somatosensory cortex. However, this result does not necessarily conflict with 
Threshold Theory. Factors such as individual variability in responsiveness to 
transcranial current stimulation (see Krause & Kadosh, 2014) may have influenced the 
effectiveness of stimulation in this case. Additionally, even if hyper-excitability in 
somatosensory cortex is involved in MTS, this may not be sufficient to induce the 
condition if other neural mechanisms (such as self-other distinction) are involved. 
The lack of significant effects reported in the experiments of Chapters 3 and 4 
(as discussed above) must be considered in light of a potential lack of statistical power 
with which to identify these effects. In Chapter 3, for instance, data from 22 participants 
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was analysed for Experiment 1 and 23 for Experiment 2. While in each case this is 
fewer than participated in the study being replicated (N = 32; Bolognini et al., 2013), in 
this previous study participants were divided into two groups in terms of the hemisphere 
targeted with tDCS (left or right) whereas in the current experiments all participants 
received stimulation on the same hemisphere. Further, the number of experimental trials 
was increased in the current experiments (180 per task compared with 144), further 
increasing statistical power. Nevertheless, achieved power for the crucial t-test 
comparison between SI and sham RTs in Experiment 2 was only 0.51, insufficient to 
detect significance. Power calculations indicate that a sample size of 44 would be 
required to achieve a 0.80 level of power. With this in mind, it should be noted that 
although the effects reported by Bolognini and colleagues were not replicated here, the 
current results alone do not provide strong evidence for the null hypothesis.  
In Chapter 4 similar problems arise. Power calculations indicate that sufficient 
power (0.96) was achieved for the interaction effect between pain responder group and 
congruency on the imitation-inhibition task where between-group differences were 
predicted, despite a null result being found. While this indicated a sufficient overall 
sample size, the analysis does not account for the unequal groups in the study (Controls 
N = 24, Sensory-Localised N = 10, Affective-Generalised N = 3). Certainly, more than 
3 participants would be required to detect significant differences in the Affective-
Generalised group versus controls. With the obtained ratio of Sensory-Localised to 
control participants, estimated sample sizes of 38 Controls and 16 Sensory-Localised 
responders would be required to achieve 0.8 power for paired comparisons, based on 
effect sizes obtained with mirror-touch synaesthetes in prior work (Santiesteban et al., 
2015b). Again, we can conclude that despite the null results obtained in this Chapter, 
strong evidence for the null hypothesis is not provided. Across both areas of 
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investigation (Chapters 3 and 4) further work with larger sample sizes is warranted in 
order to clarify discrepancies with prior work. 
Based on the evidence presented in this thesis and reviewed here, mechanisms 
associated with the sense of bodily self-awareness appear to be of relevance to 
conscious vicarious perception (at least of painful stimuli). Chapter 5 of this thesis 
presents only a preliminary investigation of bodily self-awareness in relation to 
depersonalisation and interoception, but provides a promising avenue for future 
research. Both MTS and conscious vicarious pain have previously been linked to greater 
plasticity of body representations (Aimola Davies & White, 2013; Cioffi et al., 2016; 
Maister et al., 2013; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010), with these individuals more likely to 
incorporate others into their own bodily self-concept. In line with Self-Other Theory, it 
has been suggested that this broader plasticity of the bodily self may underlie conscious 
vicarious experiences of touch and pain (see Banissy & Ward, 2013; Ward & Banissy, 
2015). Plasticity of the bodily self in MTS and conscious vicarious pain could be further 
studied using existing paradigms from the body representations literature. For instance, 
visual adaptation to a distorted version of one’s own arm (e.g, larger or smaller) alters 
perceived tactile distances on the arm, indicating a rescaling of the implicit body model 
(Taylor-Clarke, Jacobsen & Haggard, 2004; see also Longo, Azañón & Haggard, 2010). 
For individuals with MTS or conscious vicarious pain, an extended plasticity of bodily 
representations to incorporate others may mean that similar effects are observed 
following visual adaptation to another person’s arm. Methods such as these provide 
interesting future directions for research and may provide further insight into bodily 
self-awareness and vicarious perception. 
The theories discussed above, while originally developed to explain vicarious 
tactile perception, have also been adopted to explain vicarious perception of pain. While 
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substantial evidence has been provided in support of these theories in relation to both 
touch and pain (see section 1.3 for an overview), the extent to which underlying 
mechanisms overlap is not clear. For instance, differences in the prevalence rates of 
MTS (approximately 1.6%) and Sensory-Localised vicarious pain (approximately 19%) 
indicate additional factors are relevant in modulating responses to touch and pain 
stimuli. In addition, Chapter 4 of this thesis found no significant impairment in self-
other control ability in conscious vicarious pain responders, while Santiesteban and 
colleagues (2015b) have found that individuals with MTS have a difficulty inhibiting 
representations of others and promoting representations of the self. Future work should 
aim to directly compare these groups to identify the extent to which underlying 
mechanisms (such as those proposed by Threshold Theory and Self-Other Theory) are 
shared in the two conditions, and what individual variability factors dictate whether a 
person will experience, for example, vicarious perception of pain but not touch. 
 
7.6.1 Summary  
 The collected evidence presented in this thesis points towards the involvement 
of atypical self-other distinction processes relevant to the bodily self in conscious 
vicarious perception of touch and pain. This evidence supports previous suggestions of 
broader mechanisms, beyond somatosensory mirroring, involved in these experiences 
(see Self-Other Theory; Ward & Banissy, 2015). The results have implications for 
understanding vicarious perception more generally, suggesting that an ability to 
distinguish between self and other and to maintain a stable sense of bodily self-
awareness allows typical individuals, without vicarious touch or pain, to maintain 
appropriate levels of vicarious perception. The extent to which these mechanisms 
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contribute to other mechanisms of vicarious perception (e.g., for action) and more 
complex social cognitive processes (e.g., empathy) was beyond the scope of this work, 
but remains a necessary avenue for future research. 
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